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In June 2004 the Department of Trade and Industry embarked on a corporate law 
reform process which culminated in the enactment of the Companies Act 71 2008. One 
of the key objectives of the reform process was to provide flexibility in the formation 
and management of companies. As part of this goal, and by the use of the concept of 
alterable and unalterable provisions, the new Act unravelled some shareholder 
protective mechanisms provided for under the old Companies Act 61 of 1973. At the 
same time, it conferred increased powers on the board of directors of a company.  
These changes affect the power dynamic between shareholders and the board of 
directors within the company. Given the significant role of directors within the 
company, these changes give rise to concerns about shareholder protection, especially 
in the light of the conduct of directors in corporate scandals of the recent past. The 
objective of this thesis is to show where there has been a shift in the balance of power 
between shareholders and the board of directors and how this shift affects shareholder 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the enduring issues in corporate governance is the so-called agency problem which, in 
broad terms, refers to the challenge of managing the conflicts of interests that arise ‘whenever 
the welfare of one party, termed the ‘principal,’ depends upon actions taken by another party, 
termed the ‘agent.’ The problem lies in motivating the agent to act in the principal’s interest 
rather than simply in the agent’s own interest.’
1 
In the context of corporate governance the 
agency problem arises from the fact that generally the ownership of the modern public 
company is divorced from its control and management.
2
 The company’s shareholders, who 
are generally regarded as the owners of the company, are the ‘principals.’ However, due to 
widely dispersed shareholding in public companies and, for reasons of corporate efficiency, 
the company is managed and controlled by the directors.
3
In this case the directors are the 
‘agents.’  
The shareholders expect management to maximise the value of the company for the 
benefit of the shareholders but, because the directors may have little or no stake in the 
company, they may not be motivated to maximise shareholder value.
4
 If anything, they may 
be tempted to use their position to benefit themselves at the expense of the shareholders.
5
 
Hence the agency problem highlights the risk that those entrusted with the power to manage 
the company may abuse that power to the detriment of the company’s shareholders. The 
agency problem is at the core of the issues addressed in this thesis relating to the balance of 
power between the board of directors and the shareholders of a company.  
The distribution of corporate power between the two key organs of the company – the 
board of directors and the shareholders as a body, influences the incidence and severity of the 
agency problem in any given company. There is a higher risk that an agent in whom wide 
                                                          
1
  R Kraakman, J Armour, P Davies et al The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional 
Approach 2ed (2009) at 35 
2
 A Berle and G Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property 2 ed (1991) (reprint); See also PL 
Davies ‘The board of directors: composition, structure, duties and powers’ a paper delivered at a conference on 
Company Law Reform in OECD: A Comparative Outlook of Current Trends 7-8 December 2000 Stockholm, 
Sweden organised by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
3
 T Mongalo ‘The myth of director appointment by shareholders and shareholder activism in listed companies, 
(2004) 1 TSAR 96 
4
 Ibid at 98 
5
  R Kraakman, J Armour, P Davies et al op cit note 1 ; See also PL Davies ‘The board of directors: 
composition, structure, duties and powers’ op cit note 2 at 2 
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powers are invested could abuse that power and cause greater harm to the principal than an 
agent who wields limited power over the principals’ affairs.
6
 Therefore the division of 
corporate power is pivotal because it determines the extent to which shareholders of a 
company are able to exert control over the internal governance of their company,
7
 and in 
doing so constrain the abuse of power by company directors. 
It will be shown in this thesis that the old Companies Act 61 of 1973 [hereafter the 
old Act] did not prescribe how corporate powers were to be distributed between the board of 
directors and the shareholders in general meeting, thus the common law applied.  The 
common law left the issue of division of corporate powers to be determined by the 
company’s articles.
8
 At common law it was generally accepted that if the articles exclusively 
conferred certain power on the board of directors then only the board could exercise such 
power and the shareholders in general meeting were precluded from usurping that power.
9
 
Likewise directors could not usurp the power exclusively conferred by the articles on the 
general body of shareholders.
10
 It was also accepted that where certain powers were not 
conferred on the board by the Act or, by the company’s articles, the shareholders in general 
meeting had the inherent or residual authority to exercise such power.  
The new Companies Act 71 of 2008 [hereafter ‘the new Act’] which came into effect 
on 1 May 2011 significantly changes the internal governance of companies in South Africa. It 
appears to adopt a new approach regarding the division of corporate powers. The new Act 
does not leave the division to be determined by the common law but, it appears to make the 
board the dominant power wielding organ of a company. It expressly confers on the board the 
power to manage the business and affairs of the company except to the extent that the 
company’s memorandum of incorporation provides otherwise.
11
  
The changes brought about by the new Act were in pursuit of the objectives of the law 
reform process initiated by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in 2003.
12
 These 
objectives were outlined in a policy paper issued by the DTI titled, ‘South African Company 
                                                          
6
 R Kraakman, J Armour, P Davies et al op cit note 1at 36 
7
 FHI Cassim ‘The division and balance of power between the board of directors and the shareholders: the 
removal of directors.’ (2013) 29 Banking Finance Law Review 151 at 152 
8
 MS Blackman, RD Jooste, GK Everingham et al Commentary on the Companies Act (2002) Volume 2 at 8 – 
293; HS Cilliers, ML Benade, JJ Hening et al Cilliers and Benade Corporate Law (2000) 3ed at 86 
9
 Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co Ltd v Cunninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34 
10
 John Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw [1935] 2 KB 113 at 114 
11
 Section 66(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 
12
 T Mongalo ‘An overview of company law reform in South Africa: from the guidelines to the Companies Act 
2008’ (2010) Acta Juridica xii 
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Law for the 21
st
 Century,’ [hereafter ‘the DTI paper’].
13
 The DTI paper stated that the new 
company law must ‘promote innovation and investment in South African markets and 
companies by providing a predictable and effective regulatory environment and flexibility in 
the formation and management of companies.’
14
 In line with this objective the new Act 
provides flexibility by, inter alia, enabling companies to choose how they wish to organize 
their internal governance.
15
 This is achieved through the use of the concept of ‘alterable 
provisions.’ An alterable provision is a provision of the new Act in which it is expressly 
contemplated that its effect on a particular company may be negated, restricted, limited, 
qualified, extended or otherwise altered in substance or effect by that company's 
Memorandum of Incorporation [hereafter MOI].
16
  
The emphasis on flexibility is clearly evident in the following statement of Professor 
Mongalo who headed up the team tasked with devising the new Act. Widening the discretion 
in the exercise of directors’ power is prominent in this statement:
17
  
‘Even though shareholders should be allowed the flexibility to craft a company 
constitution that addresses their company specific needs, the fundamental principle 
that should underlie the corporate decision-making trajectory is that the business and 
affairs of the corporation should be managed by or be under the direction of the 
board of directors. In that regard, South African company law should invest the board 
of directors with wide discretion to make business decisions and a wide choice of 
means to effect those decisions, subject to limitations generally acceptable in 
corporate law circles,’ (writer’s emphasis). 
 
In its pursuit of flexibility the new Act appears to dispense with certain statutory 
requirements provided for in the old Act.
18
 In the process leading up to the enactment of the 
                                                          
13
Department of Trade and Industry Policy Paper South African Company Law for the 21
st
 Century. (GN 1183 
published in GG 26493 of 23 June 2004) [hereafter ‘the DTI paper’] 
14
 ibid at 9; See also Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Bill, 2008 [B 61- 2008] para 1.1.2(a) 
15
 MM Katz ‘Governance under the Companies Act 71 of 2008: flexibility is the keyword’ (2010)  Acta Juridica 
248 
16
 Section 1 of the new Act. The section also defines an unalterable provision as, ‘a provision of this Act that 
does not expressly contemplate that its effect on any particular company may be negated, restricted, limited, 
qualified, extended or otherwise altered in substance or effect by a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation or 
rules.’ Despite this definition of an unalterable provision, the effect of s 15(2)(a)(iii) of the Act is such that it 
also provides some flexibility for a company to include in its MOI a provision, ‘imposing on the company a 
higher standard, greater restriction, longer period of time or any similarly more onerous requirement, than would 
otherwise apply to the company in terms of an unalterable provision of this Act.’ 
17
 T Mongalo ‘An overview of company law reform in South Africa’ op cit note 12 at xxi 
18
 In general see for example s 85(1) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 which required, in respect of share 
repurchases, that these be authorized in the company’s articles as well as by a special resolution. As will be 
discussed in detail in the  chapter three, generally there are no such requirements in the new Act save for s 48(8) 
which requires that a share repurchase decision be approved by a special resolution of the shareholders where 
the shares are to be acquired from inter alia a director or prescribed officer of the company . The new 
requirements for share repurchases are laid out in s 48 read with s 46 of the new Act.  
 12 
new Act, the DTI paper questioned the value of some of the statutory requirements in the old 
Act arguing that, ‘a number of the statutory requirements add unnecessary formalities to 
relatively simple processes and may be of questionable value, as they do not result in greater 
protection for shareholders, transparency in the market or enhanced efficiency of 
enterprises.’
19
 While this may have been true concerning some of the provisions of the old 
Act, it will be shown that the reform process appears to have jettisoned some provisions that 
were regarded as of paramount importance in the protection of shareholders’ interests such 




Therefore the new Act appears to give more power to directors at the expense of 
shareholder protection. The changes brought about by the new Act affect the power dynamic 
between shareholders and directors, and raise questions as to whether the Act has struck the 
right balance between, on the one hand, its objective of attaining flexibility in the 
management of companies by granting directors a wide discretion and, on the other hand, 
shareholder protection.  
1.2 Objectives of the thesis 
In the light of the above, the objective of this thesis is to show where there has been a shift in 
the balance of power between shareholders and the board of directors and, how this shift 
affects shareholder protection and, whether the shift has been balanced by increased 
shareholder protection. In pursuit of this objective the thesis will discuss the following: 
 the provisions of the Act which give, or appear to give , increased power to the board; 
 if the changes brought about by the new Act affect shareholder protection; and 
 whether the shareholder remedies in the new Act adequately protect shareholders in 
view of the increased powers of the board. 
The subject matter of this thesis falls within the ambit of the subject of corporate governance. 
However, this thesis is not intended to be a broad discourse on corporate governance. Rather, 
it is limited to a discussion of the provisions of the new Act that influence the balance of 
power between the board of directors and shareholders of a company, and how this impacts 
on shareholder protection. This thesis only deals with the protection of shareholders. It does 
not deal with the protection of other securities holders such as debenture holders. The thesis 
                                                          
19
 DTI paper op cit note 13 at 15 
20
 See for instance FHI Cassim, MF Cassim, R Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 2ed (2012) at 222 
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is limited to a discussion of the changes brought about by the new Act with regard to the 
general division of power within the company. It will also focus on the changes made in the 
area of corporate finance, and how they impact on corporate governance, including the 
protection of shareholders. The provisions of the new Act that are designed to make directors 
accountable to shareholders, as well as the provisions designed to encourage shareholder 
activism will also be considered.  
The new Act brought about changes in many other areas apart from those mentioned 
above. For instance, it brought about changes by introducing the business rescue procedure 
contained in chapter 6 of the Act. It also brought about changes relating to offers to the 
public
21
, fundamental transactions such as mergers and amalgamations
22
, disposals of all or a 
greater part of the assets or the undertaking of a company
23
 and schemes of arrangement.
24
 It 
would not be possible to discuss the changes brought about by the new Act in all these areas 
in a thesis such as this. Although these provisions raise issues of shareholder protection, they 
are more regulatory in nature in that they largely direct how fundamental transactions should 
be handled. They are not much concerned with the allocation of power between shareholders 
and the board of directors and shareholders. Therefore the changes in these other areas will 
not be discussed.  
1.3 Relevance of this study 
It appears that in its pursuit of flexibility and efficiency in the management of companies 
South Africa has, to a certain extent, followed a path similar to that taken by various state 
jurisdictions in the USA, such as Delaware, New Jersey and Nevada.
25
 The development of 
American corporate law has been described as ‘one of increasing flexibility for directors and 
decreasing rights for shareholders.’
26
 Yet the pursuit of flexibility in American corporate law 
has not been perceived as a positive development by the majority of academic 
commentators.
27
 Concerns have been raised that it leaves shareholders in a vulnerable 
position. The trend of giving directors more flexibility in the management of companies 
                                                          
21
 Sections 95 to 111 
22
 Section 113 read with ss 115 and 116 
23
 Section 112 read with s 115 
24
 Section 114 read with s 115 
25
 WL. Cary ‘Federalism and corporate law: reflections upon Delaware’ (1974) 83 Yale L.J. 663. See also RK. 
Winter, Jr. ‘State law, shareholder protection, and the theory of the corporation’ (1977) 6 The Journal of Legal 
Studies 251 at 255 
26
 J Velasco ‘The fundamental rights of the shareholder’ (2006) 40 UC Davis L. Rev. 407 at 409 
27
 RK. Winter, Jr. op cit note 25 at 255-256  
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while eroding shareholder’s rights has famously been labelled as ‘the race for the bottom.’
28
 
Commenting on the trend set by several American states in revising their corporate 
legislation with the aim of attaining flexibility and efficiency, it has been said that: 
‘This psychology has been responsible for much of the “modernization” of 
corporation laws everywhere. Today they are described as “enabling” acts – enabling 
management to operate with minimum interference. Of course, many of the 
amendments have been salutary: they have effected simplification and flexibility and 
have eliminated unnecessary and vestigial procedures. At the same time, however, 




The debate generated by the pursuit of flexibility in the United States of America and its 
impact on corporate governance underscores the importance of interrogating the changes 
brought about by the new Act, including the impact these changes have on corporate 
governance in South Africa, in particular on the protection of shareholders. 
One of the stated objectives of the new Act is to balance the rights and obligations
30
 
of shareholders and directors within companies.
31
 If, as postulated in this thesis, the new Act 
gives a wide discretion to directors at the expense of shareholder protection, this would mean 
that the new Act has an adverse impact on corporate governance in South Africa because it 
leaves shareholders in a vulnerable position. Effective corporate governance requires a strong 
legal framework of investor protections.
32
 Without a strong legal framework of investor 
protections the new Act cannot promote the competitiveness and development of the South 
African economy as envisaged in the DTI paper. Indeed, concerns were raised that the 
Companies Bill limits the rights of shareholders and that this could make South Africa 
"notably less attractive" as an investment destination.
33
 Therefore this study is important in 
understanding how the changes brought about by the new Act impact on shareholder 
protection and, hence corporate governance in South Africa.  
                                                          
28




 It is not clear what ‘obligations’ means here in relation to the shareholders of a company. It is arguable that 
since some of the purposes listed in s 7 of the Act include, ‘encouraging transparency and high standards of 
corporate governance…’ and to ‘encourage the efficient and responsible management of companies,’ 
presumably the shareholders have an obligation to demonstrate responsible shareholding by actively engaging 
with the company concerning the governance of the company as required by, for example, Principle 2 of the 
Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa (CRISA) – see the discussion on shareholder activism in chapter 
6. However, the Act does not expressly impose such a duty/obligation on shareholders in relation to the 
company in the way that, for example, s 76 imposes duties on directors of the company. 
31
 Section 7(i) of the new Act 
32
 SS. Cohen and G Boyd Corporate Governance and Globalization 1ed (2000) at 74 
33
 A Crotty, “New Law Will Scare off Investors”, Business Report, available at 
http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fSetId=662&fSectionId=552&fArticleId=4563936, accessed on 20 August 
2008. 
 15 
Moreover, major corporate scandals in the recent past both locally and abroad have 
concentrated the public’s attention on the conduct of directors and the internal governance of 
companies. Corporate scandals abroad involved high profile American companies such as 
Enron, WorldCom and Arthur Andersen.
34
 South Africa too has suffered its own share of 
corporate scandals involving companies such as, Masterbond, Leisurenet and Fidentia Asset 
Management.
35
 While the causes of the scandals can be attributed to diverse factors, in some 
cases the boards of directors were partly to blame. For instance, in the Enron and Fidentia 
cases the respective boards of directors were found to have failed to act with due care and 
skill in the observance of their duties.
36
 It was also found in the Enron case that, ‘the 
independence of the Enron Board of Directors was compromised by financial ties between 
the company and certain Board members.’
37
 In the Fidentia case some of the directors were 
also found to have had conflicts of interests.
38
 In the light of this a question arises as to 
whether it is desirable to accord directors a wide discretion in the management of companies 
while seemingly disempowering the company’s shareholders as the new Act appears to do.  
The purposes of the new Act include, ‘to promote the development of the South 
African economy by encouraging transparency and high standards of corporate governance 
as appropriate given the significant role of enterprises within the social and economic life of 
the nation,’ and also ‘to encourage the efficient and responsible management of companies’ 
(writer’s emphasis). Therefore this research is valuable because it will highlight any 
weaknesses in the new Act which impact negatively on corporate governance in South Africa 
and hence frustrate the realisation of the purposes of the Act.  
This study is also important in that it will highlight the extent to which South African 
corporate law compares with the law in other comparative jurisdictions on the specific issues 
under discussion in this thesis. This is significant because one of the objectives of the 
                                                          
34
 JW. Salacuse ‘Corporate governance in the new century’ (2004) 25 Company Lawyer 69 
35
 See C Goredema South Africa: On Pension Fund Plundering Fields (2007), available at 
http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/south-africa-on-pension-fund-plundering-fields, accessed on 28 February 
2015; S Temkin ‘South Africa: Taxing time for boards after corporate scandals’ Businessday (8 January 2003) 
Available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200301080103.html, accessed  2 March 2012 
36
 In the case of Enron see ‘The Role of the Board of Directors in Enron’s Collapse,’ A Report by The 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the United States 
Senate (8 July 2002) at 3, available at  https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-107SPRT80393/pdf/CPRT-
107SPRT80393.pdf. accessed 5 July 2016. In the case of Fidentia Asset Management see the Financial Services 
Board Inspection Report (FSP No:569) Fidentia Asset Management (Pty) Ltd (2007) para 15, available at 
http://www.moneyweb.co.za/mw/action/media/downloadFile?media_fileid=506, accessed on 14 February 2015  
37
 See ‘The Role of the Board of Directors in Enron’s Collapse,’ ibid 
38
 See the Financial Services Board Inspection Report (FSP No:569) op cit note 36 at 48 
 16 




Therefore, this thesis does not only contribute to the body of knowledge on corporate 
governance in South Africa but, it also highlights weaknesses in the new Act and makes 
recommendations on how the new Act could be improved in order that the objectives of the 
corporate law reform process may be fully realized. 
  
1.4 Research design and methodology 
This study relies mainly on secondary data in the form of books and journal articles as well as 
primary sources such as legislation and case law. Other important sources relied on include 
reports of various committees and commissions, as well as reports of non-governmental 
organizations. Library and desk-top research are the primary means by which these sources 
were accessed. 
The methodology used in investigating the issues raised in this thesis encompasses 
various approaches. These include the historical and comparative approaches to research. A 
critical approach is utilised to analyse the relevant provisions of the new Act and the changes 
brought about by the new Act. The historical approach is used where knowledge of the 
historical context of the relevant provision or concept under discussion is crucial to 
understanding the nature of the changes brought about by the new Act.
40
  
In discussing various provisions of the Act this thesis also draws on the experience of 
other comparative jurisdictions. Hence the comparative approach is used to highlight the 
similarities and differences between South African law and foreign law and the significance 
of those differences. The experience of, and developments in other foreign jurisdictions are 
pertinent to this thesis because, as noted earlier, one of the objectives of the corporate law 
reform process was to ‘ensure compatibility and harmonisation with best practice 
jurisdictions internationally.’
41
 Moreover, s 5(2) of the Act allows a court to have regard to 
foreign company law when interpreting any provision of the new Act. Thus a comparative 
analysis is crucial in understanding the provisions of the new Act. 
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 DTI paper op cit note 13 at 9 
40
 See for example the discussion on the duty of care in chapter four 
41
 DTI paper op cit note 13 at 9 
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The foreign jurisdictions chosen for comparative purposes in this thesis include 
Canada, England, Australia, New Zealand as well as various states in the United States of 
America including Delaware, New York and California. The revised Model Business 
Corporations Act in the USA will also be used for comparative purposes. These jurisdictions 
have been chosen not only because they are common law jurisdictions like South Africa but, 
more importantly the law in these jurisdictions influenced the development of the new Act.
42
 
A comparison with English law is pertinent given that, in the past the development of South 
African law was largely influenced by English law although this influence has waned, 
particularly in the new Act. Jurisdictions such as Canada, Australia and Delaware, New York 
and California were also chosen for comparative purposes because some of the provisions of 
the new Act are similar to the provisions of the law in one or other of these jurisdictions.
43
 
For example, in Mouritzen v Greystones Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another
44
 the court noted 
that s 165 of the new Act, which deals with the derivative action, was modelled on s 237 of 
the Australian Corporations Act of 2001. A further example, the statutory business judgment 




It is important to note that the approach taken in relation to the comparative aspect is 
that the legal position in comparative jurisdictions will not be set out separately. Rather, 
reference to a foreign jurisdiction will be made where appropriate in discussing the relevant 
provision of the new Act. Discussing the position in comparative jurisdictions separately 
would make this thesis too long and, in any event is not necessary in a thesis in which so 
many different aspects are covered. 
1.5 Structure and overview of thesis 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters and different aspects of the thesis topic are 
addressed in each of the chapters. Listed below are the chapter headings with a brief outline 
of the major issues dealt with in each of those chapters. 
 
                                                          
42
 DM Davies Book Review of Contemporary Company Law by FHI Cassim (Ed) et al (2011)128 SALJ  791 
43
 K Van der Linde Aspects of the regulation of share capital and distributions to shareholders (unpublished 
LLD thesis, University of South Africa, 2008) 
44
 Mouritzen v Greystones Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another 2012 (5) SA 74 at 88 
45
 The business judgment rule is derived from American case-law and it has been codified in some jurisdictions 
such as Australia. See DM. Branson ‘The rule that isn’t a rule – the business judgement rule’ (2002) 36 
Valparaiso University Law Review 631 at 633. Available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=346080&rec=1&srcabs=711122, accessed 20 March 2015. 
See also FHI Cassim, MF Cassim, R Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law op cit note 20 at 563 
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As seen above chapter 1 introduces the research topic and the objectives of the thesis. It 
provides background information as well as the context or setting of the research problem. It 
explains the importance of undertaking this research and the research methodology used in 
examining the research objectives. 
 
Chapter 2 –The division of powers within the company 
Chapter 2 discusses the changes brought about by the new Act regarding the division of 
powers between the key organs of the company namely the shareholders as a body and the 
board of directors. It highlights how the allocation of power is now prescribed in the new Act 
as opposed to being set out in a company’s constitution as was the case under the old Act.  
The chapter considers whether this default division of powers can be changed by a 
company’s MOI. The power of directors to make rules for the company and to amend the 
company’s constitution is also discussed in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 3 – Directors’ Powers in the Area of Corporate Finance 
Chapter 3 focuses on specific powers of directors regarding certain corporate transactions. 
The provisions of the new Act which give directors power in relation to the authorisation of 
shares, share issues, share repurchases and distributions are critically examined and compared 
with the corporate finance provisions of the old Act in order to highlight the changes brought 
about by the new Act. The implications of these changes for shareholders are also discussed 
in this chapter.  
 
Chapter 4 –Directors’ duties and liability 
In the light of the maxim that ‘with power comes responsibility’ chapter four examines the 
provisions of the new Act designed to make directors accountable for the exercise of their 
powers. The duties and liability imposed on directors by the new Act are discussed in this 
chapter. Also discussed are the related indemnity provisions. 
 
Chapter 5 – Remedies: The derivative action and the oppression remedy 
Chapter 5 discusses two important shareholder remedies provided for in the new Act namely, 
the derivative action and the oppression remedy. The chapter discusses the changes in the 
new Act in relation to these remedies highlighting their strengths and weakness. The 
importance of these remedies as tools for holding directors accountable is discussed as well 
as their impact on the balance of power between shareholders and directors. 
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Chapter 6 – Other Remedies and the removal of directors 
Chapter 6 continues the discussion on shareholder remedies by focusing on other remedies 
such as, the dissenting shareholders’ appraisal remedy and the application to have a director 
declared delinquent or placed on probation. It also considers the right of shareholders to 
appoint and remove directors in terms of the Act. The effectiveness of the remedies provided 
for in the new Act is dependent on whether shareholders make use of them, hence chapter 6 
also discusses the problem of shareholder apathy and, how the Act attempts to encourage 
shareholder activism.  
 
Chapter 7 – Findings, conclusion and recommendations 
Chapter seven concludes the thesis by summarizing the findings of the research. 
Recommendations on how the Act may be amended to address the shortcomings highlighted 
by the research are made in this chapter.  
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In pursuit of the objectives of this thesis this chapter examines the changes brought about by 
the new Act regarding the general division of powers in a company between the board of 
directors and the shareholders as a body. Also considered in this chapter is the power 
conferred on the board of directors to amend a company’s constitution and to make rules for 
the company.  
When Lord Thurlow noted that a company ‘had no soul to be damned and no body to 
be kicked,’
1
 he was alluding to the well accepted concept that a company is a juristic person, 
consequent to which it cannot act for itself; corporate actions have to be performed through 
human agents. Amongst other human agents, a company generally acts through two principal 
organs namely, the shareholders as a body and the board of directors.
2
 These two organs play 
a fundamental role in the governance of a company and the relationship between them is 
regarded as the most important relationship in the internal corporate structure.
3
 Corporate 
governance is therefore significantly influenced by the distribution of power between these 
organs.
4
   
2.2.1 Division of powers in terms of the old Act 
In order to provide context for understanding the changes brought about by the new Act 
regarding the division of corporate powers this section discusses the legal position prior to the 
new Act coming into effect.   
Generally, the old Act did not stipulate how management powers were to be divided 
between the board of directors and the shareholders.
5
 Hence the division of corporate power 
was governed by the common law which allowed companies to determine the distribution of 
                                                          
1
 Edward, First Baron Thurlow 1731-1806 quoted in JC. Coffee Jr. “No soul to damn: no body to kick”: an 
unscandalized inquiry into the problem of corporate punishment’ (1981) 71 Michigan Law Review 386 
2
 HS Cilliers, ML Benade, JJ Hening et al Cilliers and Benade Corporate Law (2000) 3ed 84; D Davis, F 
Cassim, W Geach (eds) et al Companies and other Business Structures in South Africa (2009) 61 
3
 HS Cilliers, ML Benade, JJ Henning et al op cit note 2  
4
 MM Katz ‘Governance under the Companies Act 71 of 2008: flexibility is the key word’ (2010) Acta Juridica 
248 at 258 
5
 MM Katz op cit note 4 
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power by virtue of provisions in their articles of association.
6
  Most companies adopted 
article 59 or 60 of tables A and B respectively.
7
 Articles 59 and 60 had similar wording and, 
for present purposes the relevant part of both articles provided that: 
'The business of the company shall be managed by the directors who... may exercise 
all such powers of the company as are not by the Act or by these articles required to 
be exercised by the company in general meeting...' 
Therefore, under the old Act the board of directors derived power to manage the business of 
the company from a company’s articles. The power to manage the company’s business was 
effectively delegated by the shareholders to the board of directors by way of a provision in 
the company’s articles.
8
 Where certain functions and powers were conferred on an organ such 
as the shareholders in general meeting or, the board of directors, those functions and powers 
could be exercised by that organ only.
9
 Thus it was accepted that, ‘unless the articles of the 
company expressly so provide, members in general meeting could neither exercise powers 
conferred upon the directors by the articles nor control the directors’ exercise of such 
powers.’
10
 Further, where certain powers were not conferred on the directors, whether 
expressly or impliedly, by the Companies Act or the company’s articles, such powers were 
considered by the common law to vest in the members in general meeting; in other words 
shareholders had an inherent, residual or implied power.
11
 In Woolworths Ltd v Kelly the 
court said that the primary or, at least, the residual organ for exercising the powers of the 
company is the shareholders in general meeting.
12
 
                                                          
6
 MS Blackman, RD Jooste, GK Everingham et al Commentary on the Companies Act (2002) Volume 2 
[Revision Service 6] 8 – 293; Cilliers & Benade et al op cit note 2 at 86 
7
 Tables A and B of Schedule 1 of the old Companies Act 61 of 1973. Table A contained model articles for a 
public company while Table B contained model articles for a private company. Hence article 59 of table A was 
adopted by most public companies while most private companies adopted article 60 of table B. 
8
 Louw v Wp Kooperasie Bpk 1991(3) SA 593 (A) 602.  
9
 Scott v Scott [1943] 1 All ER 582; Cilliers and Benade et al op cit note 2 at 87; JJ Du Plessis ‘Directors' duty to 
use their powers for proper or permissible purposes’ (2004) 16 SA Merc LJ 308 at 311- 312 
10
 See MS Blackman ‘Article 59 and the distribution of powers in a company’ (1973) 90 SALJ 262 wherein he 
discusses, amongst other things, the provisions of article 59 of Table A of the South African Companies Act 61 
of 1973 and a line of English cases such as Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co Ltd v Cunninghame 
[1906] 2 CH 34 (CA) that dealt with the interpretation of a similar provision in the then English Companies Act 
of 1948. In this particular article MS Blackman questioned this generally accepted view. 
11
 MS Blackman, R D Jooste & G K Everingham et al op cit note 6, Volume 1 at 7 – 19  
12
 Woolworths Ltd v Kelly (1991) 4 ACSR 431 CA (NSW) 450. See also Gohlke & Scheneider v Westies 
Minerale (Edms) Bpk 1970(2) SA 685 (A); See also Ben-Tovim v Ben-Tovim 2001 (3) SA 1074  (C) where the 
court said that where the directors cannot or will not exercise powers vested in them the general meeting may do 
so. 
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2.2.2.1 Division of powers in terms s 66(1) of the new Act 
Whereas the old Act did not prescribe how power was to be divided between the shareholders 
and the board of directors,
13
 s 66(1) of the new Act provides that: 
‘The business and affairs of a company must be managed by or under the direction of 
its board, which has the authority to exercise all of the powers and perform any of the 
functions of the company, except to the extent that this Act or the company’s 
Memorandum of Incorporation provides otherwise.’ 
This statutorily defined division of powers is new but not unique to South Africa. Some 
foreign jurisdictions also have provisions similar to s 66(1). For instance, s 8.01(b) of the US 
Model Business Corporations Act (hereafter ‘the MBCA’) provides that,  
‘All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of the board of 
directors of the corporation, and the business and affairs of the corporation shall be 
managed by or under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of its board of 
directors, subject to any limitation set forth in the articles of incorporation or in an 
agreement authorized under section 7.32.’ 
The Delaware General Corporations Law also provides that, ‘the business and affairs of every 
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a 
board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of 
incorporation.’
14
 Canadian law provides that ‘subject to any unanimous shareholder 
agreement, the directors shall manage, or supervise the management of, the business and 
affairs of a corporation.’
15
 Similarly s 198A (1) and (2) of the Australian Corporations Act 
provide that, 
‘(1) The business of a company is to be managed by or under the direction of the 
directors. 
(2) The directors may exercise all the powers of the company except any powers that 
this Act or the company’s constitution (if any) requires the company to exercise in 
general meeting.’ 
 
It is pertinent to note that the statutory division of power in the foreign jurisdictions cited 
above is not absolute. For instance, the division of power in s 8.01(b) of the MBCA is subject 
to any limitations set in the articles of incorporation or, in a shareholder’s agreement 
                                                          
13
 MM Katz op cit note 4 at 258 
14
 Section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporations Law.  This statute is referenced here because most 
major publicly traded companies in the US are incorporated in Delaware thus making Delaware an important 
corporate law jurisdiction for comparative purposes. 
15
 Section 102(1) of the Canadian Business Corporations Act (RSC 1985, c C-44)  
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authorized under s 7.32. Likewise, s 198A (1) and (2) of the Australian Corporations Act is a 
replaceable rule which may be modified by an appropriately worded provision in a 
company’s constitution. Hence both s 8.01(b) and s 198(A)(1) and (2) are flexible; they allow 
companies to allocate corporate powers as they deem fit. It is significant that the 
memorandum on the objects of the Companies Bill, 2008 – which in amended form 
eventually became the new Companies Act – states that, ‘Part F of Chapter 4 presents all 
matters relating to company governance, introducing changes to enhance flexibility (writer’s 
emphasis), while retaining much of the existing regime designed to promote transparency and 
accountability.’
16
 Section 66(1) falls under part F of Chapter 4 of the new Act. Therefore, it 
seems that s 66(1) was introduced not only to align South African law with the law in other 
industrialised nations but also to enhance flexibility.  
Comments by Professor Katz concerning the new Act appear to lend credence to the 
view that the pursuit of flexibility motivated the changes made by s 66(1).
17
 He points out 
that the introduction of the concept of alterable provisions provides substantial flexibility for 
companies in regulating their own governance.
18
 More importantly, Katz states that the 
introduction of the concept of alterable provisions in the new Act is Parliament’s response to 
the universal challenge of trying to regulate big and small companies under a single statute.  
Section 66(1) is an alterable provision in that it is a provision the language of which 
expressly contemplates that its effect on a particular company may be negated, restricted, 
limited, qualified, extended or otherwise altered in substance or effect by that company’s 
Memorandum of Incorporation [hereafter ‘MOI’].
19
 The flexibility in this case arises from the 
fact that the company could choose to be governed by the default division of powers in s 
66(1) or, it could distribute its power differently by means of a provision in its MOI.  
 Prima facie, s 66(1) appears to have shifted the balance of power in favour of 
directors because in the past the default position was that shareholders had original powers 
but, under s 66(1) the default position is that the board has original power to manage the 
company’s business. Although this may appear to be a shift in the balance of power, it must 
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 Item 8 of the Memorandum on the objects of the Companies Bill,2008 [B 61D – 2008] 
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 MM Katz op cit note 4. It is reported that Michael Katz provided some local input to the drafters of the new 
Companies Act, see P Sutherland ‘The state of company law in South Africa’ (2012) 1 Stellenbosch University 




 See section 1 of the new Act where an alterable provision is defined as ‘a provision of this Act in which it is 
expressly contemplated that its effect on a particular company may be negated, restricted, limited, qualified, 
extended or otherwise altered in substance or effect by that company’s Memorandum of Incorporation.’ 
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be remembered that the board’s power in terms of s 66(1) is subject to what is contained in 
the MOI hence shareholders have control over the board’s power. Moreover, it is has been 
observed that, ‘section 66(1) is a codification of what is, and has for many years been, 
common practice, namely for the shareholders to delegate to the board of directors the power 
to manage and control the company’s business operations…’
 20
 This view is based on the fact 
that the wording of section 66(1) is similar to Articles 59 and 60 of tables A and B, by means 
of which power was delegated to the board under the old Act.
21
  Therefore it is submitted that 
s 66(1) has changed the default position regarding the division powers in a company albeit 
this default position can be changed by the shareholders via the company’s MOI. 
It is noteworthy that there are some nuanced differences between the wording of s 
66(1) and Articles 59 and 60 of tables A and B. Whereas articles 59 and 60 gave power to the 
board to manage the business of the company
22
, s 66(1) empowers the board to manage the 
business and affairs of the company. In the case of Ex parte Russlyn Construction (Pty) Ltd
23
 
the court had to decide whether a decision taken by a company’s directors to liquidate the 
company, without a shareholder’s resolution to that effect, was one taken in the management 
of the company’s business pursuant to the power granted by article 60 of table B. The 
applicant in that case had argued that a decision to liquidate the company was one taken in 
the management of its business and was therefore authorised by the articles. Didcott J, 
rejected the applicant’s argument and held that the termination of a company's very existence 
was not the managing of the business of the company but rather the antithesis of 
management. He went on to say that in suggesting that the directors’ power to manage the 
business of the company encompasses the power to liquidate the company, the applicant’s 
argument: 
‘…attaches the wrong label to the power of management. It is a power to manage the 
company's business. It is not a power to manage the company's 'affairs'. Nowhere 
does the article refer to the 'affairs' of the company. The word is not used. Perhaps a 
power to manage all the 'affairs' of the company would be wider, were it given, than 
the power to manage the company's business alone.’
24
(Writer’s own emphasis) 
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 See para 2.2.1 above for a quote of the relevant part of Articles 59 and 60 
23
 Ex parte Russlyn Construction (Pty) Ltd 1987(1) SA 33 (D) 
24
 ibid at 36-37; See also Ex Parte New Seasons Auto Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2008 (4) SA 341 (W) 
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The words of Didcott J, quoted above indicate that the power to manage the ‘affairs’ of the 
company is wider than the power to manage the company’s business alone. Therefore, it has 
been said that s 66(1), 
‘gives the board wider powers than was previously the case… the power extends to 
both the “business” and the “affairs” of the company. The 1973 Act had no similar 
provision and the division of powers was regulated in the company’s articles of 




In the light of the foregoing it is submitted that depending on the provisions of a particular 
company’s MOI relating to the division of powers, the change brought about by s 66(1) could 
potentially lead to a shift in the balance of power. If a company’s MOI is silent concerning 
the division of powers the default position in s 66(1) would apply with the consequence that 
the board would have the power to manage the business and affairs of the company. And, as 
noted above, this power is wider than the power granted to boards in terms of articles 59 and 
60 of tables A and B of the old Act.   
2.2.2.2 Alterability of s 66(1) 
It was noted earlier
26
 that s 66(1) is an alterable provision since it authorises the board to 
exercise all the powers and functions of the company ‘except to the extent that this Act or the 
company’s Memorandum of Incorporation provides otherwise’ (writer’s 
emphasis).Therefore, it would appear that s 66(1) provides flexibility for shareholders to curb 
the board’s powers by means of an appropriately worded provision in the MOI. 
It is submitted that the extent to which the MOI could curtail the board’s power 
depends on how the relevant provision in the MOI is drafted. It is noteworthy that in addition 
to s 66(1), other provisions of the Act expressly and exclusively confer specific powers 
relating to the management of the company’s business and affairs on the board. For instance, 
s 46(1)(a)(ii) and s 48(2)(a) expressly empower the board to authorise distributions to 
shareholders and to authorise share repurchases respectively. Both ss 46 and 48 are 
unalterable provisions. Therefore it would seem that it would not be permissible for a 
provision in the MOI to take away the powers expressly conferred on the board by ss 46 and 
48. Any such provision in the MOI would be inconsistent with the Act and therefore void in 
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 See M Havenga ‘Directors’ exploitation of corporate opportunities and the Companies Act 71 of 2008’ 
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terms of s 15(1) of the Act
27
 to the extent that it takes away managerial powers which the Act 
exclusively confers on the board.  
Arguably, and at most, it would be permissible to insert a provision in the MOI 
requiring that any action taken by the directors in the exercise of their powers must be 
approved by the shareholders.
28
 Such a provision would be in accord with s 15(2)(a)(iii) 
which provides that, the MOI ‘may include any provision imposing on the company a higher 
standard, greater restriction, longer period of time or any similarly more onerous requirement 
than would otherwise apply to the company in terms of an unalterable provision of this Act.’  
Thus a provision in the MOI may subject some of the board’s management powers to a 
shareholder veto on the basis of s 15(2)(a)(iii). In certain places the new Act itself subjects 
some of the board’s power to a veto by shareholders in general meeting. For example, section 
115 requires shareholder approval for certain fundamental transactions which the board may 
propose.  
An interesting question is whether, save for those powers expressly and exclusively 
conferred on the board by provisions of the Act, such as s 46(1)(a)(ii) and s 48(2)(a), the MOI 
could, or should deprive the board of all the power conferred on it by s 66(1) to manage the 
business and affairs of the company. Commenting on s 66(1) Delport et al state that, 
“whether the memorandum of incorporation can exclude all management functions is 
uncertain. It should be noted that the section places a positive obligation on the directors – i.e. 
to manage the company.”
29
 This statement suggests Delport et al doubt that it would be 
permissible for a provision in the MOI to take away all managerial power from the board. 
Their reasoning appears to be that s 66(1) obligates the board to manage the company, 
therefore taking away all the board’s managerial powers would be inconsistent with the 
obligation placed on the board. Prima facie, s 66(1) imposes a legal duty on the board to the 
extent that it provides that, ‘The business and affairs of the company must be managed by or 
under the direction of its board…,’ (writer’s emphasis). Focusing on this part of the provision 
only could lead to the conclusion that this obligation cannot be diminished by a provision in 
the MOI taking away all the board’s managerial powers. However, it is submitted that it 
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 See the discussion in chapter three on distributions 
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would be erroneous to come to this conclusion based on an incomplete reading of s 66(1). To 
fully understand the import of a provision one must interpret it as a whole and not just focus 
on a part of it.   
When read in its totality it becomes clear that s 66(1) provides that ‘the business and 
affairs of the company must be managed by or under the direction of the board, which has the 
authority to exercise all of the powers and perform any of the functions of the company, 
except to the extent that this Act or the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation provides 
otherwise,’ (writer’s emphasis). Thus even though s 66(1) imposes a duty on the board to 
manage the business and affairs of the company, and to exercise all the powers of the 
company, the latter part of the provision acknowledges that the MOI may deprive the board 
of its management powers. Both the duty and powers of the board in terms s 66(1) are subject 
to what is provided for in the Act or the MOI.
30
  
The question that remains is whether, despite the fact that s 66(1) permits it, the MOI 
should take away all the board’s managerial powers? It is submitted that there are practical, 
policy and legal considerations that militate against the MOI taking away all of the board’s 
managerial powers, especially in the context of widely public companies. From a practical 
standpoint the question that arises is what purpose would be served by taking away the 
management functions and powers of the board? If the MOI deprived the board of its powers 
those powers would of necessity have to be allocated to the shareholders as a body since they 
constitute an organ of the company. However, the practical and commercial reality, 
especially in public companies where shares are widely held, is that it is impossible for 
shareholders to meet frequently for the purposes of passing resolutions in order to exercise 
day-to-day control over the business and affairs of the company.
31
   
Further, because of their professional knowledge, experience and skills in business, 
directors are usually better placed than most of the shareholders to manage the business and 
affairs of the company.
32
 The general meeting of shareholders makes for an unwieldy 
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decision making body, comprised of individuals who are likely to have little or no experience 
in managing a company. On the other hand, the board of directors is a small manageably 
sized body comprised of individuals with the necessary experience to direct the company. In 
the widely accepted code of corporate governance principles in South Africa it is stipulated 
that, ‘the governing body [the board] should serve as the focal point and custodian of 
corporate governance in the organisation.’
33
  Hence a board is needed to manage the business 
and affairs of the company. That is why under the old Act shareholders routinely delegated 
the power to manage the business of the company to the board even though the old Act did 
not prescribe this. Moreover, ‘it is not feasible to place too many restraints on the powers of 
the board as it is designed to manage the affairs of the company and it can do that effectively 
only if it is granted a certain degree of independence.’
34
 Thus taking away all of the board’s 
managerial powers would defeat the rationale for appointing a board in the first place. 
From a policy perspective it would appear that divesting the board of all its 
management powers would run contrary to the purposes of the new Act. The Act aims to 
inter alia, ‘encourage the efficient and responsible management of companies.’
35
 Realisation 
of this aim would be inhibited if the power to manage the business of the company is taken 
away from the board and invested in the shareholders as a body because as noted above, the 
shareholders as a body is not an efficient decision making organ.  
It is also clear from the words of Prof Mongalo quoted below that one of the 
underlying policy considerations concerning the division of powers in the new Act was that 
notwithstanding any flexibility provided for in the Act, ultimately the power to manage the 
company should reside with the board. Prof Mongalo states that the designers of the 
guidelines for the corporate law reform process acknowledged inter alia that,
36
  
‘Even though shareholders should be allowed the flexibility to craft a company 
constitution that addresses their company specific needs, the fundamental principle 
that should underlie the corporate decision-making trajectory is that the business and 
affairs of the corporation should be managed by or be under the direction of the board 
of directors. In that regard, South African company law should invest the board of 
directors with wide discretion to make business decisions and a wide choice of means 
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to effect those decisions, subject to limitations generally acceptable in corporate law 
circles.’  
In the light of this background information it would seem that a provision in the MOI which 
takes away the board’s management power and re-allocates it to shareholders would go 
against the policy consideration underlying the enactment of s 66(1). It is questionable 
whether a provision in the MOI that takes away all the board’s management powers would, in 
the words of Prof Mongalo be ‘generally acceptable in corporate law circles.’
37
 A different 
but related question is the extent to which the common law principle that, in the case of a 
deadlock in the directors’ meeting, powers of management revert by default to the 
shareholders meeting
38
 can be reconciled with s 66(1). It is submitted that this common law 
principle can and ought to be read into s 66(1) in circumstances where there is deadlock 
amongst the directors concerning the management of the company. For practical reasons it is 
imperative that if directors are unable or unwilling to act then another organ – shareholders in 
general meeting – ought to have residual power to exercise the board’s managerial powers in 
those circumstances.
39
 It is further submitted that reading this principle into s 66(1) where the 
directors are deadlocked is justifiable on the basis of necessity or business efficacy. Moreover  
reading the principle into s 66(1) in those circumstances would not be inconsistent with the 
Act given that s 66(1) is an alterable provision. Of course the power of the shareholders in 
general meeting to intervene in such circumstances must be read in only to the extent it is 
necessary to resolve the deadlock and to enable the company to function efficiently. Doing 
otherwise would not be in accord with the policy considerations referred to in Prof Mongalo’s 
statement quoted earlier and hence could be considered as being inconsistent with the Act. 
Another aspect that militates against the MOI taking away all the managerial powers 
of the board is the relationship between the exercise of the directorial powers and the 
observance of the statutory duties of directors. Sections 75 and 76 of the new Act impose a 
number of duties on company directors. The term ‘director’ is defined in the new Act as 
including any person occupying the position of a director.
40
 It has been observed that the 
definition of the term ‘director’ in the new Act is wide enough to include both de jure and de 
facto directors.
41
 It is submitted that if the MOI were to re-allocate the board’s managerial 
power to shareholders as a body this would result in the shareholders occupying the position 
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of a director. As such they would be obligated to comply with the statutory duties imposed on 
directors of a company by the new Act. They would also be at risk of being held liable in 
terms of s 77 of the new Act for breach of those statutory duties. Apart from this risk, there is 
also the question of how the reallocation of power could affect the directors’ ability to 
comply with their statutory duties as discussed in paragraph 2.3.3 below.
42
 
In the light of the above it would appear that it is undesirable for the MOI of a widely 
held public company, to take away or, eliminate all the board powers. However the situation 
is different with regard to small closely held private companies, such as family owned 
businesses. In such companies the directors and shareholders of the company are usually the 
same individuals and, it is not unusual for such companies to be run as quasi-partnerships.
43
 
The default governance arrangement provided for by s 66(1) may not be suitable for such 
small family owned businesses and therefore there is need to permit such companies to come 
up with arrangements that suit them. Albeit s 66(1) is alterable, it is debatable whether the 
boards’ powers could be totally excluded by the MOI as observed earlier. It is submitted that 
there is a practical need to ensure that s 66(1) is worded in such a way that it permits the MOI 
of a small closely held private company to exclude or eliminate the board’s powers.  In this 
regard it is interesting to note the approach in the MBCA regarding the division of powers. 
As noted in paragraph 2.2.2 above, s 8.01(b) of the MBCA empowers a corporation’s board 
to manage the business and affairs of the corporation ‘subject to any limitation set forth in the 
articles of incorporation or in an agreement authorized under section 7.32.’ Although s 
8.01(b) is similar to our s 66(1), it is significantly different in that, in addition to subjecting 
the board’s power to limitations in the articles, s 8.01(b) also provides that the board’s power 
may be limited by a shareholder’s agreement. Any limitations to the board’s power contained 
in the articles would have to comply with the MBCA
44
 but, notably, a provision in a 
shareholder’s agreement may validly limit the board’s power in a manner that is inconsistent 
with the Model Act. For instance, s 7.32(a)(1); (2) and (8) provide that: 
‘An agreement among the shareholders of a corporation that complies with this 
section is effective among the shareholders and the corporation even though it is 
inconsistent with one or more other provisions of this Act in that it: 
(1) eliminates the board of directors or restricts the discretion or powers of the board 
of directors; 
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(2) governs the authorization or making of distributions whether or not in proportion 
to ownership of shares, subject to the limitations in section 6.40… 
(8) otherwise governs the exercise of the corporate powers or the management of the 
business and affairs of the corporation or the relationship among the shareholders, the 
directors and the corporation, or among any of them, and is not contrary to public 
policy.’(writer’s emphasis) 
 
The rationale for allowing a provision in the shareholders’ agreement to limit the board’s 
power in a manner that is inconsistent with the Act can be gathered from the official 
commentary on s 8.01(a) of the MBCA which states that, 
‘Obviously, some form of governance is necessary for every corporation. The board 
of directors is the traditional form of corporate governance but it need not be the 
exclusive form. Patterns of management may also be tailored to specific needs in 
connection with family controlled enterprises, wholly or partially owned subsidiaries, 
or corporate joint ventures through a shareholder agreement under section 7.32.’ 
Hence s 7.32 ensures that companies, especially small closely held private companies, are not 
shackled by the default division of powers in the MBCA. Companies can easily exclude, 
restrict or qualify the board’s power by means of a provision in the shareholders’ agreement 
without being concerned that the provision in the shareholders’ agreement could be declared 
invalid for being inconsistent with the Model Act. In this regard the MBCA is more flexible 
than our Act which only allows the board’s powers to be limited by a provision of the MOI in 
terms of s 66(1). And as observed above, any such provision in the MOI limiting the board’s 
power must be consistent with the Act otherwise it will be declared invalid in terms of s 15(1) 
for being inconsistent with the Act. Likewise a similar provision in a shareholder’s agreement 
would also be void in terms of s 15(7).
45
 The possibility that a provision in the MOI or, in a 
shareholder’s agreement, designed to limit the board’s power may be invalidated for being 
inconsistent with the Act limits the options available to companies that may wish to alter the 
default division of powers provided for in the Act. By enacting provisions similar to ss 
8.01(a) and 7.32(b) of the MBCA the legislature would provide greater flexibility for 
companies, particularly small private companies, to establish appropriate governance 
structures that meet their needs without worrying that provisions in the MOI establishing 
such arrangements could be invalidated. In this regard it is pertinent to note that the King IV 
                                                          
45
 Section 15(7) of the Act provides that: 
‘The shareholders of a company may enter into any agreement with one another concerning any matter relating 
to the company, but any such agreement must be consistent with this Act and the company’s Memorandum of 
Incorporation, and any provision of such an agreement that is inconsistent with this Act or the company’s 
Memorandum of Incorporation is void to the extent of the inconsistency.’ 
 32 
Report that was issued towards the end of 2016 recognises that organisations, including 
companies, vary ‘largely in size, resources, extent and complexity of activities.’
46
 It notes that 
appreciating this diversity amongst organisations is important when interpreting and applying 
the King IV Code on Corporate Governance,
47
[hereafter the King IV Code]. Hence the King 
IV Code is flexible in that it embraces the philosophy that corporate governance 
arrangements and practices vary across organisations depending on inter alia, their type, size 
and complexity.
48
 It is submitted that in the context of companies this philosophy could be 
better fostered in the new Act by providing even greater flexibility than is currently provided 
for by s 66(1), for different types and sizes of companies to establish governance 
arrangements that are suitable for their circumstances. 
 Another important issue worthy of discussion regarding the ability of shareholders to 
control the board’s powers is the question whether shareholders could validly give directions 
to the board concerning how the latter should exercise the powers conferred on it by the Act. 
At common law the generally accepted view is that where management power is conferred on 
the board by a company’s constitution then only the board can exercise those powers.
49
 In 
several cases attempts by shareholders in general meeting to control the board’s management 
powers by directing the board to act in a particular manner were struck down by the courts.
50
 
For instance, in Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw
51
 a resolution of the shareholders directing 
the chairman of the board to instruct the company’s lawyers not to proceed with a legal suit 
was held to be a nullity. The court said that,
52
 
‘If powers of management are vested in the directors, they and they alone can exercise 
these powers. The only way in which the general body of the shareholders can control 
the exercise of the powers vested by the articles in the directors is by altering their 
articles, or, if opportunity arises under the articles, by refusing to re-elect the directors 
of whose actions they disapprove. They cannot themselves usurp the powers which by 
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the articles are vested in the directors any more than the directors can usurp the 
powers vested by the articles in the general body of shareholders.’ 
Similarly, in Scott v Scott
53
 a resolution of the shareholders in general meeting which could 
be seen either, as directions to pay an interim dividend or, instructions to make loans was also 
found to be inconsistent with the company’s articles and declared a nullity. The approach of 
the court in these and other similar cases led some commentators, in the past, to remark that, 
‘the usual provision in the articles that the managerial powers of the board of directors are 
subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by the company in general meeting is 
without effect.’
54
 However, Blackman argues convincingly that the only possible effect of the 
words in article 59 of Table A (article 60 of Table B) of the old Act subjecting the directors’ 
powers of management to, ‘such regulations… as may be prescribed by the company in 
general meeting,’ is that it permits the shareholders in general meeting to control the 
directors’ exercise of their power of management by means of an ordinary resolution.
55
  
It is noteworthy that in the UK the legislature has tried to side-step the effect of cases 
such as Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw
56
 and also Scott v Scott
57
 which gave the board’s 
managerial power pre-eminence over any directions given to the directors by the shareholders 
in general meeting. This has been done by providing for a default rule in the model articles 
empowering shareholders in general meeting to direct directors, by way of a special 
resolution, to take or to refrain from taking specified action.
58
  The new South African 
Companies Act does not have a similar provision. Therefore it would seem that in the 
absence of any provision to the contrary in a company’s MOI, South African courts are likely 
to follow the approach in Scott v Scott and other similar cases. In other words, the courts are 
likely to find that unless the MOI of a company provides otherwise, the Act confers the 
power to manage the business and affairs on the board, therefore only the board can exercise 
that power. And, the shareholders may not usurp those powers or give directions to the board 
unless they amend their company’s MOI to include a provision to that effect.  
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2.2.2.3 Alterability of s 66(1) and the interplay with directors’ 
statutory duties 
Another factor that could militate against the ability of shareholders to limit the directors’ 
powers is the relationship between s 66(1) and the statutory directors’ duties imposed by s 
76(3) of the new Act as well as the liability of directors in terms of s 77 of the new Act. 
Section 76(3) requires a director of a company, 
‘when acting in that capacity, to exercise the powers and perform the functions of a 
director; 
(a)  in good faith and for a proper purpose,  
(b) in the best interests of the company and  
(c) with the degree and of care, skill and diligence….’ 
 
Section 77(2)(a) and (b) follows this up by imposing liability on a director in accordance with 
the principles of common law relating to breach of fiduciary duty or to breach of the duty to 
act with care and skill.  
The challenge is to what extent could the shareholders, by virtue of a provision in the 
company’s MOI negate, restrict or qualify the powers given to directors by s 66(1) without 
affecting the directors’ ability to honour their statutory duties. For instance, if shareholders 
reserved for themselves power in the MOI to give directions to the board concerning how the 
latter should exercise its powers, it is conceivable that a direction given by the shareholders 
on a particular matter may place the directors in a conflicted position if the directors were of 
the view that the direction by the shareholders was not in the best interests of the company.
59
 
In such an instance would the directors be obliged to follow the directions given by the 
shareholders in general meeting as per the company’s MOI or, would they be justified in 
ignoring the directions given by the shareholders and instead, uphold their fiduciary duties to 
the company?     
The answers to the above questions are not clear. It is therefore helpful to learn from 
the experiences of other jurisdictions that have statutory provisions similar to those of the 
South African Companies Act. In this regard the Australian experience is relevant. Like the 
new South African Companies Act, s 198A of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 also 
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confers on the board the power to manage the business
60
 of a company while ss 180 and 181 
of that Act require the directors to exercise their powers and discharge their duties with due 
care and diligence and in good faith, in the interests of the company. In an article discussing 
the division of power between the board and general meeting in the context of the Australian 
Corporations Act 2001, Elizabeth Boros considers what the position would be if a company’s 
constitution was altered to give shareholders the power to give directions to directors in 
respect of a particular nominated matter, but the directors were of the view that the directions 
were not in the best interests of the company.
61
  
Boros posits steps in trying to tackle the issue; the first of which is a matter of 
interpretation whereby one determines whether the direction by the shareholders to the 
directors is binding on the latter.
62
 If the enquiry establishes that the direction was not binding 
on the directors and the directors opted to abide by that direction, this would not release the 
directors from the obligation to comply with their statutory duties. In other words, if the 
directors chose to abide by the direction – which is not binding on them – they could still be 
found liable for breaching their statutory fiduciary duties. Citing the Australian case of 
Capricornia Credit Union Ltd v ASIC
63
 Boros argues that on the one hand, if it was possible 
to include a provision in the company’s constitution – entitling shareholders to give 
directions to the board, such a provision could arguably also modify the directors’ duties to 
ensure that compliance with the shareholders’ directions would not result in breach of duty.
64
 
She then notes however that, on the other hand, it is not a simple matter to overcome 
statutory duties.
65
 It is submitted, for the reason discussed below, that the same would be true 
in South Africa in respect of the statutory directors’ fiduciary duties. 
It is submitted that in South Africa, just like in Australia, the members could not by a 
resolution adopted by the company, or a provision in the company’s MOI, release directors 
from their fiduciary duties so as to exclude the possibility of the directors being found liable 
for breach of their duties when acting in compliance with a direction given by the members in 
general meeting. Section 78(2) of the new Act provides that: 
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‘Subject to subsections (4) to (6), any provision of an agreement, the Memorandum of 
Incorporation or rules of a company, or a resolution adopted by a company, whether 
express or implied, is void to the extent that it directly or indirectly purports to-  
(a) relieve a director of-  
(i) a duty contemplated in section 75 or 76; or  
(ii) liability contemplated in section 77; or  
(b) negate, limit or restrict any legal consequences arising from an act or omission 
that constitutes wilful misconduct or wilful breach of trust on the part of the director’ 
 
In the light of the above, it is submitted that any company that contemplates taking advantage 
of the so called flexibility of s 66(1) in order to affect the balance of power within the 
company via a provision in its MOI would have to be very careful in drafting such a 
provision. The provision in the MOI would have to be drafted in such a way that it would not 
put directors in a position of conflict. The drafters of the MOI would also have to keep in 
mind that s 78(2) of the new Act prohibits any provision in the MOI or a resolution of the 
company relieving directors of their statutory duties. They would also have to ensure that the 
shareholders in general meeting are not granted extensive powers of direction over the board 
to control how the latter exercises its managerial powers. Extensive powers of direction could 
result in the shareholders having to comply with the statutory directors’ duties. 
2.3 Directors powers and the company’s constitution and rules 
  
A consequence of certain of the board of directors’ new found powers is that the board is able 
to affect the internal governance of the company through its power to amend the MOI and 
also to make, amend or repeal rules relating to the governance of the company. 
 Except to the extent that a company’s MOI provides otherwise, s 36(3) and (4) read 
with s 16(1)(b) empower the board of a company to amend the company’s MOI in such a 
way as to, inter alia, increase or decrease the company’s share capital and, to reclassify any 
unclassified shares that have been authorised but not yet issued. This is a significant power 
which enables the board to amend the MOI and to affect the company’s capital structure.
66
 
Under the old Act the constitution of a company could only be amended by a special 
resolution of the company’s shareholders.
67
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In addition to the power to amend the company’s constitution, the new Act also gives 
directors the power to make, amend and repeal rules for the company in terms of s 15(3). The 
rules of a company are meant to regulate any ‘matters incidental to the governance of the 
company’ but which are not addressed in the Act or the company’s MOI.
68
 There are no 
guidelines in the Act as to what matters are considered ‘incidental to the governance of the 
company.’ The term appears to be quite wide, the only qualification being that the rules can 
only regulate those matters that are not addressed by the Act or the company’s MOI. 
Therefore, the power to make rules for the company is a significant avenue for directors to 
influence the internal governance of a company. It must be noted though that s 15(3) is an 
alterable provision; it provides that, ‘Except to the extent that a company’s memorandum of 
incorporation provides otherwise, the board of the company may make, amend or repeal any 
necessary or incidental rules relating to the governance of the company…’ (writer’s 
emphasis). Therefore the company may, in its MOI, preclude this power of directors to make, 
amend or repeal rules of the company.
69
 However, if the MOI is silent concerning the board’s 
power to make rules then the default position in the Act applies with the consequence that the 
board may make rules for the company. Although the Act gives shareholders power to ratify 
the rules made by the directors, they are only able to do so at the next general meeting of the 
shareholders.
70
 In the interim period the rules will be binding between the company and each 
shareholder, between or among the shareholders of the company, between the company and 
each director, or prescribed officer of the company or any other person serving the company 
as a member of a committee of the board.
71
   
  It is noteworthy that the provisions of the Act empowering the board to amend the 
MOI or make rules of the company are opt-out provisions. That is they apply by default 
unless a company excludes or limits their application by inserting an appropriate provision in 
the MOI.
72
 This works in favour of the board because the onus is placed on shareholders to 
take active steps to remove or restrict the board’s power. In this respect it would seem that the 
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Act was influenced by the MBCA of which for example, s 10.05(4)(a) and (b) provides inter 
alia that,  
‘Unless the articles of incorporation provide otherwise, a corporation’s board of 
directors may adopt amendments to the corporation’s articles of incorporation without 
shareholder approval: 
(4) if the corporation has only one class of shares outstanding: 
(a) to change each issued and unissued authorized share of the class into a greater 
number of whole shares of that class; or 
(b) to increase the number of authorized shares of the class to the extent necessary to 
permit the issuance of shares as a share dividend,’ (writer’s emphasis). 
 
With regard to company rules, s 2.06 of the MBCA empowers the incorporators or the board 
of directors of a corporation to adopt initial bylaws for the corporation. And, s 10(2)(b)(1) 
and (2) further provide that: 
  A corporation’s board of directors may amend or repeal the corporation’s bylaws, 
unless: 
(1) the articles of incorporation or section 10.21 reserve that power exclusively to the 
shareholders in whole or part; or 
(2) the shareholders in amending, repealing, or adopting a bylaw expressly provide 
that the board of directors may not amend, repeal, or reinstate that bylaw. 
 
It is noteworthy that the MBCA potentially grants wider powers to the board than our Act 
regarding the making and amending of company rules. This is because the MBCA generally 
does not require that any bylaws adopted or amended by the board be ratified by the 
shareholders as is the case under s 15(4)(c) of our Act.
73
   
This approach contrasts with the position in the UK where the company’s constitution 
can only be amended by a special resolution of the shareholders.
74
 Likewise in Australia a 
company constitution may be adopted at the time of registering a company only by persons 
who have consented to become members of the company
75
 or, after incorporation by a special 
resolution of the company’s shareholders.
76
 Further, a company may modify or repeal its 
constitution, or a provision of its constitution, by a special resolution of the shareholders.
77
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Thus in the UK and Australia only the shareholders have power over the company’s 
constitution.  
The South African position is to some extent similar to the position in Delaware 
although the position in the latter jurisdiction is complicated. The law in Delaware is that 
inter alia, the initial directors of a corporation other than a non-stock corporation or the board 
of directors of a corporation other than a non-stock corporation which has not yet received 
any payment for any of its stock may adopt, amend or repeal the original or other bylaws of 
the corporation.
78
 The Delaware Code further provides that after a corporation has received 
any payment for any of its stock, the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws shall be in the 
stockholders entitled to vote.
79
 Notwithstanding this any corporation may, in its certificate of 
incorporation, confer the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws upon the directors.
80
 Hence 
in Delaware the law empowers directors prior to the corporation receiving any payment for 
any of its stock. If the directors do not adopt, amend or repeal the corporation’s by-laws in 
that period the position shifts in favour of the shareholders once the corporation has received 
payment for any its stock. From then on the power to make and amend the by-laws lies with 
the shareholders.  
The foregoing discussion has shown that the division of powers between shareholders 
and directors in terms of s 66(1) has the potential to shift the balance of power in favour of 
directors. If shareholders wish to retain control over the board’s power to manage the 
business and affairs of the company they will have to ensure the company’s MOI contains a 
clause that permits them to do so. If the MOI is silent concerning the board’s power, the 
board will have original power to manage the business and affairs of the company in terms of 
s 66(1). A comparison with the position in other jurisdiction has shown that the board of 
directors of a South African company enjoys more statutory power over a company’s 
constitution and rules of the company than boards of directors of companies in the UK, 
Australia and Delaware. 
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CHAPTER 3: DIRECTORS’ POWERS IN THE AREA OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE  
 
3.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter discussed, inter alia, the changes made by the new Act concerning the 
general division of powers within a company as between the board of directors and the 
company’s shareholders in general meeting. This chapter carries the discussion forward by 
critically examining specific powers conferred on directors in relation to particular company 
transactions in the area of corporate finance.  
In the Department of Trade and Industry’s policy paper [hereafter ‘the DTI paper’], 
which laid down the foundation for the corporate law reform process, the term ‘corporate 
finance’ is used to refer to ‘the area of company law which deals with equity and debt 
financing of companies, share capital, acquisitions by companies of own shares and financial 
assistance thereof, share allotments and issue of shares, debentures and restrictions on 
offering shares for sale.’
1
 This is a useful definition but it does not cover corporate 
distributions apart from share buy backs. For the purposes of this thesis this definition will be 
adapted to include corporate distributions as these involve the use of the company’s assets or 
funds. The discussion in this chapter considers certain aspects of corporate finance such as 
the authorization for shares, the directors’ power to issue shares, share repurchases and other 
corporate distributions in respect of which the new Act has brought about changes that 
directly impact on the balance of power between the board of directors and the shareholders. 
Other aspects of corporate finance such as debt financing and debentures which do not 
significantly impact on the balance of power between the board of directors and the 
shareholders as a body will not be considered.  
3.2   Authorisation for shares 
The authorization of shares is an area in which the new Act has brought about changes. 
Authorisation for shares is governed by s 36 which is set out below in full for the reader’s 
convenience:  
36. Authorisation for shares  
(1) A company’s Memorandum of Incorporation-  
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(a) must set out the classes of shares, and the number of shares of each class, that the 
company is authorised to issue;  
(b) must set out, with respect to each class of shares-  
(i) a distinguishing designation for that class; and  
(ii) the preferences, rights, limitations and other terms associated with that class, subject to 
paragraph (d);  
(c) may authorise a stated number of unclassified shares, which are subject to classification by 
the board of the company in accordance with subsection (3)(c); and  
(d) may set out a class of shares-  
(i) without specifying the associated preferences, rights, limitations or other terms of that 
class;  
(ii) for which the board of the company must determine the associated preferences, rights, 
limitations or other terms; and  
(iii) which must not be issued until the board of the company has determined the associated 
preferences, rights, limitations or other terms, as contemplated in subparagraph (ii).  
(2) The authorisation and classification of shares, the numbers of authorised shares of each 
class, and the preferences, rights, limitations and other terms associated with each class of 
shares, as set out in a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation, may be changed only by-  
(a) an amendment of the Memorandum of Incorporation by special resolution of the 
shareholders; or  
(b) the board of the company, in the manner contemplated in subsection (3), except to the 
extent that the Memorandum of Incorporation provides otherwise.  
(3) Except to the extent that a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation provides otherwise, 
the company’s board may-  
(a) increase or decrease the number of authorised shares of any class of shares;  
(b) reclassify any classified shares that have been authorised but not issued;  
(c) classify any unclassified shares that have been authorised as contemplated in subsection 
(1)(c), but are not issued; or  
(d) determine the preferences, rights, limitations or other terms of shares in a class 
contemplated in subsection (1)(d).  
(4) If the board of a company acts pursuant to its authority contemplated in subsection (3), the 
company must file a Notice of Amendment of its Memorandum of Incorporation, setting out 
the changes effected by the board.  
 
Section 36(1)(d), read with s 36(3)(c) invests in the board of directors the power to classify 
any unclassified shares into one or more existing classes of authorised shares. Further, section 
36(1)(d), read with section 36(3)(d), of the new Act invests the board with power to 
determine the rights attaching to the class of shares envisaged by s 36(1)(d). Effectively this 
empowers the directors to create a new class of shares.
2
 
In this regard s 36(1)(d) read with s 36(3)(d) appear to have been influenced by s 6.02 
of the MBCA which provides as follows: 
                                                          
2
 C Stein & G Everingham The New Companies Act Companies Act Unlocked (2011) at 155. Such shares have 
been described as ‘blank cheque stock’ by Hanks who explains that, ‘blank cheque stock was developed in the 
US over 20 years ago and has proven to be extremely useful to companies in rapidly raising capital in time-
sensitive, highly competitive global financial markets without the need for the time consuming process of 
obtaining shareholder approval…’ See JJ. Hanks, Jr ‘The new legal capital regime in South Africa’ (2010) Acta 
Juridica 131 at 145 
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(a) If the articles of incorporation so provide, the board of directors is authorized, 
without shareholder approval, to: 
(1) classify any unissued shares into one or more classes or into one or more series 
within a class, 
(2) reclassify any unissued shares of any class into one or more classes or into one or 
more series within one or more classes, or 
(3) reclassify any unissued shares of any series of any class into one or more classes 
or into one or more series within a class. 
(b) If the board of directors acts pursuant to subsection (a), it must determine the 
terms, including the preferences, rights and limitations, to the same extent permitted 
under section 6.01, of: 
(1) any class of shares before the issuance of any shares of that class, or 
(2) any series within a class before the issuance of any shares of that series. 
 
Thus the MBCA, like our new Act, authorizes the board to create a new class of shares by 
reclassifying any unissued shares of any class into one or more classes and to determine the 
rights and preferences attaching to that new class. To the extent that ss 36(1)(c) and (d) of the 
new Act invests power in the board to create a new class of shares and, to determine the 
rights attaching to any shares without further reference to shareholders for approval, these 
provisions constitute a fundamental departure from the position under the old Act.
3
  In terms 
of s 75 of the old Act the creation of any shares and the determination of rights attaching to 




Apart from the changes relating to the authorization of shares, the new Act has also 
brought about changes regarding the power to amend the MOI, in particular the provisions of 
the MOI relating to the number of authorized shares and the rights attaching to shares. There 
are two different ways in which the authorization and classification of shares, the number of 
authorised shares of each class, and the rights associated with each class of shares may be 
changed.
5
 One way of effecting the change is by way of an amendment to the MOI pursuant 
to a special resolution of the shareholders.
6
 The other way is by means of a resolution of the 
company’s board of directors in terms of s 36(2)(b). The essence of ss 36(2)(b) and (3) is that 
unless a company’s MOI provides otherwise, the company’s directors are empowered to 
change the number of authorised shares of any class, the class(es) into which the company’s 
shares are divided into, and the rights attaching to those shares. In other words, to the extent 
that a company’s MOI does not provide otherwise, the new Act invests directors with the 
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 C Stein & G Everingham op cit note 2 
4
 Section 75(1)(a) – (i) of the old Act 
5
 Section 36(2) of the new Act 
6
 Section 36(2)(a) of the new Act 
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power to alter the nature and number of a company’s authorised shares without further 
reference to the company’s shareholders. This contrasts with the position under s 75 of the 
old Act where a company could only alter its share capital if it was authorised to do so by its 
articles and by special resolution of the shareholders. Sections 36(2)(b) and (3) may have 
been influenced by s 10.05(4)(a) and (b) of the MBCA which empowers the board of a 
company that has only one class of shares outstanding to amend the company’s constitution 
in order to: 
(a) change each issued and unissued authorized share of the class into a greater 
number of whole shares of that class or,  
(b) to increase the number of authorized shares of the class to the extent necessary to 
permit the issuance of shares as a share dividend. 
 
The concept of a company having authorized capital serves to inter alia, protect shareholders 
against dilution of their shareholding in the company.
7
 In terms of the old Act the measure of 
protection enjoyed by shareholders against possible dilution of their shareholding was 
enhanced by the fact that shareholders wielded a veto power over any proposed changes to 
the company’s share capital. The old Act provided that a company having a share capital 
could, by way of a special resolution and if so authorized by its articles, increase its share 
capital, subdivide its shares or convert its ordinary or preference share capital.
8
 This meant 
the company’s share capital could not be altered without shareholder approval. In terms of 
the provisions of the new Act referred to above, the possibility now exists that directors may 
alter the company’s share capital without reference to shareholders. It is submitted that this 
possibility represents a potential shift in power unless of course the MOI precludes the board 
from having such power as discussed below.  
Both ss 36(2)(b) and (3) are alterable provisions. Therefore the MOI of a company 
may alter the effect of these provisions. For instance, the MOI could negate the effect of s 
36(2)(b) by expressly excluding the board’s power to increase or decrease the authorised 
shares. Consequent to this the company would then only be able to alter its authorized capital 
by means of a special resolution of the company’s shareholders as provided for in s 36(2)(a). 
Shareholders would thus be in a position to protect their interests since they, and not the 
board, would have the power to alter the company’s authorised capital. 
                                                          
7
 K Van der Linde ‘The regulation of share capital and shareholder contributions in the Companies Bill 2008’ 
(2009) TSAR 39 at 44 
8
 Section 75(1)(a)(i) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 [ hereafter ‘the old Act’] 
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While ss 36(2)(b) and (3) are alterable, deliberate action on the part of the company’s 
shareholders is required to amend the MOI in order to exclude the board’s power to alter the 
company’s authorized share capital. If a company’s MOI is silent on the matter the default 
position provided for in the Act prevails. It is submitted that whether the shareholders of a 
particular company will be able to amend the company’s MOI in order to exclude the board’s 
power depends largely on the nature and voting power of the dissatisfied shareholders.  
If the shareholding mainly consists of unsophisticated shareholders it is highly 
unlikely that they would be pro-active enough to examine the company’s constitution, let 
alone initiate the required changes. On the other hand if the shareholding consists largely of 
institutional investors, such shareholders are likely to be sophisticated and pro-active enough 
to be able to initiate and carry through the necessary changes.
9
 However, even if the average 
individual investor was sophisticated, pro-active and motivated enough to read the company’s 
MOI, it may be another matter altogether for that shareholder to have the requisite voting 
power to pass a special resolution to amend the company’s MOI.
10
 In terms of s 
16(1)(c)(i)(bb) of the new Act the shareholder would only be able to propose a special 
resolution to amend the MOI if he was entitled to exercise at least 10% of the votes that may 
be exercised on such a resolution.
11
  
In the light of the above s36 of the new Act potentially shifts the balance of power in 
favour of directors by making it possible for directors to alter the company’s share capital 
without reference to shareholders. This does not bode well for shareholder protection and 
good corporate governance.  
3.3 Issuing of shares 
The preceding section considered the changes made by the new Act in relation to the 
authorization of shares. The decision to issue the authorized shares is also regulated by 
company law.
12
  This section highlights certain problems associated with the issuing of 
                                                          
9
 For a discussion of the influence of institutional shareholders on corporate governance see BS. Black 
‘Shareholder passivity re-examined’ (1990) 89 Michigan Law Review 520 at 570ff 
10
 In terms of s 16(11)(a) of the new Act a special resolution is required to amend the company’s MOI to the 
extent required by ss 16(1)(c) and 36(2)(a). Generally, in terms of 65(9) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 a 
special resolution must be supported by 75% of the voting rights exercised on the resolution. (This threshold 
may be changed in terms of s 65(10) of the Act). Thus it may not always be easy for a shareholder to get a 
company to amend its MOI so as to counter the effects of ss 36(2)(b) and (3) of the new Act.  
11
 The 10% threshold with respect to proposals for MOI amendments may be changed by the company’s MOI in 
terms of s 16(2) of the new Act 
12
 See s 36 and 38 of the new Act concerning authorisation and issuing of shares respectively. 
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shares. Thereafter the regulation of share issues in terms of the old as well as the new Act 
will be discussed. 
Directors can abuse the power to issue shares for diverse reasons.
13
 These include for 
example the dilution of the ownership of existing shareholders and, entrenchment of directors 
on the board.
14
 In Fraser v Whalley
15
 the directors of the company were facing removal from 
office at the next annual general meeting. To prevent their removal the directors, acting on 
the basis of an obsolete power entrusted upon them for a different purpose, resolved to issue 
shares of the company for the purpose of controlling the annual general meeting at which the 
directors’ fate was to be decided. A minority shareholder applied to court for an injunction to 
restrain the issue of such shares. The court granted the injunction and held that where 
directors clandestinely, and at the last moment, use a stale resolution for the express purpose 
of preventing the free action of shareholders the court would intervene to prevent so gross a 
breach of trust.
16
 Although the directors in Fraser v Whalley failed in their bid, the case 
illustrates the potential for abuse of power by directors who are eager to retain office.
17
 
Apart from misusing the power to issue shares to keep themselves in office and to 
change or create a majority, directors may also misuse the power to frustrate a take-over 
bid.
18
 This was the case in Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd and Others.
19
  In that case the articles of 
the company placed the shares of the company under the control of the directors who were 
invested with the power to allot or dispose of the shares on such terms and conditions as the 
directors thought fit. A Mr. Baxter made a take-over bid for Cramphorn Ltd. The directors of 
the company believed the take-over was bad for the company. They acted to prevent the 
takeover by issuing shares with special voting rights of ten votes per share to a trust created 
for the benefit of the company’s employees; some of the directors were trustees of the trust 
and the share issue effectively put them in a position to outvote the take-over bid. The court 
found that the purpose of this scheme was to ensure control of the company by the directors 
and those whom they could confidently regard as their supporters. It held that the share issue 
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 See, J Kiggundu ‘The control of the directors’ power to allot shares’ (1993) 5 Afr. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 260 at 
261. 
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 Fraser v Whalley (1864) 2 Hem. & M.10; 71 E.R. 361 
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19
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amounted to an improper exercise by the directors of their fiduciary power to issue shares and 
thus should be set aside.  
The cases discussed above illustrate some of the problems attendant upon giving the 
power to issue shares to directors. In the light of these problems and for the protection of 
shareholders’ interests, it becomes crucial for any system of corporate governance to regulate 
the power to issue shares by inter alia, providing a system of checks and balances to prevent 
the abuse of the power to issue shares.  
3.3.2. Authority to issue shares under section 221 of the Companies 
Act 61 of 1973 
The relevant section under the old Act regarding the issuing of shares was s 221(1) which 
provided that, 
‘Notwithstanding anything contained in its memorandum of articles, the directors of 
a company shall not have the power to allot or issue shares of the company without 
the prior approval of the company in general meeting.’ 
The section required directors to seek shareholder approval before they could issue any 
shares. Hence shareholders enjoyed a veto power over the board’s decision to issue shares. It 
is submitted that this served to prevent abuse of the power to issue shares. Section 221 was a 
preventative measure which empowered shareholders to protect their interests before any 
harm could be done by directors acting in their own selfish interests. If the shareholders were 
of the view that a share issue proposed by the directors could be harmful to their interests, the 
shareholders were in a position to prevent such a share issue without having to go to court for 
an injunction to prevent the share issue. All the shareholders had to do was to withhold their 
approval for such a share issue.  
Section 221(1) was reinforced by s 221(4). In terms of s 221(4) any director who 
knowingly took part in the allotment or issue of any shares in contravention of s 221(1) was 
liable to compensate the company for any loss, damages or costs which the company may 
have incurred or sustained as a result of the unauthorized allotment or issue of shares. This, 
and the liability of directors in terms of the common law for breach of their fiduciary duties, 
enhanced the protection enjoyed by shareholders against directors’ self-interested actions. 
If shareholders gave their approval for directors to issue shares as envisaged by s 221, 
the old Act had another veneer of protection. The approval could have taken one of two 
forms. It could have been in the form of a general authority to the directors to issue any 
shares in their discretion or, it could have been in the form of a specific authority in respect of 
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any particular allotment or issue of shares.
20
 In the latter case the likelihood of abuse by 
directors of their power to issue shares was very remote given that the share issue would have 
been authorized for a specific purpose and the directors enjoyed no discretion in that regard. 
A greater possibility of abuse was present in the case of an approval given as a general 
authority to issue shares because then the directors had a degree of discretion in the matter 
and thus could use the general authority to further their own interests instead of advancing the 
interests of the shareholders. However, the scope of abuse was, to some extent, limited by the 
fact that the general authority was not one that endured indefinitely; if the approval was given 
as a general authority, such approval was valid only until the next annual general meeting of 
the company and the general authority could also be varied or revoked by any general 
meeting of the company prior to the next annual general meeting.
21
 Thus s 221 put 
shareholders in a position to control the use of the power to issue shares by company 
directors thereby empowering the shareholders to protect their interests. However, as noted 
above, there was very little protection for shareholders where a general approval was granted 
because there was scope for abuse while the authority lasted. 
The rationale behind the enactment of s 221 of the old Act is noteworthy.  The section 
was enacted following recommendations from the Van Wyk de Vries Commission which 
pointed out that,  
‘[T]here was a strong body of opinion to the effect that directors should not have 
unlimited powers, whether derived from the articles or a resolution by the company 
in meeting to issue shares. The issue by the company of further shares is a matter 
which directly affects the interests of each holder of shares in that company…There 
seems to be justification for imposing a curb on unlimited powers of directors in this 
respect…’
22
   
In the light of the above statement it is reasonable to conclude that the restriction imposed by 
s 221 on the directors’ powers to issue shares was introduced to protect the interests of 
shareholders. The general body of opinion at the time was that the issue of further shares by a 
company was a transaction that directly impacted on shareholders’ interests and thus it was 
crucial to give shareholders a say on the matter.
23
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 Section 222 of the old Act also governed the issue of shares and debentures to 
directors. It provided as follows: 
 (1) No provision in any memorandum or articles or in any resolution of a company 
authorizing the directors to allot or issue any shares or debentures convertible into 
shares of the company at the discretion of the directors, shall authorize the allotment 
or issue of any such shares or debentures to any director of the company or his 
nominee, or to any body corporate which is or the directors of which are accustomed 
to act in accordance with the directions or instructions of such director or nominee, or 
at a general meeting of which such director or his nominee is entitled to exercise or 
control the exercise of one-fifth or more of the voting power, or to any subsidiary of 
such body corporate unless- 
(a) the particular allotment or issue has prior to the allotment or issue been 
specifically approved by the company in general meeting; or 
(b) such shares or debentures are allotted or issued under a contract underwriting such 
shares or debentures; or 
(c) such shares or debentures are allotted or issued in proportion to existing holdings, 
on the same terms and conditions as have been offered to all the members or 
debenture-holders of the company or to all the holders of the shares or such 
debentures of the class or classes being allotted or issued; or 
(d) such shares or debentures are allotted or issued on the same terms and conditions 
as have been offered to members of the public. 
 
The restriction in s 222 was much wider than s 221 in that it related not only to the issue of 
shares, but also to the issue of debentures convertible into shares of the company.
24
 The 
restriction in s 222 regulated the allotment or issue of shares or debentures convertible into 
shares where directors were likely to have a conflict of interest. Section 222(1)(a) required 
that in such instances the allotment or issue be specifically approved by the company in 
general meeting. In this respect s 222 is similar to s 41(1) of the new Act to the extent that the 
latter requires shareholder approval for inter alia, an issue of shares or securities convertible 
into shares where the shares or securities are to be issued to, amongst others, a director, 
prescribed officer of the company
25
 or, to a person related or interrelated to the company.
26
 It 
must be noted though that s 222(a) only required an ordinary resolution in such instances 
whereas s 41(1) requires a special resolution as discussed in paragraph 3.3.3 below. 
 Section 222 did not require shareholder approval where directors were unlikely to act 
in their own interest at the expense of shareholders such as for example, where the shares or 
debentures were allotted or issued on a prorated basis and, on the same terms and conditions 
as had been offered to all the members or debenture-holders of the company or, to all the 
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holders of the shares or such debentures of the class or classes being allotted or issued.
27
 
Likewise s 41 does not require shareholder where the directors are not likely to be influenced 
by a conflict of interest such as for example, when the issue of shares or securities is in 
proportion to existing holdings, and on the same terms and conditions as have been offered to 




3.3.3 Authority to issue shares under section 38 of the new 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 
 
Under the new Act the issuing of shares is governed by section 38 which provides that,  
‘The board of a company may resolve to issue shares of the company at any time, 
but only within the classes, and to the extent, that the shares have been authorized by 




Unlike s 221(1) of the old Act, no shareholder approval is required in terms of s 38(1) of the 
new Act. There are only a few prescribed instances in which directors are required to seek 
shareholder approval to issue shares in terms of the new Act. These are laid down in s 
41(1)(a)-(c) which provides that an issue of shares or securities convertible into shares, or a 
grant of options, or a grant of any other rights exercisable for securities, must be approved by 
a special resolution of the shareholders of a company if the shares, securities, options or 
rights are issued to specified classes of people who include, amongst others, directors or 
future directors of the company or any persons related or inter-related to such directors or the 
company or a nominee of the afore-mentioned persons.
30
  Section 41(3) also provides that: 
‘An issue of shares, securities convertible into shares, or rights exercisable for shares 
in a transaction or a series of integrated transactions requires approval of the 
shareholders by special resolution if the voting power of the class of shares that are 
issued or issuable as a result of the transaction or series of integrated transactions will 
be equal to or exceed 30% of the voting power of all the shares of that class held by 
shareholders immediately before the transaction or series of transactions.’
31
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By empowering the board to issue shares without shareholder approval the approach in the 
new Act is in line with jurisdictions such as Australia where, unless the company’s 
constitution provides otherwise, a company’s power to issue shares is also exercised by the 
board of directors.
32
 The MBCA also invests the power to issue shares in the board of 
directors.
33
 However section 6.21(a) of the MBCA also provides that the powers granted to 
the board of directors to issue shares may be reserved to the shareholders by the articles of 
incorporation. Hence the MBCA, unlike our new Act provides flexibility for shareholders to 
retain control over the power to issue shares. The only instance where shareholder approval is 
required to issue shares under the MBCA is in terms of s 6.21 (f) which provides that an 
issuance of shares or other securities convertible into or rights exercisable for shares, in a 
transaction or a series of integrated transactions, requires approval of the shareholders if the 
shares, other securities, or rights are issued for consideration other than cash or cash 
equivalents, and the voting power of shares that are issued and issuable as a result of the 
transaction or series of integrated transactions will comprise more than 20 percent of the 
voting power of the shares of the corporation that were outstanding immediately before the 
transaction. 
Section 6.21(f) of the MBCA is similar to s 41(3) of our Act which also requires 
shareholder approval in similar circumstances. However, shareholder approval would only be 
required in terms of s 41(3) if the voting power of shares that are issued will be equal to or 
exceed 30% of the voting power of all the shares of that class held by shareholders 
immediately before the transaction or series of transaction. Thus our Act sets a higher 
threshold of voting power that would trigger the requirement for shareholder approval. In this 
respect our Act offers weaker protection to shareholders than the MBCA. However our Act 
better protects shareholders than the MBCA in another respect because it also requires 
shareholder approval where shares are issued to inter alia, directors and prescribed officers of 
the company or persons that are related to them as discussed earlier. 
Apart from empowering directors to issue shares without further reference to 
shareholders, the provisions of the new Act make it possible for directors to get away with 
issuing shares that are not authorized in accordance with the provisions of the Act or which 
are in excess of what is authorized in the company’s MOI. Section 38(2)(a) and (b) provide 
that,  
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33
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‘If a company issues shares –  
(a) that have not been authorized in accordance with section 36; or in excess of the 
number of authorized shares of any particular class, 
(b) the issuance of those shares may be retroactively authorized in terms of s 36 within 




It will be recalled that s 36 of the new Act provides inter alia, that the authorization for 
shares and the numbers of authorized shares of each class may be changed by either, an 
amendment to the MOI pursuant to a special resolution of the shareholders or, except to the 
extent that the MOI provides otherwise, by an amendment to the MOI made by the 
directors.
34
 It follows from this that not only is the board of directors empowered to issue 
shares without reference to shareholders in terms of s 38(1), but in terms of s 38(2) read with 
ss 36(2), (3) and (4), the directors can also potentially get away with issuing shares in excess 
of what is authorised in the company’s MOI. They can do this by retroactively authorizing 
the shares by way of an amendment to the MOI in accordance with s 36. The directors’ power 
in this regard represents a new and extraordinary power which directors did not have under 
the old Act. 
In the light of the above it is submitted that s 38(1) of the new Act represents a 
fundamental shift from the position under s 221(1) of the old Act. Presumably it is part of the 
changes designed to provide flexibility for companies in the area of corporate finance as 
envisaged in the DTI Policy paper.
35
 While it is acknowledged that dispensing with the 
requirement for shareholder approval in the context of issuing shares affords company 
management a measure of flexibility when raising finance for the company, dispensing with 
the requirement takes away the protection accorded to shareholders by s 221 of the old Act. 
This radical shift in position has been questioned especially given the genesis of s 221.
36
  
It is submitted that in the context of corporate governance both shareholder protection 
and flexibility in the management of companies are valid and important considerations; to 
prefer one over the other calls for a value judgment based on a weighing of the two. 
Therefore, the apparent paring away, by s 38(1) of the new Act, of the shareholder protection 
afforded by s 221 of the old Act, would be justified if, in the end, the benefits of granting 
flexibility to directors to issue shares without seeking shareholder approval would outweigh 
the apparent loss of shareholder protection as encapsulated in s 221 of the old Act.  
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The shift would also be justifiable if the other measures for protecting shareholders in 
the new Act provide the required balance.  In this respect one of the protective measures 
provided for in the Act is the requirement for approval by way of a special resolution of the 
company’s shareholders of certain share issues that present a high risk for shareholders.
37
 As 
observed earlier s 41(1) of the Act requires shareholder approval where shares are being 
issued to directors or persons related to them who can be regarded as ‘insiders’
38
 in relation to 
the company. In such cases there is a real concern of a conflict of interests on the part of 
directors
39
 because the share issue would be made to ‘insiders.’
 
Hence the requirement 
subjecting such share issues to approval by a special resolution of the shareholders empowers 
the shareholders to protect themselves against self-serving conduct on the part of the 
directors. It gives shareholders an oversight role to ensure that the share issues are above 
board.  
Another shareholder protection measure employed by the new Act is the pre-emptive 
right provided for in s 39(2) and (3) which provide that: 
‘(2) If a private company proposes to issue any shares, other than as contemplated in 
subsection (1)(b), each shareholder of that private company has a right, before any 
other person who is not a shareholder of that company, to be offered and, within a 
reasonable time to subscribe for, a percentage of the shares to be issued equal to the 
voting power of that shareholder’s general voting rights immediately before the offer 
was made. 
(3) A private or personal liability company’s Memorandum of Incorporation may 
limit, negate, restrict or place conditions upon the right set out in subsection (2), with 
respect to any or all classes of shares of that company.’ 
 
The utility of pre-emptive rights as a tool for protecting shareholders has been described thus: 
“In the context of share issues, pre-emptive rights constitute a limitation on the 
power of directors to issue further shares. Pre-emptive rights limit their discretion 
regarding the persons from whom offers for subscription may be invited or to whom 
shares may be offered. By subscribing for further shares, existing shareholders who 
have the financial means to inject additional funds into the company can avoid a 
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 54 
The usefulness of a pre-emptive right depends on amongst other things, whether the 
company’s shareholders can afford to inject additional funds into the company in 
consideration for the issues to be issued. Moreover, it should be noted that the pre-emptive 
right required by s 39(2) of the new Act only applies to private companies and personal 
liability companies.
41
 Section 39 does not apply to public companies except to the extent that 
the company’s MOI provides otherwise.
42
 Accordingly the default position as provided for by 
the new Act is that shareholders in a public company generally do not enjoy pre-emptive 
rights unless the company’s MOI provides for such rights. The implication of this for 
shareholders of public companies is that if they wish to protect their interest by means of pre-
emptive rights they will have to be pro-active in reading the MOIs of companies that they 
invest in. If the MOIs of such companies do not provide for pre-emptive rights the 
shareholders will have to take positive steps to amend the company’s MOI by including pre-
emption rights. Failing this, shareholders in listed public companies would have to rely on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange [hereafter ‘the JSE’] Listing Requirements as the primary tool 
for protecting their interests as discussed below.  
The JSE Listing Requirements protect existing shareholders in listed companies 
against dilution of their equity in the context of new share issues by according them pre-
emptive rights. A listed company that proposes to issue equity securities for cash is required 
to first offer those securities (unless the issue is an acquisition issue) effected by way of a 
rights offer to existing holders of equity securities in proportion to their existing holdings.
43
 
Further, a listed company may only offer equity securities for cash to persons other than the 
existing shareholders to the extent that such securities are not taken up by holders of equity in 
accordance with their pre-emption rights.
44
  
An issue of equity securities for cash, made otherwise than to existing holders of 
securities in proportion to their existing holdings, is only permitted in terms of the JSE 
Listing Requirements if it is authorised by an ordinary resolution of the company’s 
                                                          
41
 Section 39(1)(b) of the new Act 
42
 Section 39(1)(a) of the new Act 
43
 Section 3 para 3.30 of the JSE Limited Listing Requirements (Service Issue 18) [hereafter ‘the JSE Listing 
Requirements’], available at https://www.jse.co.za/content/JSEEducationItems/JSEListingsRequirements.pdf, 
accessed 20 December 2014 
44
 Ibid. However, para 3.31 of Section 3 of the JSE Limited Listing Requirements provides that subject to the 
approval of the JSE, the application of the pre-emptive rights may be waived to the extent allowed by the 





 In other words the existing shareholders in a listed company could waive their 
pre-emptive rights by passing a general resolution authorising the company to issue shares to 
other persons. Thus the JSE Listing requirements protect shareholders through the use of the 
concept of pre-emptive rights and also the requirement for approval of new share issues by 
means of a resolution of the shareholders. 
It appears odd that shareholders of publicly listed companies will now have to rely on 
the JSE Listing Requirements rather than the primary legislation governing companies to 
protect their interests. Moreover, unless the MOI of their company provides for pre-emptive 
rights, shareholders of unlisted public companies are left in the cold since they cannot rely on 
the JSE listing requirements for protection. In formulating the guidelines for the new Act the 
DTI considered including pre-emptive rights as either an optional or mandatory rule, but it is 
clear that in the end pre-emptive rights were considered as a vital protection against the 
dilution of shareholders’ rights only in small companies with a limited number of 
shareholders. Hence, unless the MOI of the company provides otherwise, section 39 makes 
pre-emptive rights mandatory for private and personal liabilities companies and only optional 
for public companies.   
However, it would seem that the risk of equity dilution is also a concern to 
shareholders in public companies and, shareholders in publicly listed companies rely on their 
veto power over share issues to protect themselves.
46
 For instance it has been reported that 
the shareholders of Investec, a company listed on the JSE, voted against resolutions that 
would have given the company’s directors authority to allot and issue additional shares; to 
allot shares for cash; and to issue additional preference shares.
47
 One of the company’s 
shareholders who reportedly voted against the resolutions is said to have commented that:  
“Poor allocation of capital and dilution of shareholders persuaded us to vote against 
those resolutions even though we would normally support a limitation of 5 percent. 
Shareholders are signalling that they expect to be consulted on the issue of shares 
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In the light of the above as well as the fact that the JSE Listing requirements provide for pre-
emptive rights it is surprising that the legislature saw fit to regulate pre-emptive rights only 
for private companies and personal liability companies.  
While one could argue that s 39 provides public companies with the option to include 
pre-emptive rights in their MOI’s, it must be emphasized that the usefulness of that option 
calls for greater vigilance on the part of shareholders. They must read and understand what 
their companies MOIs provide for. Besides, amending a company’s MOI may not be that 
easy. An amendment to a company’s MOI has to be passed by a special resolution of the 
shareholders which generally requires support of at least 75% of the votes exercised on the 
resolution.
49
 Furthermore, in order to propose an amendment to a company’s MOI the 
shareholder(s) making the proposal, must be able to exercise at least 10% of the voting rights 
that may be exercised on such a resolution.
50
 Hence shareholders who wish to be protected by 
means of pre-emptive rights could find it difficult to amend a company’s MOI in which case 
they, provided their company is listed, would have to rely on the JSE Listing Requirements as 
their primary tool to protect their interests.  
It is submitted that in the interests of shareholder protection the new Act should have 
provided for pre-emptive rights as the statutory default position, not only for private 
companies, but also for public companies while allowing them to opt out of that statutory 
default position. This would also ensure that the new Act and the JSE Listing requirements 
were aligned. The provision of pre-emptive rights in public companies is nothing unusual; it 
is the default position in all European jurisdictions pursuant to article 33 of the Second 
European Union Company Law Directive as recast and published in the Official Journal of 
the European Union.
51
 Institutional investors in the UK are fully behind the pre-emption rule 
and they have crafted Pre-emption Guidelines defining the limited circumstances in which 
they would waive their pre-emption rights by delegating the power to issue shares to the 
board.
52
 This highlights the fact that pre-emption rights are valued by shareholders as a tool 
to protect their interests in the context of new share issues. It also echoes media reports that 
shareholders of publicly listed companies in South Africa routinely refuse to give directors 
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 57 
the power to issue new shares.
 53
 This underlines the importance of pre-emption rights as a 
shareholder protection mechanism with regard to new share issues.    
It appears that the South African legislature chose to follow the position in the USA 
where the default position in most state jurisdictions that have adopted the MBCA is that the 
shareholders of a corporation do not have a pre-emptive right to acquire the corporation’s 
unissued shares except to the extent that the articles of incorporation so provide.
54
 Arguably 
the legislature has chosen to follow this route in order to provide companies with flexibility 
in creating financing mechanisms in a fast changing global environment. Perhaps the 
argument is that requiring directors to approach the existing shareholders every time the 
company plans to issue new shares inhibits the company’s ability to raise finance speedily 
and thus reduces its competitiveness in a globalised market characterised by rapid socio-
economic and technological changes. However, as has already been shown above, it would 
appear that shareholders would much rather prefer having a say on new share issues and the 




It is to be noted that the new Act imposes fiduciary duties on company directors,
56
  
which duties could be relied on as a remedy against abuse of the directors’ power to issue 
shares. However it must be noted that these duties are enforced through litigation after harm 
has already been done to the company. It is submitted that prevention is better than cure, 
especially if that cure entails resorting to litigation in a country like ours where access to the 
courts may not be easy or cheap for some. 
3.3.4 Application of s 15(2)(a)(iii) 
It is pertinent to point out that s 38(1) of the new Act is an unalterable provision as defined in 
s 1 of the new Act. This means that s 38(1) is a provision that does not expressly contemplate 
that its effect on a particular company may be negated, restricted, limited, qualified, extended 
or otherwise altered in substance or effect by a company’s MOI or rules.
57
 Thus at first sight 
it would appear that the company would not, by a provision in its MOI, be able to curtail the 
board’s power to issue shares by making the exercise of that power subject to approval by 
shareholders. That said it is arguable that although s 38(1) is an unalterable provision, 
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 58 
shareholders are not without means to protect themselves against an unfettered exercise of the 
directors’ power to issue shares. For s 15(2)(a)(iii) of the new Act provides that,  
‘The Memorandum of Incorporation of any company may include any provision 
imposing on the company a higher standard, greater restriction, longer period of 
time or any similarly more onerous requirement, than would otherwise apply to the 
company in terms of an unalterable provision of this Act,’ (writer’s own emphasis). 
In the light of s 15(2)(a)(iii) it may be argued that shareholders are in a position to control the 
directors’ power to issue shares. They could control it by subjecting the exercise of that 
power to an onerous requirement namely that it should be approved by shareholders in 
general meeting. Indeed it has been said that shareholders can effectively prevent the board 
from issuing shares at any time by amending the company’s MOI in accordance with s 
15(2)(a)(iii) to provide that any issue of shares also requires the approval of shareholders.
58
 If 
this argument is correct, then the implication for shareholders of the changes made by the 
new Act with regard to issuing of shares is that shareholders will need to be pro-active in 
protecting their interests by amending a company’s MOI in terms of s 15(2)(a)(iii) to ensure 
that the board’s new-found power is subjected to shareholder approval. 
While the above interpretation of s 15(2)(a)(iii) would put shareholders in a position 
to protect their interests, an interesting counter argument that could potentially be raised 
against this interpretation is as follows: The language used in s 15(2)(a)(iii) contemplates that 
the section is only applicable to those unalterable provisions which impose a requirement, 
restriction or standard that has to be adhered to before a power could be exercised. This is 
because the words used in that section are comparative adjectives. Therefore, s 15(2)(a)(iii) 
contemplates that the provision that may be included in a MOI to change the effect of an 
unalterable provision must impose on the company, a higher standard, greater restriction, 
longer period of time, or any similarly more onerous requirement than would otherwise apply 
to the company in terms of an unalterable provision of the Act. The use of the comparative 
adjectives in the sections pre-supposes the existence of some standard, restriction or 
requirement which may be enhanced by making it higher, greater or more onerous as the case 
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The argument then would be that a provision may be included in the MOI in terms of 
s 15(2)(a)(iii) only if the unalterable provision in the Act which the provision in the MOI 
seeks to change already contains a standard, restriction, time period or requirement which the 
provision in the MOI seeks to increase.  
Put in other words the argument would be that it is not permissible to insert a 
provision in the MOI in terms of s 15(2)(a)(iii) purporting to change the effect of an 
unalterable provision by imposing a standard, restriction, time period or other requirement 
where the unalterable provision itself does not impose any such standard, restriction, time 
period or other requirement in the first place. To do otherwise, so the argument would go, 
would render the comparative adjectives used in s 15(2)(a)(iii) superfluous because there is 
no existing standard, restriction or requirement to be enhanced by making it greater, higher or 
more onerous.   
As part of the above argument it would be conceded that s 38(1) imposes a restriction 
– as opposed to a requirement or standard – to the extent that it prescribes that the directors 
may issue shares, ‘only within the classes, and to the extent, that the shares have been 
authorized by or in terms of the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation….’ However, so 
it will be argued, this restriction relates to the class and extent, that is the number, of shares. 
Therefore, the only, if any, permissible provision that could be included in the MOI in terms 
of s 15(2)(a)(iii) would be one that imposes a greater restriction on the classes and number of 
shares in respect of which the directors may exercise their power in terms s 38(1).  
Although the above argument may be compelling, its weakness is that it is based on 
an unduly restrictive interpretation of s 15(2)(a)(iii) of the new Act. Such a restrictive 
interpretation disempowers shareholders by diminishing their ability to protect themselves 
against the unfettered exercise of the directors’ power to issue shares. There is nothing in the 
language of s 15(2)(a)(iii) of the new Act to justify limiting the application of that section 
only to unalterable provisions that already contain a standard, restriction, time period or other 
requirement. It does not necessarily follow that because s 15(2)(a)(iii) uses comparative 
adjectives, therefore the unalterable provision in the Act which the provision in the MOI 
seeks to change must already contain a standard, restriction, time period or requirement. It is 
difficult to see why and how the comparative adjectives used in s 15(2)(a)(iii) would become 
superfluous where one is dealing with an unalterable provision that does not already contain a 
standard, restriction, time period or requirement.  
 60 
For, supposing that the unalterable provision in question contains no requirements, 
restrictions, standards or whatever the case may be, would the imposition of a new, in place 
of the non-existent standard, restriction or, requirement not amount to imposing a higher 
standard, greater restriction or more onerous requirement than would otherwise apply to the 
company in terms of the unalterable provision? Surely it cannot be argued that where 
previously no standard, restriction or requirement existed, the imposition of a new standard, 
restriction or requirement in that instance does not amount to imposing a greater standard, 
higher restriction or more onerous requirement than previously existed. Accordingly, there is 
no basis for limiting the application of s 15(2)(a)(iii) only to an unalterable provision that 
already contains a standard, requirement, time period or restriction.  
The modern trend in statutory interpretation is to interpret legislative provisions 
purposively having regard to the context of the provision in question.
60
 In this regard context 
refers to inter alia, ‘the matter of the statute, its apparent scope and purpose, and within 
limits, its background.’
61
 Section s 5(1) also provides that the new Act ‘must be interpreted 
and applied in a manner that gives effect to the purposes set out in s 7 of that Act.’ The 
purposes of the new Act include, amongst other things, promoting the development of the 
South African economy by creating flexibility and simplicity in the formation and 
maintenance of companies, balancing the rights and obligations of shareholders and directors 
within companies.
62
 It is to be hoped that the courts will adopt a wide interpretation of s 
15(2)(a)(iii) that allows a provision in the MOI to change the effect of an unalterable 
provision by imposing a standard, restriction, time period or other requirement even where 
the unalterable provision in question does not already contain any such standard, restriction, 
time period or other requirement. Such a wide interpretation would empower shareholders to 
protect their interests by enabling them to override or veto the wide power given to directors 
regarding the issuing of shares.
63
 Such a wide interpretation would be in keeping with the 
purposes of the new Act in that it will promote flexibility in the management of companies.  
Given the potential that s 15(2)(a)(iii) could be interpreted restrictively to the 
detriment of shareholders as discussed above, it is suggested that the legislature should 
amend the section to make it clear that companies can amend an unalterable provision in 
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terms even where the unalterable provision does not prescribe any standard, restriction, time 
period or other requirement. 
 
3.4.0 Distributions 
3.4.1 Distributions - General 
The distribution of a company’s assets to any of its shareholders is another important area of 
corporate finance in which the new Act has brought about changes that raise concerns for 
corporate governance and the protection of shareholders’ interests. Generally, the distribution 
of its assets by a company to its shareholders may take place as a return on share capital or as 
a return of share capital.
64
 Whatever form it takes, a distribution of a company’s assets to its 
shareholders carries with it the risk of abuses such as the discriminatory and unequal 
treatment of shareholders.
65
 In view of these risks corporate law must strive to regulate 
distributions so as to protect the interests of, amongst others, minority shareholders of the 
company.
66
 In the context of the changes made by the new Act concerning the regulation of 
distributions, the concern is whether the new Act has shifted the balance of power between 
shareholders and directors in favour of the latter. And, if so, what implications does this have 
for corporate governance in South Africa and, in particular, the protection of shareholders’ 
interests. 
The discussion that follows below highlights some of the changes made by the new 
Act with regard to the regulation of different types of distributions. The discussion will cover 
the problems associated with the different types of distributions so as to give context for 
understanding the nature of the changes made by the new Act, as well as the implications of 
those changes for corporate governance and the protection of shareholders’ interests. It will 
also be shown that in certain instances, the changes made by the new Act have the effect of 
giving directors freedom with regard to distributions and that this is achieved by taking away 
certain powers enjoyed by shareholders under the old Act. 
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 62 
To clarify the approach taken in dealing with distributions in this thesis it is relevant to 
briefly note the marked difference in approaches to the regulation of distributions between 
the new Act and the old Act.  
The old Act did not define the term, ‘distribution.’
67
 It dealt with different types of 
distributions separately. For instance, diverse provisions of the old Act dealt with certain 
distributions as follows: 
 Payments of interest on share capital68 
 Payments made by a company to its shareholders as a consideration for the 
repurchase of its own shares
69
 








On the other hand, section 1 of the new Act comprehensively defines as distribution as 
follows: 
“distribution” means a direct or indirect-  
(a) transfer by a company of money or other property of the company, other than its 
own shares, to or for the benefit of one or more holders of any of the shares, or to the 
holder of a beneficial interest in any such shares, of that company or of another 
company within the same group of companies, whether-  
 (i) in the form of a dividend;  
(ii) as a payment in lieu of a capitalisation share, as contemplated in section 47;  
(iii) as consideration for the acquisition-  
 (aa) by the company of any of its shares, as contemplated in section 48; or 
(bb) by any company within the same group of companies, of any shares of a 
company within that group of companies; or 
(iv) otherwise in respect of any of the shares of that company or of another company 
within the same group of companies, subject to section 164(19);  
(b) incurrence of a debt or other obligation by a company for the benefit of one or 
more holders of any of the shares of that company or of another company within the 
same group of companies; or  
(c) forgiveness or waiver by a company of a debt or other obligation owed to the 
company by one or more holders of any of the shares of that company or of another 
company within the same group of companies,  
but does not include any such action taken upon the final liquidation of the company. 
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The definition can be divided into three broad classes of distributions. The first class is a 
direct or indirect transfer by a company of money or other property of the company.
72
 The 
second class involves the incurrence of a debt or other obligation by a company for the 
benefit of one or more holders of any of the shares of that company or of another company 
within the same group of companies.
73
 The third class of distributions is the forgiveness or 
waiver by a company of a debt or other obligation owed to the company by one or more 
holders of any of the shares of that company or of another company within the same group of 
companies.
74
 The definition of a distribution in the new Act bears some resemblance to the 
definition in the MBCA where a distribution is defined as follows:
75
 
‘‘Distribution’’ means a direct or indirect transfer of money or other property (except 
its own shares) or incurrence of indebtedness by a corporation to or for the benefit of 
its shareholders in respect of any of its shares. A distribution may be in the form of a 
declaration or payment of a dividend; a purchase, redemption, or other acquisition of 
shares; a distribution of indebtedness; or otherwise. 
 
It is interesting to note that the definition of the term ‘distribution’ in s 1.40(6) of the MBCA 
does not expressly cover the forgiveness or waiver of a debt.
76
 The words ‘or otherwise,’ at 
the end of the definition in s 1.40(6) appear to indicate that the list of examples of 
distributions appearing before those words is not exhaustive. Moreover all the examples 
preceding those words are limited to the class of distributions involving a direct or indirect 
transfer of money or other property of the company. Hence it is doubtful whether the words 
‘or otherwise’ are a catch-all phrase that would include forgiveness or waiver of a debt.  Thus 
it is arguable that the definition of a distribution in our Act is wider than the definition in the 
MBCA and hence it better protects the company and ultimately the shareholders against 
instances where the company’s wealth could be transferred to a shareholder by means of the 
forgiveness or waiver of a debt. 
 It is important to note that, unlike the old Act, the new Act does not regulate the 
different types of distributions separately, but it has a global provision namely, s 46, which 
regulates distributions in general.
77
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Since this thesis is not majoring on distributions per se, it is not intended to discuss in 
detail each example of the different types of distributions as defined in the Act. Only those 
aspects of the three broad classes of distributions noted above which impact on the balance of 
power between shareholders and directors and also on the protection of shareholders will be 
discussed. Given the different approaches in the new and the old Act it is appropriate to 
clarify the approach taken in dealing with distributions in this thesis. For reasons that follow 
below, this thesis proposes to deal separately with the different kinds of distributions. Certain 
types of distributions, such as the payment by a company of a consideration for the 
acquisition of its own shares and a dividend payment, resemble each other in that they share 
the same characteristic namely; they both involve a transfer of money by a company to its 
shareholders. Consequently, it may appear logical to lump them together under the banner of 
distribution without making a distinction between them. However, they are very different 
from each other.
78
 Moreover, they raise different corporate governance issues when it comes 
to the protection of shareholders. For instance, payment in respect of a share repurchase is 
made to the shareholder who sells his/her shares to the company; on the other hand, a 
dividend payment is made to shareholders of a particular class of shares. Accordingly, with a 
dividend payment there cannot be disparate treatment of shareholders within the same class 
whereas with a share repurchase it is possible that shareholders of the same class could be 
treated disproportionately.
79
   
Therefore, the approach taken in this thesis is to deal separately with specific types of 
distributions in order to highlight with greater clarity the nature of the changes made by the 
new Act with regard to the regulation of those types of distributions. It is also submitted that 
such an approach makes it possible to discuss more lucidly the specific issues arising in 
relation to a particular type of distribution. 
 
3.4.2 Share repurchases 
3.4.2.1 Problems associated with share repurchases 
The payment made to shareholders by a company when it repurchases its own shares is a 
distribution as defined in the Act.
80
 And there is good reason why the repurchase of its own 
shares by a company should be regulated. It has been said that a share repurchase operates at 
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 Para (a)(iii) of the definition in Section 1  
 65 
once as a distribution of assets, a reorganisation of ownership and a transfer of shares.
81
 In 
each of these three functions a share repurchase raises significant corporate governance issues 
because it is susceptible to misuse in a number of different ways.
82
 In its function as a share 
transfer, a share repurchase brings with it the possibility of insider trading and price 
manipulation.
83
 In its function as a distribution of assets, a share repurchase is associated with 
the risk of asset stripping and debt avoidance. Finally, as a reorganisation share repurchase 
brings the possibility of unfair and discriminatory treatment of minority shareholders.
84
 In the 
context of corporate governance in South Africa, the unfair and discriminatory treatment of 
shareholders runs contrary to the tenets of good corporate governance practices which 
demand that shareholders be treated equally.
85
  In the light of this it is crucial that corporate 
law regulates share repurchases in a way that accords with good corporate governance 
practices by protecting shareholders’ interests. The discussion that follows below will 
highlight how the old Act sought to protect shareholders’ interests in the context of share 
repurchases and how changes made by the new Act appear to take away that protection in 
pursuit of flexibility. 
3.4.2.2 Share repurchases in terms of the old Companies Act 61 of 
1973 
For a greater part of its existence the old Act sought to prevent the abuses associated with 
different types of distributions by means of the capital maintenance rule.
86
 The capital 
maintenance rule had its genesis in the case of Trevor v Whitworth.
87
  Essentially the rule 
prohibited a company from returning its capital funds to its members unless this was done 
pursuant to a formal reduction of its share capital.
88
 The rule gave rise to several principles 
one of which prohibited a company from acquiring its own shares or shares in its holding 
company.
89
 The capital maintenance rule was said to protect a company’s creditors.
90
 
However, the rule did not only protect the company’s creditors, it was thought to protect the 
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interests of shareholders as well.
91
For instance, it has been argued that the general prohibition 
against the acquisition of its own shares by a company prevents the majority from absorbing 
liquid assets to the detriment of minority shareholders.
92
 
The role of the capital maintenance rule as a protective measure for creditors and 
minority shareholders effectively ended when the old Act was amended in 1999.
93
 A 
significant consequence of that amendment was that the capital maintenance rule was 
essentially abolished.
94
 The abolishment of the capital maintenance rule saw the 
establishment of the ‘solvency and liquidity tests’ in South African corporate law.
95
 Hence 
from 1999 onwards the old Act protected creditors and minority shareholders where 




Part of the measures in the old Act designed to protect shareholders in the context of 
share repurchases included the two requirements for a share repurchase contained in s 85(1) 
of that Act. In terms of that section a company could repurchase its own shares if it was 
authorized to do so by its articles and, the repurchase was approved by way of a special 
resolution of the company’s shareholders. That these requirements served to protect 
shareholders is supported by the following comment relating to the power to repurchase; ‘The 
power in question undeniably has great potential for altering the nature of the company and 
therefore the shareholders as a body should be required to consider whether they want it to be 
available to the company.'
97
  
With regard to the requirement that the share repurchase had to be approved by a 
special resolution, it must be noted that the special resolution envisaged by s 85(1) could take 
the form of a general approval or a specific approval for a particular acquisition.
98
 If the 
approval was a general one, such an approval was valid only until the next annual general 
meeting of the company and, it could be varied or revoked by a special resolution passed any 
time prior to the next annual general meeting.
99
 It is submitted that the requirement in s 85(1) 
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of the old Act that the repurchase had to be approved by a special resolution of the 
company’s shareholders also served to empower shareholders. It secured their participation in 
the decision making process of such an important transaction which has the potential to alter 
the balance of power within the company. Therefore, the old Act empowered shareholders to 
protect their interests by giving them a power to veto the exercise of the repurchase power.  
 In addition to the above requirements, the old Act also laid down certain procedural 
requirements with regard to share repurchases whose import was to protect shareholders.
100
 
The old Act provided for two types of procedures that had to be followed depending on 
whether the company was repurchasing its own shares on the open market, or if the company 
was repurchasing its own shares by way of an off-market transaction.
101
 The most relevant 
procedure for the purposes of this discussion is the one relating to off market transactions as 
such transactions represent a corporate governance challenge because of the attendant risk of 
unequal treatment of shareholders. The applicable provision in the old Act pertaining to off-
market transactions was s 87(1). That section required the company to send a written offering 
circular to each registered shareholder offering to acquire shares from the shareholder; the 
circular also had to state the number and the class or kind of its issued shares which the 
company proposed to acquire, and to specify the terms and reasons for the offer. Where, in 
response to the offer circular, the shareholders proposed to sell a greater number of shares 
than the company offered to repurchase, the company was required to repurchase on a pro 
rata basis from all shareholders who offered to sell their shares.
102
 
The relevance of the procedural requirement contained in section 87(1) of the old Act 
is best captured by Cassim who explains that: 
‘The procedure for a share buy-back, as laid down in s 87, is of fundamental 
importance in preventing the abuse of the share repurchase power and discrimination 
against shareholders holding the same class of shares. The procedure is designed to 
protect the interests of shareholders. It ensures that shareholders of the same class 
are offered the same opportunity as every other shareholder. Equality of treatment 
lies at the basis of s 87(1).’
103
 
The procedural requirement served to prevent ‘abuse arising from certain shareholders selling 
their shares back to the company at a time when the company is facing a severe financial 
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crisis thereby leaving the less favoured shareholders to face the crisis.’
104
 Requiring share 
repurchases to be made on a pro rata basis ensured that all shareholders of the affected class 
had an opportunity to sell their shares back to the company on the same terms.
105
  
In the light of the above it is clear that the old Act protected shareholders or 
empowered shareholders to protect their interests through the requirements it laid down in 
respect of share repurchases. As discussed below, some of these requirements – or protective 
measures – have been discarded by the new Act, presumably in pursuit of giving directors 
flexibility in effecting share repurchases. This raises concerns whether the changes made by 
the new Act have elevated flexibility at the expense of the protection of shareholders. 
3.4.2.3 Share repurchases in terms of the new Companies Act 71 of 
2008 
The starting point is to note that the definition of a ‘distribution’ in the new Act – discussed 
earlier, includes the payment by a company of a consideration for the repurchase of its own 
shares by the company.
106
 Therefore, the provisions in the new Act relating to distributions in 
the new Act are applicable to share repurchases. In this regard the most relevant provisions 
are ss 46 and 48.  
Section 46 of the new Act prescribes the requirements to be complied with concerning 
the making of a distribution by a company. Generally the new Act provides that the company 
cannot make a distribution unless the distribution is pursuant to an existing legal obligation of 
the company, or a court order or, unless the distribution has been authorized by a resolution 
of the board of the company.
107
 Further, a company must not make a distribution unless it 
reasonably appears that the company will satisfy the solvency and liquidity test immediately 
after completing the proposed distribution and the board of the company, by resolution, has 
acknowledged that it has applied the solvency and liquidity test and reasonably concluded 
that the company will meet the test immediately after the distribution is made.
108
 In addition 
to these provisions relating to distributions in general, the other provision relevant to share 
repurchases is s 48(2)(a) which specifically deals with repurchases. In essence that section 
empowers the board of the company to decide that the company will acquire its own shares 
provided that such a decision satisfies the requirements of s 46 relating to distributions as 
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well as other requirements laid down in the rest of s 48. Section 48(2)(a) is an unalterable 
provision therefore any attempts to limit or, qualify the board’s power to authorize share 
repurchases via provisions in the MOI must comply with the prescripts of s 15(2)(a)(iii). In 
this regard the observations made in paragraph 3.3.4 above concerning the limited scope, 
under s 15(2)(a)(iii), for limiting or, qualifying the power of directors to issue shares in terms 
of s 38(1) apply mutatis mutandis in relation to the directors’ power to authorize share 
repurchases in terms of s 48(2)(a). 
 It is noteworthy that s 48 generally does not require shareholder approval for a share 
repurchase. This stands in contra-distinction to the position under the old Act where the 
general position was that shareholder approval was required in relation to a share 
repurchase.
109
 The new Act gives power to the board of directors to decide on a share 
repurchase. Accordingly, it appears that the new Act has shifted the balance of power in this 
regard. At the time the Act was passed the decision to exclude shareholders from the decision 
making process was questioned in the light of the fact that shareholders’ interests were at risk 
where share repurchases are concerned.
110
 
 In addition to the above, it should also be noted that the new Act does not have the 
equivalent of the procedural requirement in s 87(1) of the old Act whereby a company 
making an off-market share repurchase was required to send a written offer circular wherein 
the company informed each registered shareholder of the share repurchase and also offered to 
acquire their shares. As previously observed, such a requirement in the old Act prevented the 
incidence of unequal treatment of shareholders by ensuring that each shareholder was given 
the same opportunity to sell their shares to the company. Therefore, the absence of a similar 
requirement in s 48 of the new Act appears to deal a blow to the protection of minority 
shareholders in the context of off-market share repurchases.
111
 In this regard the new Act has 
been criticized thus; 
 ‘Not only does the new Act exclude shareholders from deciding on a buy-back, it 
also contains no provisions aimed at informing shareholders as to the merits or de-
merits of an offer to acquire their shares. No circulars in a prescribed form, like 
those required by the current Act (see s 87 of the current Act [the old Companies Act 
61 of 1973]), have to be sent to all shareholders when an offer for their shares is 
made (in the case of listed shares the Listing Rules of the JSE Securities Exchange 
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SA would of course be applicable). No distinction is drawn in the new Act between 
general and selective offers (unlike s 87 of the current Act). No special safeguards 




Therefore in the context of share repurchases it appears that the new Act has shifted the 
balance of power between shareholders and directors in favour of the latter. The new Act has 
dispensed with important protective measures that existed in terms of the provisions of the 
old Act. That said it must be noted that the new Act does give some room, albeit limited, for 
shareholders to participate in the decision making process concerning share repurchases. In 
terms of s 48(8)(a) a repurchase decision by the board of a company must be approved by a 
special resolution of the shareholders of the company if any shares are to be acquired by the 
company from a director or prescribed officer of the company, or a person related to a 
director or a prescribed officer.   
The position in terms of the new Act regarding share repurchases is similar to the 
position under the MBCA. The acquisition of its own shares by a company is regulated by 
6.31(a) of the MBCA which provides that ‘a corporation may acquire its own shares, and 
shares so acquired constitute authorized but unissued shares.’ In terms of the MBCA it would 
seem that the power to authorise a repurchase is exclusively invested in the board by virtue of 
the fact that s 6.40 (a) vests the power to authorise a distribution in the board, and s 1.40(6) 
defines a distribution to include a purchase, redemption, or other acquisition of the 
corporation’s shares. In Delaware s 160(a) of the Delaware General Corporations Law 
authorises a corporation to repurchase its shares but it does not expressly empower the board 
to authorise share repurchases. However, it would also seem that in Delaware the board 
would have authority to authorise a repurchase of its own shares by the company based on the 
fact that s 140(a) of the Delaware General Corporations Law provides for the business and 
affairs of every corporation to be managed by or under the control of the board. Moreover, s 
174 imposes personal liability on the directors under whose watch an unlawful stock 
purchase takes place in violation of s 160.   
However to the extent that s 48(8)(a) of the new Act requires approval by a special 
resolution of the shareholders where shares are to be repurchased from a director or 
prescribed officer of the company, the South African position differs from the Delaware 
position and the position in the MBCA. In this respect the new Act better protects 
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shareholders against share repurchases tainted by the directors’ self-interest than the 
Delaware General Corporations Law. The protection of shareholders in the context of 
selective share repurchases could have been enhanced in the new Act by following the 
example of Australia where s 257D of the Australian Corporations Act requires that a 
selective share repurchase be approved by a special resolution of the shareholders in general 
meeting and the notice of the meeting must include a statement setting out all material 
information that is relevant to the proposal regarding the selective share repurchase.  
Section 61(1)(b)(i) and (ii) of the New Zealand Companies Act, 1993 also protects 
shareholders in the case of selective repurchases by prescribing that all shareholders must 
consent in writing to a selective offer or, the selective offer must be expressly permitted by 
the company’s constitution and it must be made in accordance with the procedure set out in s 
61 of that Act. Section s 61(1) prescribes inter alia, that the board may make a selective offer 
to repurchase shares only if it has previously resolved that the acquisition is of benefit to the 
remaining shareholders and, that the terms of the offer and the consideration offered for the 
shares are fair and reasonable to the remaining shareholders. Further, s 61(5) requires the 
company to send a disclosure document to every shareholder before any offer to repurchase 
shares is made. In terms of s 62 of the New Zealand Companies Act the disclosure document 
must provide the following information, 
‘(a) the nature and terms of the offer, and if made to specified shareholders, 
to whom it will be made; and 
(b) the nature and extent of any relevant interest of any director of the company 
in any shares the subject of the offer; and 
(c) the text of the resolution required by section 61, together with such further 
information and explanation as may be necessary to enable a 
reasonable shareholder to understand the nature and implications for the 
company and its shareholders of the proposed acquisition.’ 
 
Hence the requirement for a disclosure document facilitates transparency and thereby 
empowers shareholders to make informed decisions and to protect their interests in the 
context of selective repurchases. 
 
3.4.3 Dividend Payments 
3.4.3.1 Authority to make dividend payments 
A dividend payment is listed in the Act as an example of a distribution which falls in the 
category of ‘a direct or indirect transfer, by a company of money or other property of the 
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company, other than its own shares, to or for the benefit of one or more holders of any of the 
shares of that company or of another company within the same group of companies.’
113
 
Hence the requirements for a distribution prescribed by s 46 noted above with regard to the 
payment of a consideration for the acquisition of its own shares by a company also apply to a 
dividend payment. This contrasts with the approach under the old Act where, as noted earlier, 
dividend payments and payments in respect of share repurchases were governed by different 
provisions.
114
   
Under the old Act dividend payments were governed by s 90 which provided that: 
(1) A company may make payments to its shareholders subject to the provisions of 
this section and if authorized thereto by its articles. 
(2) A company shall not make any payment in whatever form to its shareholders if 
there are reasonable grounds for believing that- 
(a) the company is, or would after the payment be, unable to pay its debts as they 
become due in the ordinary course of business; or 
(b) the consolidated assets of the company fairly valued would after the payment be 
less than the consolidated liabilities of the company. 
(3) For the purposes of this section 'payment' includes any direct or indirect payment 
or transfer of money or other property to a shareholder of the company by virtue of 
the shareholder's shareholding in the company, but excludes an acquisition of shares 
in terms of section 85, a redemption of redeemable preference shares in terms of 
section 98, any acquisition of shares in terms of an order of Court and the issue of 
capitalisation shares in the company. 
(4) A shareholder shall be liable to the company for any payment received contrary to 
the provisions of subsection (2). 
 
Therefore a company could only make a payment (or a dividend) if it was authorized to do so 
by its articles [henceforth a reference to ‘payments’ would also include a reference to a 
dividend payment]. Since a company’s power to make a payment was determined by the 
articles this meant it was possible for the articles to impose any restrictions or requirements 
on the company’s ability to make payments. Hence the articles could restrict the funds that 
could be utilized to make a particular payment by providing, for example that, a dividend 
payment shall only be made out of profits.
115
  By contrast s 46 of the new Act does not 
require any authorization in the MOI. It appears that a company now has inherent power to 
make a payment even in the absence of a provision expressly authorising such payments in 
the MOI.  
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Section 46 is an unalterable provision hence it is debatable whether the MOI could 
impose any prohibitions, conditions or requirements regarding distributions. Van der Linde is 
of the view that the MOI could validly impose a requirement that any distribution by the 
company must be approved by the shareholders.
116
 Although the basis of Van der Linde’s 
view is not apparent from her paper this writer agrees with her view on the basis that, as 
discussed in paragraph 3.3.4 above, s 15(2)(a)(iii) permits the MOI to include a provision 
imposing on the company a higher standard, greater restriction or more onerous requirement 
than would otherwise apply to the company in terms of an unalterable provision of this 
Act.
117
 In line with this it is arguable that s 15(2)(a)(iii) would also permit a provision in the 
MOI restricting the company from paying dividends otherwise than out of profits as this 
would be a higher standard, greater restriction or more onerous requirement than would 
otherwise apply in terms of s 46.   
Admittedly the validity of a clause in a MOI which seeks to impose any prohibitions, 
conditions or requirements regarding distributions is not always certain since it is dependent 
on a value judgment based on s 15(2)(a)(iii), that is whether it actually imposes a higher 
standard, greater restriction or more onerous requirement than would otherwise be applicable 
in terms of the unalterable provision. This uncertainty is undesirable. In the context of s 46 
perhaps it would have been desirable if the legislature had followed the example of s 6.40 of 
the MBCA which provides inter alia that ‘A board of directors may authorize and the 
corporation may make distributions to its shareholders subject to restriction by the articles of 
incorporation…’ This provision is clear and simple; the board has power to authorise 
distributions subject to any restriction in the articles. And, the validity of the restriction in the 
articles is not dependent on whether it imposes a higher standard, greater restriction or more 
onerous requirement. 
 
3.4.3.2 Who has the power to authorize and make dividend 
payments? 
Section 90 did not specify which organ had the power to authorize and make payments.  
However the model articles for both public and private companies provided that, ‘the 
company in annual general meeting may declare dividends but no dividend shall exceed the 
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amount recommended by directors.’
118
 The model articles also authorized ‘directors from 
time to time to pay to the members such interim dividends as appear to the directors to be 
justified by the profits of the company.’
119
 If a company’s articles were silent regarding the 
payment of dividends the common law applied. At common law dividends are payable only 
when declared by an ordinary resolution of the shareholders in general meeting.
120
 It would 
seem the actual payment had to be made by or on the authority of the directors.
121
 In this 
respect it is pertinent to note that the model articles provided that ‘every dividend or other 
moneys payable in cash in respect of shares may be paid by cheque, warrant, coupons or 
otherwise as the directors may from time to time determine.’
122
 Moreover generally the 
articles conferred power on the board to exercise all such powers of the company that were 
not required by the Act or the articles to be exercised by the company in general meeting.
123
  
 By directly empowering the board to authorize distributions (including dividend 
payments) s 46 of the new Act has significantly changed the position regarding who has the 
power to authorize dividend payments. In this respect s 46 has set South African company 
law apart from the law of the UK where the matter of who has power to authorize dividend 
payments is still determined by a company’s articles.
124
 As was the case under the old Act, 
the UK model articles for both private and public companies limited by shares determine that 
a dividend which does not exceed the amount recommended by the directors may be declared 
by ordinary resolution.
125
 Thus in the UK the position remains as per common law that if the 
articles are silent on the matter, the power to decide on dividend payments would rest with 
the shareholders in general meeting.
126
 
To a great extent it would appear that the enactment of s 46 was influenced by 
American law. As noted earlier, s 6.40 of the MBCA empowers the board of a corporation to 
authorize distributions
127
 subject to restrictions in the articles. Likewise, in Delaware the 
board of directors has exclusive power to declare a dividend. Section 170(a) of the Delaware 
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General Corporations Law provides that ‘the directors of every corporation, subject to any 
restrictions contained in its certificate of incorporation, may declare and pay dividends upon 
the shares of its capital stock…’ Section 254U of the Australian Corporations Act also 
provides that the directors may determine that a dividend is payable and that the board may 
fix, the amount of the dividend, the time for payment and the method of payment. However 
unlike s 46 of the Act which is an unalterable provision, s 254U of the Australian 
Corporations Act is a ‘replaceable rule’ and thus Australian companies have the flexibility to 
alter the power dynamic between the board and shareholders regarding the power to authorise 
distributions. In South Africa a company may not completely exclude the power conferred on 
directors by s 46; as discussed earlier the most that could be done is to impose a higher 
standard, greater restriction or more onerous requirement than would otherwise apply to the 
company as envisaged by s 15(2)(a)(iii). 
While it may be desirable to empower the board of a company to authorise dividend 
payments, it would have been desirable to give companies the flexibility to decide whether 
they want their board to have this power in the first place, and to impose whatever restrictions 
or conditions or requirements they deem necessary regarding distributions. 
3.4.4 Incurrence of and forgiveness or waiver of debts or other 
obligations 
A company makes a distribution if it incurs a debt or other obligation for the benefit of one or 
more of its shareholders or a shareholder of another company with the same group of 
companies.
128
 It has been said that, ‘it is unclear whether the incurring of a non-monetary 
obligation by a company for example, to render a service or to refrain from doing something, 
will also constitute a distribution and, if so, how it will be quantified.’
129
 The answer to this 
question is not certain but, it is submitted that paragraph (b) of the definition of ‘distribution’ 
makes no distinction between monetary and non-monetary obligations. Hence it is arguable 
that it refers to the incurrence of any obligation including a non-monetary obligation.  
It is further submitted that a loophole could arise if it were it to be held that the 
incurrence of a non-monetary obligation is not a distribution. It must be noted that one of the 
principles underlying the regulation of distributions is to ‘ensure that the rights of creditors 
are not endangered.’
130
 To this end ‘the primary form of regulation in favour of creditors is 
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the imposition of financial restrictions on distributions.’
131
 Hence one of the requirements for 
a distribution is that a company must not make a distribution unless it reasonably appears that 
the company will satisfy the solvency and liquidity test immediately after completing the 
distribution.
132
 While the incurrence of an obligation to perform a service or, to refrain from 
doing something may not sound in money, it is conceivable that the actual performance of the 
service itself or refraining from doing something may come at a cost to the company. This 
may in turn impact on the company’s solvency and liquidity. Therefore, excluding the 
incurrence of non-monetary obligations – which may negatively impact on a company’s 
financial position – from the definition of a ‘distribution’ could affect the protection of 
creditors’ interests.  
In light of the above it is submitted that the definition of a distribution must be taken 
to include not only the incurrence of monetary obligations, but also non-monetary obligations 
with the result that a company will be required to take into account the cost implications, and 
the impact thereof on its financial position of any decision to incur a non-monetary 
obligation. Of course if the incurrence of a particular non-monetary obligation has no cost 
implications and, therefore will not impact on a company’s financial position, the company 
may proceed with the distribution because then all things being equal, it will reasonably 
appear that the company will satisfy the solvency and liquidity test after the distribution. 
Distributions whereby a company forgives or waives a debt or other obligation owed 
to it by one or more of its shareholders or a shareholder of another company within the same 
group of companies, do not seem to raise any serious issues regarding the balance of power 
between shareholders and the board of directors and also pertaining to the protection of 
shareholders’ interests. Therefore, no further discussion of these types of distributions will be 
undertaken in this thesis. 
3.4.5 Solvency & liquidity test and protection of preference 
shareholders 
As noted earlier the solvency and liquidity test is one of the requirements that must be 
satisfied by a company before it can make a distribution. One of the criticisms that have been 
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levelled at this requirement is that it undermines the protection of preferent shareholders’ 
interests.
133
 This arises from the qualification contained in s 4(2)(c) to the effect that, 
‘unless the Memorandum of Incorporation of the company provides otherwise, when 
applying the test in respect of a distribution contemplated in paragraph (a) of the 
definition of ‘distribution’ in section 1, a person is not to include as a liability any 
amount that would be required, if the company were to be liquidated at the time of the 
distribution, to satisfy the preferential rights upon liquidation of shareholders whose 
preferential rights upon liquidation are superior to the preferential rights upon 
liquidation of those receiving the distribution.’ 
 
Effectively this provision undermines the protection of preferential dissolution rights of 
shareholders if the distribution takes the form of a transfer of money or property as 
contemplated in paragraph (a) of the definition of distribution. If the MOI does not provide 
otherwise, those applying the solvency liquidity test in that context do not have to take into 
account the amount required to satisfy the preferential rights of preference shareholders.
134
 
This entails that preference shareholders who wish to protect their interests would need to 
take steps to amend the company’s MOI so that it includes a provision requiring those 
applying the solvency and liquidity test to take into account the amount required to satisfy the 
preferential rights of preference shareholders. It is submitted that this is not satisfactory 
because the preference shareholders needing protection may not be able to muster the 
sufficient number of votes required to amend the company’s MOI. 
 In light of the express exclusion by s 4(2)(c) of the preference rights of preference 
shareholders in the context of paragraph (a) distributions, it would seem that the rights of 
preference shareholders must be taken into account if the distribution were in the form of an 
incurrence of a debt, or the forgiveness or waiver of a debt as contemplated in paragraphs (b) 
and (c) of the definition of a distribution.
135
 It is of note that the wording of s 4(2)(c) is 
similar to the wording of s 6.40(c) of the MBCA but the latter provision actually protects the 
preferential dissolution rights of shareholders
136
 by providing that: 
  No distribution may be made if, after giving it effect: 
(1) the corporation would not be able to pay its debts as they become due in the usual 
course of business; or 
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(2) the corporation’s total assets would be less than the sum of its total liabilities plus 
(unless the articles of incorporation permit otherwise) the amount that would be 
needed, if the corporation were to be dissolved at the time of the distribution, to 
satisfy the preferential rights upon dissolution of shareholders whose preferential 
rights are superior to those receiving the distribution (writer’s emphasis). 
Section 6.40(c) does not restrict itself to a particular type of distribution unlike our s 4(2)(c) 
which deals only with paragraph (a) distributions – transfers of money or other assets of the 
company. 
The preferential rights of shareholders in the context of distributions are also 
protected in New Zealand. Section 52(4) of the New Zealand Corporations Act 105 of 1993 
provides as follows: 
In applying the solvency test for the purposes of this section and section 56
137
,— 
(a) debts includes fixed preferential returns on shares ranking ahead of those in  
respect of which a distribution is made (except where that fixed preferential return 
is expressed in the constitution as being subject to the power of the directors to 
make distributions), but does not include debts arising by reason of the 
authorisation; and 
(b) liabilities includes the amount that would be required, if the company were to  
be removed from the New Zealand register after the distribution, to repay all fixed 
preferential amounts payable by the company to shareholders, at that time, or on 
earlier redemption (except where such fixed preferential amounts are expressed in 
the constitution as being subject to the power of directors to make distributions); 
but, subject to paragraph (a), does not include dividends payable in the future. 
 
It is submitted that the new Act ought to have followed the example of s 6.40(c) of the 
MBCA or, s 52(4) of the New Zealand Corporations Act 105 of 1993 both of which are quite 
clear that the preferential liquidation rights of shareholders which are superior to the rights of 
those shareholders receiving the distribution are be treated as a liability when applying the 
solvency and liquidity test. If a company issues preference shareholders with superior 
liquidation rights the holders of such stock are entitled to expect that the MOI will protect 
their rights unless the shareholders themselves agree to forego such protection.
138
 
3.4.6 Liability for unlawful distributions 
It is important to note that one of the changes brought about by the new Act is that, unlike the 
old Act which only imposed liability on directors for unlawful share repurchases but not for 
unlawful payments
139
, the new Act imposes liability on directors for unlawful distributions 
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 Sections 52 and 56 of the New Zealand Corporations Act 105 of 1993 deal with distributions to shareholders 
and the recovery of unlawful distributions respectively. 
138
 JJ. Hanks, Jr op cit note 3 at 149 
139




 This is a positive change. Since directors now generally have 
the power to authorise distributions without shareholder approval it is important that they are 
held accountable for any unlawful distributions and not just for unlawful share repurchases. 
The liability of directors for unlawful distributions in terms of the new Act and the 




                                                          
140
 Sections 46(6) read with s 77(3)(e)(vi) of the new Act 
141
 See chapter 4 para 4.4.2.2  
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CHAPTER 4: DIRECTORS’ DUTIES AND LIABILITY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter highlighted how the new Act vests increased powers on the board of 
directors in the area of corporate finance. The question that immediately arises in the light of 
the increased powers of directors is whether, and how, the new Act makes directors 
accountable for the exercise of those powers. This question is relevant to the topic of this 
thesis as it relates to the protection of shareholders. Power without accountability invites 
abuse of that power. Therefore those to whom greater power has been given must be held 
accountable for the exercise of that power and, it is generally accepted that ‘with great power 
comes great responsibility.’
1
 Hence the discussion in this chapter will focus on the 
responsibilities imposed on directors, as well as the measures in the new Act designed to 
make directors accountable to shareholders. 
The focus of the discussion in this chapter is the statutory duties of directors. Also 
discussed is the liability imposed on directors in terms of s 77 of the new Act for breach of 
these duties as well as the directors’ liability in relation to specific company transactions such 
as distributions and share issues. Other related provisions concerning the indemnification of 
directors as well as those provisions providing for relief from liability will also be discussed.  
 
4.2 The agency problem and statutory directors’ duties 
The fact that the new Act has shifted power from shareholders to directors is a matter of 
concern from a corporate governance perspective because it raises the specter of the age-old 





 the agency problem arises from the fact that the directors who manage 
and control the company may be motivated to act in their own selfish interests at the expense 
of the shareholders. This possibility imposes ‘agency costs’ on the shareholders in that they 
have to monitor the behavior of the directors. Research has shown that these agency costs are 
likely to increase where the agent has to undertake tasks of greater complexity and where 
                                                          
1
 C Stein & G Everingham The New Companies Act Unlocked (2011) 255. See also Monks and Minnow Power 
and Accountability available at http://www.lens-library.com/power/chapter3.html#section2, accessed on 21 
February 2014; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Healey [2011] FCA 717 at para 14  
2
 R Kraakman, J Armour & P Davies et al The Anatomy of Corporate Law-A Comparative and Functional 
Approach 2 ed (2009) 35 
3
 See discussion in para 1 of Chapter 1 
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he/she is given greater discretion.
4
 Since the new Act gives greater powers and hence 
discretion to company directors there is concern that the new Act could leave shareholders in 
a worse position than they were under the old Act. Therefore, it is important to establish 
whether the new Act has put in place mechanisms to protect shareholders against self-serving 
or negligent actions of directors. 
One of the strategies employed by corporate law in an attempt to constrain conflicts of 
interest is the imposition upon directors of fiduciary duties to the company.
5
 It has been said 
that: 
“The law has tried to answer this question of agency costs by developing its highest 
standard of behaviour, the fiduciary standard, and applying it to those who hold and 
manage property on behalf of others. This standard applies to several different players 




Apart from the fiduciary duties, the common law also attempts to make directors accountable 
to the shareholders by imposing upon them the duty to act with reasonable care and skill in 
the management of the company’s affairs.
7
  
It is not intended here to engage in a comprehensive discussion of the directors’ 
common law duties. What is important to note is that a prominent feature of the new Act is 
that it restates the common law fiduciary duties of directors as well as the duty to exercise 
reasonable care and skill thereby giving them statutory force.
8
  
What follows below is a brief discussion of the fiduciary duties as well as the duty of 
care and skill as restated in the new Act. To give context to these statutory duties the 
equivalent common law duties will also be briefly discussed. Also discussed is the liability of 
directors for breach of these statutory duties.  
4.3 Statutory directors’ duties 
4.3.1 Duty to avoid a conflict of interest 
The relevant provisions in the new Act concerning directors’ duties are sections 75 and 76. 
Both sections have a bearing on the directors’ duty to avoid a conflict of interest. Section 
                                                          
4
 Ibid at 36 
5
 Robinson v Randfontein Estates GM Co Ltd 1921 AD 168 at 177-178; See also Sibex Construction (SA) Pty 
Ltd v Injectaseal CC 1988(2) SA 54 (T) 65 
6
 Monks and Minnow Power and Accountability op cit note 1 
7
  African Claim and Land Co Ltd v W J Langermann 1905 TS 494 at 504; Fisheries Development Corporation 
of SA Ltd v Jorgensen 1980(4) SA 156(W) at 166 
8
 FHI Cassim, MF Cassim & R Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 2ed (2012) at 507  
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76(2)(a) is discussed here while s 75 will be discussed below under the duty to disclose 
personal financial interests. Section 76(2)(a) provides as follows: 
‘A director of a company must-  
(a) not use the position of director, or any information obtained while acting in the   
     capacity of a director-  
(i) to gain an advantage for the director, or for another person other than the company      
or a wholly-owned subsidiary of the company; or  
(ii) to knowingly cause harm to the company or a subsidiary of the company;’ 
 
At the core of the above quoted provision is the directors’ duty of loyalty and fidelity to the 
company which is the essence of the common law fiduciary directors’ duty to avoid a conflict 
of interest.
9
 Although at first sight it may appear as if s 76(2)(a) is equivalent to the common 
law fiduciary duty to avoid a conflict of interest, it must be noted that the scope of the 
statutory duty is wider than the common law duty. This is because the statutory duty in s 
76(2)(a) is owed to the company and to that company’s wholly owned subsidiary, on the 





4.3.2 General duty of disclosure 
Section 76(2)(b) imposes upon directors a general duty to disclose to the board information 
which is material to the company. The section provides as follows:  
‘(2) A director of a company must- 
(b) communicate to the board at the earliest practicable opportunity any information 
that comes to the director’s attention, unless the director-  
(i) reasonably believes that the information is-  
(aa) immaterial to the company; or  
(bb) generally available to the public, or known to the other directors; or  
(ii) is bound not to disclose that information by a legal or ethical obligation of 
confidentiality.’ 
Section 76(2)(b) appears to be a restatement of the common law fiduciary duty to disclose 
information that is material to the company, in particular the fair dealing rule.
11
 The fair 
dealing rule requires a director to inter alia, reveal any information which he has, and knows 
                                                          
9
 FHI Cassim, MF Cassim & R Cassim et al op cit note 8 at 514-515. The common law directors’ fiduciary duty 
to avoid a conflict of interest was distilled into two related principles namely, the no-conflict rule and the no 
profit rule. The former rule entailed that the director had a duty to avoid a conflict of personal interests while the 
import of the latter rule was that the director had a duty not to make a profit from his position as a director. See 
for example Phillips v Fieldstone 2004(3) SA 465 (SCA) 479 para 31 
10
 R v Milne and Erleigh (7) 1951(1) SA 791 (A) 828  
11
 FHI Cassim, MF Cassim & R Cassim et al op cit note 8 at 554 
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that those acting for the company do not have, if it is information likely to influence the 
company’s decision in a particular matter.
12
 
Section 76(2)(b) is couched in very wide terms; it requires a director to disclose any 
information that comes to the directors’ attention. Despite its wide terms, it would appear that 
the defences provided in sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii) of that section could make it relatively 




4.3.3 Duty to disclose personal financial interests 
Apart from requiring directors to disclose any information that is material to the company, 
section 75(5) of the new Act also specifically requires a director to disclose a personal 
financial interest which the director or any person related to him/her has in respect of a matter 
that is to be considered at a meeting of the board of directors. In terms of s 75(5)(a) and (b) 
the director in question must disclose the interest and its general nature before the matter is 
considered by the board and, he must also disclose any material information relating to the 
matter known to him or her. Having made that disclosure, the director is then required to 
recuse himself as per s 75(5)(d) and (e) from the board meeting wherein the matter in respect 
of which he or a person related to him/her has a personal financial interest will be considered. 
A director must not, as per s 75(5)(g), execute a document on behalf of the company in 
relation to a matter in which he has a personal financial interest unless he is specifically 
requested or directed to do so by the board. Section 75(6) further provides that, 
‘If a director of a company acquires a personal financial interest in an agreement or 
other matter in which the company has a material interest, or knows that a related 
person has acquired a personal financial interest in the matter, after the agreement or 
other matter has been approved by the company, the director must promptly disclose 
to the board, or to the shareholders in the case of a company contemplated in 
subsection (3), the nature and extent of that interest, and the material circumstances 
relating to the director or related person’s acquisition of that interest.’ 
 
Section 75 embodies the common law fiduciary duty of a director to avoid putting himself in 
a situation where his personal interests stand in conflict, or potential conflict, with his/her 
duties to the company.
14
  
One major difference between the statutory duty and the common law duty relates to 
the consequences for breach of the duty. At common law if a director breaches his duty by 
                                                          
12
 Novick v Comair Holdings Ltd 1979 (2) SA 116 (W) 153. 
13
 C Stein & G Everingham op cit note 1 at 247. See also P Delport The New Companies Act Manual 2ed (2011) 
95 
14
 Robinson v Randfontein Estates GM Co Ltd supra note 5 at 177-178  
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acting on behalf of the company in a matter in which he has an interest that conflicts with his 
duty or, by failing to disclose his interest, the contract is voidable at the instance of the 
company as against the director or a third party who had knowledge of the director’s breach 
of duty.
15
 On the other hand the gist of s 75(7)(b) is that where a transaction is approved 
without the required disclosure of a directors’ personal financial interest, the transaction in 
question would be valid only if it has subsequently been ratified by an ordinary resolution of 
the shareholders following disclosure of the interest or, if the transaction is declared valid by 
a court consequent to an application by an interested person in terms of s 75(8). In other 
words, the transaction is not valid unless any one of the foregoing conditions is met. 
The new Act, much like ss 234 to 241 of the old Act, generally requires that the 
disclosure be made to the board of directors of the company.
16
 Disclosure of the interest to 
the company’s shareholders is not required except in the case of a company having only one 
director where the director is not the only shareholder.
17
 At common law a director is 
required to disclose any interest he has in a proposed company contract to the shareholders in 
general meeting.
18
 The only exception to this rule is that the company’s articles may 
authorize a director to act for the company in such matters if he discloses his interest to the 
other board members.
19
 From a shareholder’s perspective the statutory position requiring 
disclosure only to the board of directors and not the general meeting of shareholders raises 
the concern that the ‘disinterested’ board members tasked with deciding on the interest of one 
of their own may not exercise their minds independently.
20
 In other words the directors may 
be more inclined to decide in favour of a fellow board member.  
However, this concern must be balanced against the need to ensure that companies are 
able to conclude deals with speed. The time consuming requirement for disclosure to and 
approval by shareholders in general meeting may be counterproductive.
21
 The general 
practice of companies under the old corporate law regime whereby they included a provision 
                                                          
15
   MS Blackman, RD Jooste & GK Everingham et al Commentary on the Companies Act (2002) Volume 2 at 
8-132 to 133 
16
 Section 75(4) read with s 75(7) of the new Act. See also P Delport, Q Vorster, D Burdette et al Henochsberg 
on the Companies Act, 71 of 2008 (2011) Volume 1 at 287-288; FHI Cassim, M F Cassim & R Cassim et al op 
cit note 8at 572 
17
 Section 75(4) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 
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 Woolworths Ltd v Kelly (1991) 4 ACSR 431 435 CA(NSW) 
21
 MS Blackman, RD Jooste, GK Everingham et al op cit note 15 at 8-328 
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in their articles permitting disclosure to the board of directors
22
 instead of the general meeting 
was a pragmatic one. Accordingly, s 75 appears to be satisfactory. 
 
4.3.4 Duty to act in good faith, for a proper purpose and in the best 
interests of the company 
One of the most important common law fiduciary duties is that a director has a duty to act 
bona fide in the best interests of the company.
23
 The duty to act bona fide, or in good faith, is 
a subjective one requiring the director to act honestly in what he/she considers, not what the 
court considers, to be in the best interests of the company.
24
  It is an all-encompassing duty 
extending to the exercise of all the directors’ powers within the company. The director’s bona 
fides alone does not suffice; the director in question must also ensure that he acts in what he 
considers, in good faith, to be in the best interests of the company.
25
 It is widely accepted that 
the concept of ‘interests of the company’ generally refers to the interests of the shareholders, 
in their capacity as shareholders, as a general body.
26
 
The common law fiduciary duty to act bona fide in the best interests of the company 
has been restated in section 76(3) of the new Act as follows: 
‘Subject to subsections (4) and (5), a director of a company, when acting in that 
capacity, must exercise the powers and perform the functions of director-  
(a) in good faith and for a proper purpose;  
(b) in the best interests of the company; and...’ 
Paragraph (a) couples the duty to act in good faith with the duty to exercise the power for a 
proper purpose. The duty to act for a proper purpose derives from the common law fiduciary 
duty of directors not to exercise their powers for unauthorised or collateral purposes.
27
 The 
common law duty requires directors to exercise their powers only for the purposes for which 
the power was granted. It has been observed, and rightly so, that section 76(3)(a) of the new 
Act is declaratory of the common law and as such it does not change this aspect of the 
common-law fiduciary duties of directors.
28
 Similarly s 76(3)(b) does not appear to diverge 
from the common law duty to act in the best interests of the company. 
 




 Da Silva v CH Chemicals (Pty) Ltd 2008(6) SA 620 (SCA) 627 
24
 Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd [1967] CH 254 at 268 
25
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26
 MS Blackman, RD Jooste & GK Everingham et al op cit note 15 at 8-67 
27
 Samuel v President Brand Gold Mining Co Ltd 1969(3) SA 629 (A) at 678; Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd [1967] Ch 
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4.3.5.1 Duty to act with care, skill and diligence 
Apart from the common law director’s fiduciary duties, the common law duty requiring 
directors to exercise their powers with reasonable care and skill
29
 is another tool designed to 
make directors accountable to shareholders. The duty is owed to the company
30
 and, while it 
is aimed at the protection of the company it also ultimately, albeit indirectly, protects the 
shareholders.
31
 The principles pertaining to the director’s duty of care and skill were largely 
developed by the English courts in cases such as In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co 
Ltd,
32
 In re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates Ltd
33




In the case of In re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates Ltd
35
 the court held that 
a director’s duty requires him ‘to act with such care as is reasonably to be expected from him, 
having regard to his knowledge and experience. He is… not bound to bring any special 
qualifications to his office.’ The court further held that the director must use reasonable care 
in conducting the company’s business and, in this respect reasonable care ‘must be measured 
by the care an ordinary man might be expected to take in the same circumstances on his own 
behalf.’
36
 In the case of In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd
37
 the court said inter alia, 
‘a director need not exhibit in the performance of his duties a greater degree of skill than may 
reasonably be expected from a person of his knowledge and experience…A director is not 
bound to give continuous attention to the affairs of his company.’ 
The decisions of English courts discussed above influenced the development of South 
African law pertaining to the director’s duty of care and skill. For instance, in the leading 
South African case on the subject, Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v 
Jorgensen,
38
 Margo J noted that the principles developed by the English courts were of 
guidance to South African courts. He distilled the principles regarding a director’s duty of 
care and skill from the English cases and observed inter alia that, ‘[nowhere are his duties 
and qualifications listed as being equal to those of an auditor or accountant. Nor is he 
                                                          
29
 Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen supra note 7 at 165-166 and also In re City 
Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd [1925] 1 Ch 407 at 427 
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required to have special business acumen or expertise, or singular ability or intelligence…He 
is nevertheless expected to exercise the care which can reasonably be expected of a person 
with his knowledge and experience…A director is not liable for mere errors of judgment.’
39
   
 
It can be seen from the foregoing that the test for the degree of care and skill required 
at common law is partly objective, that is the care which can be reasonably be expected from 
a person with his knowledge and experience (writer’s emphasis). The test is also partly 
subjective to the extent that the particular director’s knowledge and experience influences the 
level of care that can be expected of him.
40
 Notwithstanding this dual nature of the common 
law test of care and skill, ‘it is generally accepted that …the common law duty of care and 
skill is at heart more subjective than objective – the individual director is considered, and is 
neither measured against a reasonable person nor against the reasonable director, but what the 
reasonable thing would have been for such a director to have done.’
41
  This overemphasis of 
the subjective aspect led to the criticism that the common law sets a very low standard of care 
and skill for directors.
42
  It has been said that overemphasizing the skills and experience of 
the director concerned in a given situation amounts to not setting a standard at all; such a test 
absolves honest, but sometimes inept, directors from their actions on the basis that they are 
incapable of performing their duties any better.
43
 Indeed the laxity associated with the 
common law duty of care and skill appears to be borne out by the paucity of cases where 




4.3.5.2 The statutory duty of care, skill and diligence 
Section 76(3)(c) establishes a statutory duty of care, skill and diligence which applies 
concurrently with the common law duty. Section 76(3)(c) of the new Act provides that: 
‘Subject to subsections (4) and (5), a director of a company, when acting in that 
capacity, must exercise the powers and perform the functions of director- …… 
                                                          
39
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40
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(c) with the degree of care, skill and diligence that may reasonably be expected of a  
person-  
(i) carrying out the same functions in relation to the company as those 
carried out by that director; and  
(ii) having the general knowledge, skill and experience of that director.’ 
 
The test for the standard of care required in terms of s 76(3)(c)(i) and (ii) is not very clear 
and, it is submitted that Cassidy is correct in observing that the provision is ambiguous.
45
 The 
first leg of the test contained in s 76(3)(c)(i) appears to set an objective standard of care and 
skill. However, when read together with the second leg of the test contained in s 76(3)(c)(ii) it 
seems that the first leg is reduced to a subjective standard. Hence divergent views have been 
expressed concerning the test of care and skill imposed by s 76(3)(c); one view is that the 
section imposes ‘a less subjective test and a slightly more demanding standard of care on 
directors…than the common law.’
46
 Another view is that the section imposes an overly 
subjective standard similar to the common law test which is dependent on the level of 
knowledge, skill and experience of the director whose conduct is in question.
47
  
 It is submitted that the ambiguity in s 76(3)(c) should be resolved through purposive 
interpretation which takes into account not only the language of the statute, but also its object 
and policy, that is its purpose as well as its background.
48
 Purposive interpretation would be 
in accord with s 5(1) of the Act which provides that the Act ‘must be interpreted and applied 
in a manner that gives effect to the purposes set out in section 7’ (writer’s emphasis). One of 
the purposes of the new Act is to promote the development of the South African economy by 
‘encouraging transparency and high standards of corporate governance and also to 
encourage the efficient and responsible management of companies,’
49
(writer’s emphasis). It 
is submitted that the realisation of this objective would be hindered if the courts were to 
interpret s 76(3)(c) as imposing an overly subjective standard of care and skill similar to the 
common law standard. As noted earlier the subjective approach at common law has been 
criticised for setting the bar very low in terms of the degree of care and skill.
50
  
Therefore s 76(3)(c) must be interpreted in such a way that it imposes a stricter 
standard of care and skill. This would entail that s 76(3)(c)(i) imposes a minimum objective 
                                                          
45
 J Cassidy op cit note 42 at 376 
46
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standard against which the conduct of every director will be measured irrespective of his 
level of skill and experience and, the subjective elements contained in s 76(3)(c)(ii) would 
serve to enhance the standard where the director concerned possesses greater skills and/or 





 although Sutherland does not explicitly refer to purposive interpretation as the 
means to attain such an end. 
It must also be kept in mind that ‘[T]he decision of the Department of Trade and 
Industry in South Africa (the DTI) to review and modernize company law in this country was 
based on the need to bring our law in line with international trends …’
53
 It was said that one 
of the objectives of the new company law should be to promote the competitiveness and 
development of the South African economy by ensuring compatibility and harmonisation 
with best practice jurisdictions internationally.
54
 Interpreting s 76(3)(c) in such a way that it 
imposes a stricter standard of care and skill would align South African corporate law with the 
trend in other common law jurisdictions, such as England and Australia, where they have 




  Significantly, the wording of s 76(3)(c) is similar to the wording of s 174 of the UK 
Companies Act 2006. Section 174 provides as follows: 
(1) A director of a company must exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence.  
(2) This means the care, skill and diligence that would be exercised by a  
reasonably diligent person with— 
(a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of a 
person carrying out the functions carried out by the director in relation to the 
company, and 
(b) the general knowledge, skill and experience that the director has 
 
Section 174(2) establishes a dual objective/subjective test of knowledge, skill and experience. 
The view is held that s 174(2)(a) sets a minimum objective standard of knowledge, skill and 
experience, which standard may then be raised by the subjective element of the test – 
paragraph  (b) of the same section – if the director in question has any special knowledge, 
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 The approach to s 174(2) is significant in the context of our s 76(3)(c) 
given that in terms of s 5(2) of the new Act a South African court may, to the extent 
appropriate, consider foreign company law when interpreting the Act. 
  Given the uncertainties of statutory interpretation, it is submitted that the best way to 
resolve the ambiguity in s 76(3)(c) is for the legislature to amend s 76(3)(c) of the new Act 
along the lines of s 60(1A) of our Banks Act 94 of 1990 [hereafter ‘the Banks Act’] which 
imposes a duty of care and skill on bank directors.
57
 Section 60(1A)(c) of the Banks Act 
provides that: 
‘Each director, chief executive officer and executive officer of a bank owes a duty 
towards the bank to possess and maintain the knowledge and skill that may 
reasonably be expected of a person holding a similar appointment and carrying out 
similar functions as are carried out by the director, chief executive officer or 
executive officer of that bank.’ 
 
This is followed up by s 60(1A)(d) which provides, unambiguously, that: 
‘Each director, chief executive officer and executive officer of a bank owes a duty 
towards the bank to exercise such care in the carrying out of his or her functions in 
relation to that bank as may reasonably be expected of a diligent person who holds 
the same appointment under similar circumstances, and who possesses both the 
knowledge and skill mentioned in paragraph (c) and any such additional knowledge 
and skill as the director, chief executive officer or executive officer in question may 
have.’ 
Section 60(1A) ‘clarifies the uncertainty at common law relating to the test applicable to 
determine whether or not the duty has been discharged. Common-law interpretations favour a 
subjective test, whereas s 60(IA)(c) and (d) introduce an objective test for both the duty of 
skill and the duty of care…’
58
 Section 60(1A)(d) read with s 60(1A)(c) of the Banks Act 
explicitly lays down a minimum objective standard of care and skill expected of a director 
namely, that which may reasonably be expected of a diligent person who holds the same 
appointment under similar circumstances. It also makes clear that a director who possesses 
additional knowledge and skills will be measured against the standard of care and skill that 
can be reasonably expected of a diligent person who holds the same appointment under 
similar circumstances, and who possess both the knowledge and skill mentioned in paragraph 
(c) and any such additional and knowledge. 
                                                          
56
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It is submitted that amending s 76(3)(c) by adopting the wording of s 60(1A) of the 
Banks Act would address the uncertainty surrounding the interpretation of s 76(3)(c) by 
removing the ambiguity in s 76(3)(c)(ii). This would ensure that the courts will not impose a 
subjective standard on the statutory duty of care and skill thereby condemning it to suffer 
from the same weaknesses that afflict the common law duty. 
The forgoing discussion briefly outlined how the new Act has restated the directors’ 
duties found at common law. Highlighted in the discussion were some similarities and 
differences between the common law duties and the statutory duties. A restatement of these 
common law duties in the new Act would be of no significance to shareholder protection if 
no liability was imposed upon the directors for breach of those duties. It is therefore 
important to discuss whether, and what liability is imposed by the new Act upon directors for 
breach of these statutory duties. A discussion of the directors’ liability provides insight into 
whether the new Act imposes appropriate liability for breach of those duties in the light of the 
increased powers bestowed on the directors by the new Act. 
 
4.4.0 Liability of directors 
4.4.1 Liability of directors in terms of s 77(2) 
Section 77 of the new Act is the global provision dealing with the liability of directors. It is 
important to note who qualifies as a director in this regard. Section 1 of the Act defines a 
director as ‘a member of the board of a company, as contemplated in section 66, or an 
alternate director of a company and includes any person occupying the position of a director 
or alternate director, by whatever name designated.’ It has correctly been observed that ‘this 
definition is wide enough to include most types of directors, such as executive and non-
executive directors, de facto and de jure directors, alternate directors, nominee directors, ex 
officio directors and also shadow directors.’
59
  
 In terms of ss 75 and 76 which deal with directors’ duties, as well as s77 which deals 
with the liability of directors, the term director also includes a prescribed officer; or a person 
who is a member of a committee of a board of a company, or of the audit committee of a 
company, irrespective of whether or not the person is also a member of the company’s 
board.
60
 Further, a prescribed officer is defined as a person who, despite not being a director 
of a company, exercises or, regularly participates to a material degree in the exercise of 
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general executive control over and management of the whole or, significant portion, of the 
business and activities of the company.
61
 It is submitted that this aspect of the new Act 
enhances the protection of shareholders as it casts the net of accountability over an extended 
class of persons, whether appointed as directors or not, who ‘play an increasingly important 
role in the functioning of corporate boards.’
62
 
Sections 77(2)(a) and (b) specifically deal with the liability of directors for breach of 
their statutory fiduciary duties and the duty of care and skill as provided for in ss 75 and 76. 
Section 77(2) provides that, 
‘A director of a company may be held liable-  
(a) in accordance with the principles of the common law relating to breach of a 
 fiduciary duty, for any loss, damages or costs sustained by the company as a 
consequence of any breach by the director of a duty contemplated in section 75, 
76(2) or 76(3)(a) or (b); or  
(b) in accordance with the principles of the common law relating to delict for any 
loss, damages or costs sustained by the company as a consequence of any breach 
by the director of-  
(i) a duty contemplated in section 76(3)(c) …’  
(ii) any provision of this Act not otherwise mentioned in this section; or  
(iii) any provision of the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation. 
 
The duties referred to in paragraph (a) above are the statutory fiduciary duties
63
 while the 




Hence directors who breach their statutory duties will be held liable in accordance 
with the common law principles relating to breach of a duty for any loss, damages or costs 
sustained by the company as a consequence of any breach by the director of a statutory duty.  
It is worth noting that s 77(2)(a) specifically refers to liability ‘for any loss, damages 
or costs sustained by the company.’ This appears to restrict the liability of directors only to 
the loss, damages or costs sustained by the company. The provision is silent concerning 
whether directors would be accountable to the company for any profits that they make in 
breach of the no-profit rule.
65
 At common law a company can recover any profits made by 
the directors in breach of the no-profit rule even though the company may actually not have 
                                                          
61
 Regulation 38(1) of the Companies Regulations 2011 read with s 66(10) of the new Act 
62
 FHI Cassim, MF Cassim & R Cassim et al op cit note 8 at 511-512 
63
 See discussion in paragraph 4.3.1 up to and including paragraph 4.3.4 
64
 See paragraph 4.3.5.1 above 
65
  FHI Cassim, MF Cassim & R Cassim et al op cit note 8 at 583. The no-profit rule stipulates that a person 
who stands in a fiduciary position must not make a profit by use of his office or position and, if he/she does 
make a profit he/she must account for the profit to the principal unless the principal gives his/her consent for the 
fiduciary to retain the profit. See for instance Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd supra note 5 
 93 
suffered any loss in the circumstances; in this regard the company’s claim for disgorgement 
of the profit made in breach of duty is sui generis.
66
  
The silence of s 77(2)(a) on this aspect creates an ambiguity which leads to 
uncertainty as to whether the legislature meant to exclude a company’s right to recover 
profits made by directors in breach of their fiduciary duty in circumstances where the profits 
were not made at the expense of the company.
67
 It would not bode well for corporate 
governance, in particular the protection of shareholders, if directors were to be permitted to 
keep profits made in breach of their statutory fiduciary duties. Perhaps the better view is that 
even though the Act is silent on the issue of recovery of profits made in breach of statutory 
fiduciary duties, these could still be recovered in terms of the common law principle. This 
would seem to be so since the new Act does not expressly state that the statutory provisions 
concerning the directors’ duties and the liability attaching thereto are in substitution of the 
common law rules and principles.
68
 It is trite law that statutes are to be interpreted in 
conformity with the common law rather than against it except where and, so far as the statute 
expressly alters the common law.
69
  
Concerning directors’ liability for breach of the statutory duty of care, skill and 
diligence
70
, s 77(2)(b)(i) provides that such a director would be held liable in accordance with 
the principles of the common law relating to delict for any loss, damages or costs sustained 
by the company as a consequence of the breach by the director. In this respect the new Act 
appears to be in line with the common law.  
It is to be noted that where directors breach their statutory fiduciary duties or their 
duty of care and skill, the proper plaintiff to sue the directors’ concerned in terms of s 
77(2)(a) and (b)(i) is the company since the duties mentioned therein are owed to the 
company and not the shareholders. However, shareholders are not without means to ensure 
that redress is made for harm done to the company in situations where those in control of the 
company fail or, refuse to take remedial action. In such circumstances a shareholder and an 
extended class of people including, amongst others, directors, prescribed officers and trade 
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unions may bring a derivative action in terms of s 165 of the new Act.
71
 More will be said 
about this remedy in the next chapter. 
Before proceeding to deal with the liability of directors in terms of s 77(3) it is 
important to point out that in addition to s 77(2)(b)(i) which deals with the liability of a 
director for breach of the statutory duty of care, skill and diligence, ss 77(2)(b)(ii) and (iii) 
also provide that a director may be held liable in accordance with the principles of the 
common law relating to delict for any loss, damages or costs sustained by the company as a 
consequence of any breach by the director of any provision of this Act not otherwise 
mentioned in s 77 or any provision of the company’s MOI. Thus the personal liability of 
directors in terms of s 77 goes beyond the statutory fiduciary duties and the duty of care, skill 
and diligence imposed by ss 75 and 76. 
4.4.2 Liability of directors in terms of s 77(3) 
Section 77(3) deals with the liability of directors in relation to specific corporate transactions. 
It provides inter alia, that: 
‘A director of a company is liable for any loss, damages or costs sustained by the 
company as a direct or indirect consequence of the director having-  
(a) acted in the name of the company, signed anything on behalf of the company, or 
purported to bind the company or authorise the taking of any action by or on behalf of 
the company, despite knowing that the director lacked the authority to do so;  
(b) acquiesced in the carrying on of the company’s business despite knowing that it 
was being conducted in a manner prohibited by section 22(1);  
(c) been a party to an act or omission by the company despite knowing that the act or 
omission was calculated to defraud a creditor, employee or shareholder of the 
company, or had another fraudulent purpose… 
(e) been present at a meeting, or participated in the making of a decision in terms of 
section 74, and failed to vote against-  
(i) the issuing of any unauthorised shares, despite knowing that those shares had not 
been authorised in accordance with section 36;  
(ii) the issuing of any authorised securities, despite knowing that the issue of those 
securities was inconsistent with section 41… 
(v) the provision of financial assistance to a director for a purpose contemplated in 
section 45, despite knowing that the provision of financial assistance was inconsistent 
with that section or the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation;  
(vi) a resolution approving a distribution, despite knowing that the distribution was 
contrary to section 46, subject to subsection (4);  
(vii) the acquisition by the company of any of its shares, or the shares of its holding 
company, despite knowing that the acquisition was contrary to section 46 or 48…’  
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All the paragraphs in s 77(3) use the word ‘knowing’ hence knowledge on the part of the 
director is a prerequisite for liability under the section. The term ‘knowing’ as defined in s 1 
has an extended meaning. Section 1 provides that the words ‘knowing’, ‘knowingly’ or 
‘knows’, when used with respect to a person, and in relation to a particular matter, means that 
the person either had actual knowledge of the matter, or was in a position in which the person 
reasonably ought to have had actual knowledge, investigated the matter to an extent that 
would have provided the person with actual knowledge; or taken other measures which, if 
taken, would reasonably be expected to have provided the person with actual knowledge of 
the matter. 
4.4.2.1 Liability in relation to issue of shares, provision of financial 
assistance and distributions 
As mentioned above in the context of directors’ statutory duties, as well as the liability of 
directors, the term ‘director’ is defined expansively to include other persons such as 
prescribed officers and members of the board committees or the audit committee irrespective 
of whether any such persons are also members of the company’s body.
72
 However when it 
comes to the liability of directors for the specific company transactions mentioned in s 
77(3)(e)
73
, in particular distributions and the acquisition by the company of its own shares, it 
would appear that only a director in the strict sense of the word can be held liable.
74
 The 
reason for this is that for liability to attach to a person in relation to a distribution or an 
acquisition by a company of its own shares, that person must, amongst other requirements, 
have participated in passing the board resolution authorising the distribution or the share 
acquisition;
75
 and, in terms of ss 46(1)(a)(ii) and 48(2)(a) only board members can vote on 
such matters. 
 A concern has been raised that a director who did not participate in making a 
resolution authorising a distribution may escape liability even though he may have 
participated in making the subsequent resolution required by s 46(1)(c) whereby the board 
acknowledges inter alia that it has applied the solvency and liquidity test
76
 [hereafter ‘the 
acknowledgement resolution’]. This argument is premised on the fact that the use of the word 
‘approved’ in ss 46(6) read with s 77(3)(e)(vi) implies that a director’s liability in relation to a 
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distribution depends on the director having participated in making, or failing to vote against, 
the resolution approving a distribution. Sections 46(6) and 77(3)(e)(vi) do not mention a 
directors’ participation in making the acknowledgement resolution hence it would it seem 
that a director who only participates in making such a resolution, but not the resolution 
approving a distribution, could escape liability.
77
 The argument highlights a loophole in the 
Act which some directors may seek to exploit in a bid to escape liability. Hence the 
legislature should look into tightening s 77(3)(e)(vi) to ensure that this argument cannot be 
raised by a director who only participates in passing the acknowledgement resolution.  
Notwithstanding the loophole referred to above, it is submitted that a director who did 
not participate in making the resolution authorising a distribution or approving a share 
acquisition by the company, but who participated in making the acknowledgement resolution 
required by s 46(1)(c) could still be held liable for breaching the duty of care, skill and 
diligence in terms of s 77(2)(b)(i). In this regard it must be noted that when passing the 
acknowledgment resolution the board will in effect be acknowledging that it has applied the 
solvency and liquidity test and reasonably concluded that the company will satisfy the test 
immediately after completing the proposed distribution.
78
 Hence before participating in 
making the acknowledgment resolution it is incumbent upon the director who did not 
participate in the earlier resolution authorising the distribution or, approving a share 
acquisition by the company, to satisfy himself/herself concerning the reasonableness of the 
conclusion arrived at by his fellow board members that the company would satisfy the 
solvency and liquidity test immediately after the completing the distribution. 
 
Further, it is clear from the tenor of s 76(4)(a)(i) that, in order to discharge his 
statutory duty of care, skill and diligence a director must inter alia, take reasonably diligent 
steps to become informed about a matter before making a decision in his capacity as a 
director. Hence a director would breach the statutory duty of care, skill and diligence if he 
supports the acknowledgement resolution and it turns out that the distribution or, share 
acquisition was contrary to s 46 because the company fails to meet the solvency and liquidity 
test immediately after the transaction and, that it was unreasonable at the time of the decision 
for the board to conclude that the company would satisfy the solvency and liquidity test 
immediately after completing the transaction. Therefore, even if a director could potentially 
escape liability under s 77(3)(e)(vi) or (vii) by pleading that he did not participate in the 




 Section 46(1)(c) of the new Act 
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initial resolution authorising the distribution or approving the share acquisition, it is 
submitted that the director could still be held liable in terms of s 77(2)(b)(i) for failing to act 
with due care and diligence. 
Another point of concern that has been raised by Van der Linde is that the new Act 
treats the liability of a director in respect of a transaction whereby a company acquires its 
own shares differently from his/her liability in relation to a distribution.
79
 The argument 
advanced in this regard is that the requirements in 77(4)(a) which are precedent to a directors’ 
liability in terms of s 77(3)(e)(vi) limit a director’s liability in relation to a distribution that is 
contrary to s 46, but the Act does not make these requirements applicable to a directors’ 
liability in terms of s 77(3)(e)(vii) in relation to an acquisition by the company of its own 
shares in contravention of s 46 or 48. Section 77(4)(a) provides that, 
 
‘…the liability of a director in terms of s 77(3)(e)(vi) as a consequence of the 
director having failed to vote against a distribution in contravention of section 46 
arises only if,‘(i) immediately after making all of the distribution contemplated in a 
resolution in terms of section 46, the company does not satisfy the solvency and 
liquidity test; and (ii) it was unreasonable at the time of the decision to conclude that 
the company would satisfy the solvency and liquidity test after making the relevant 
distribution.’  
 
Van Der Linde argues that as a consequence of the above, directors who participate in 
making a decision approving the acquisition of its own shares by a company in contravention 
of the solvency and liquidity requirements in s 46 potentially face wider liability than 
directors involved in an unlawful distribution.
80
 She contends that this creates an unjustifiable 
bias since the payment by a company of a consideration for the acquisition of its own shares 
is also a distribution.
 81
 
The argument raised by Van Der Linde is to some extent valid. It is also 
acknowledged that ss 77(3)(e)(vi) and (vi) as well as s 77(4) of the Act do appear to make a 
distinction between the liability of a director in relation to a distribution and in relation to a 
share acquisition respectively. However, it is submitted that sight must not be lost of the fact 
that the Act does not preclude the possibility that a director who participates in approving a 
decision for the acquisition by the company of its own shares in contravention of s 46 could 
be held liable in terms s 77(3)(e)(vi). The latter imposes liability for a distribution in 
contravention of s 46.  It must be noted that in terms of s 48(2), the board of a company may 
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not authorize the acquisition by the company of its own shares unless the decision to do so 
satisfies the requirements of a distribution in s 46. Moreover, the definition of a distribution 
in s 1 of the Act includes a payment made by a company for the acquisition of its own shares. 
Therefore, it follows that where a director participates in making a decision to authorize the 
acquisition of shares in contravention of s 46, such a director could be held liable not only in 
terms in terms of s 77(3)(e)(vii), but also in terms of s 77(3)(e)(vi) which relates to a 
distribution contrary to s 46. If the latter provision is relied upon in proceedings against the 
director, then s 77(4)(a) could find application and thus also limit the directors’ liability in 
relation to a share acquisition thereby obviating the problem alluded to by Van der Linde.
82
  
It is submitted that the reference to s 46 in s 77(3)(e)(vii), which partly gives rise to 
the bias noted by Van der Linde
83
, is anomalous. The reference to s 46 in this instance is 
problematic because s 46 deals exclusively with distributions and the ‘acquisition’ of shares 
by the company is not in itself a distribution.
84
 It is only the payment made by the company 
for the acquisition of its shares that qualifies as distribution in terms of s 1 of the new Act. It 
is further submitted that s 77(3)(e)(vii) ought only to have referred to an acquisition that was 
contrary to s 48 without mentioning s 46 because a director’s liability for contravening s 46 – 
which deals with distributions – is already appropriately taken care of by s 77(3)(e)(vi) which 
deals with a distribution that contravenes s 46.  
Before moving on to other aspects of directors’ liability in terms of s 77 it is to be 
noted that ss 77(4)(b)(i) and (ii) provide that the director’s liability in terms of s 77(3)(e)(vi) 
is limited to the difference between the amount by which the value of the distribution 
exceeded the amount that could have been distributed without causing the company to fail to 
satisfy the solvency and liquidity test; and the amount, if any, recovered by the company 
from persons to whom the distribution was made. It is also noteworthy that s 77(6) provides 
that the liability of any person in terms of s 77 is joint and several with any other person who 
may be held liable for the same act. This prevents any one of the wrongdoing directors from 
avoiding paying the full amount of costs, damages or other amount recoverable in terms of 
the Act by pleading that the liability should be spread proportionally amongst all the guilty 
parties. 






 R Jooste ‘Issues Relating to the regulation of ‘distributions’ by the 2008 Companies Act’ (2009) 126 SALJ 
627 at 647 
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4.4.3. Relief from liability by the court 
Section 77(5) provides that if the board of a company has made a decision in a manner that 
contravenes the new Act as contemplated in s 77(3)(e),
85
 the company or any director who 
has been or may be held liable in terms of s 77(3)(e), may apply to a court for an order setting 
aside the decision of the board.
86
 Upon such an application being made to it the court may 
make an order setting aside the decision in whole or in part, absolutely or conditionally and 
any further order that is just and equitable in the circumstances, including an order-  
 
(aa) to rectify the decision, reverse any transaction, or restore any consideration 
paid or benefit received by any person in terms of the decision of the board; 
and 
(bb) requiring the company to indemnify any director who has been or may be held 
liable in terms of this section, including indemnification for the costs of the 




The rationale for a court to make an order in terms of (bb) above has been criticised, and 
rightly so, for being incomprehensible.
88
 As noted earlier, the liability of a director in terms 
of s 77(3) concerning company transactions such as, amongst others, share issues, share 
repurchases and distributions is dependent on whether the director in question had 
knowledge, at the time the transaction was approved, that the transaction was in 
contravention of the Act. Therefore it is difficult to understand why a company should be 
directed to indemnify a director in this instance when to start with the director had 
knowledge
89
 that the transaction was contrary to the Act but, despite that knowledge, he 
failed to vote against the approval of the transaction.
90
  
Section 77(9) is another relevant provision concerning the relief of directors from 
liability by the court. It empowers the court, in any proceedings against a director, other than 
for wilful misconduct or wilful breach of trust, to relieve the director, either wholly or partly, 
from any liability set out in s 77, on any terms the court considers just if it appears to the 
court that-  
(a) the director is or may be liable, but has acted honestly and reasonably; or  
(b) having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including those connected with 
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        the appointment of the director, it would be fair to excuse the director. 
 
Section 77(9) only provides relief where the director acted honestly and reasonably and, it 
does not provide relief from wilful misconduct or wilful breach of trust. To the extent that 
77(9) makes it possible for directors to be relieved from liability arising from their negligence 
it is similar to its predecessor, s 248(1) of the old Companies Act of 1973. A concern from 
the perspective of shareholder protection is the fact that s 77(9) is much wider in its scope, 
thus giving directors a much wider berth to escape liability than was previously the case 
under the old s 248(1). The latter section provided for exemption from liability in any 
proceedings against directors for negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust. By 
contrast s 77(9) appears to cover even proceedings for gross negligence.
91
  
Further, before a court could grant relief from liability in terms of s 248(1) of the old 
Act the court had to be satisfied that the director had acted honestly and reasonably and that, 
having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including those connected to his 
appointment, he ought to be fairly excused from liability.
92
 On the other hand the new Act 
requires the court to be satisfied that the director acted honestly and reasonably or having 
regard to all the circumstances of the case, including those connected with the appointment of 
the director, it would be fair to excuse the director. The fact that the grounds for relief are 
couched in the alternative in the new Act appears to imply that it is possible for a director to 
be granted relief even where the director acted unreasonably.
93
 It is submitted that this 
appears to give directors an escape from liability and it does not resonate well with principles 
of good corporate governance. It also enhances the perception that the new Act has shifted 
the balance of power between shareholders and directors in favour of the latter. 
  Another provision related to s 77(9) is s 77(10) of the new Act which provides that a 
director who has reason to apprehend that a claim may be made alleging that the director is 
liable, other than for wilful misconduct or wilful breach of trust, may apply to a court for 
relief, and the court may grant relief to the director on the same grounds as if the matter had 
come before the court in terms of subsection (9). Section 77(10) also provides directors with 
an escape route from liability and the concerns discussed above in relation to s 77(9) apply 
equally to s 77(10).  
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4.4.4 Other liability 
4.4.4.1 Section 20(6) 
The liability of a director in terms of s 77 discussed in the above paragraphs is to the 
company. Section 20(6) on the other hand empowers each shareholder of a company to bring 
a claim for damages against any person, including a director, who intentionally, fraudulently 
or due to gross negligence causes the company to do anything inconsistent with the Act or a 
limitation, restriction or qualification contemplated in s 20, unless that action has been 
ratified by the shareholders. In terms of s 20(2) the shareholders may by special resolution 
ratify any act of the directors which is contrary to any limitation, restriction or qualification in 
the company’s MOI relating to the company’s capacity or the authority of the directors to act 
on behalf of the company. This overrides the common law principle established in Ashbury 
Railway Carriage and Iron Co v Richie
94
 that an ultra vires action done on behalf of the 
company was void and, therefore not capable of being ratified even by the unanimous assent 
of all the shareholders. However, s 20(3) precludes the ratification of any action that is in 
contravention of the Act. Hence shareholders may not ratify any action of the directors that is 
in breach of any of the statutory duties. This is commendable as it ensures that even minority 
shareholders can hold directors accountable for the observance of their statutory duties.  
4.4.4.2 Section 218 (2) 
Section 218(2) is another important provision concerning the liability of directors. It provides 
that: 
‘Any person who contravenes any provision of this Act is liable to any other person 
for any loss or damage suffered by that person as a result of that contravention.’ 
 
It is clear from the repeated use of the word ‘any’ in this section that the provision has a wide 
reach. Significantly, it exposes directors to personal liability not only to the company, but 
also to other persons, including shareholders. Although s 218(2) creates an avenue through 
which shareholders may have recourse against company directors for the recovery of 
damages, it must be borne in mind that acts of directors which cause harm to shareholders are 
likely to also cause loss to the company and thus the ‘no reflective loss’ principle may come 
into play thereby preventing the shareholder from recovering against directors if his loss is 
reflective of the loss suffered by the company.
95
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Further, persons other than the company may not find it easy in certain instances to 
hold directors, or any other person, liable in terms of s 218(2). It is noteworthy that a person, 
including a director, must have contravened a provision of the Act in order to be held 
personally liable to any other person in terms of s 218(2). This may lead to interpretive 
challenges, due to the wording of certain provisions of the Act, concerning whether there has 
been a contravention of a provision of the Act by a director entitling a person, other than the 
company, to bring an action in terms of s 218(2). For instance, Stevens and De Beer
96
 
correctly point out that in the context of a contravention of s 22(1), read with s 77(3)(b), it 
would be difficult for any person other than the company, to hold directors personally liable 
in terms of s 218(2). They argue that directors acting on behalf of the company cannot 
personally contravene s 22(1) because the prohibition against reckless and fraudulent trading 
contained in that section applies to the company itself; therefore only the company can 
contravene that provision.
97
 Although s 77(3)(b) imposes liability on directors for knowingly 
acquiescing in the carrying on of the company’s business in a manner prohibited by section 
22(1), the section cannot be contravened by the directors because it is neither peremptory nor 
directory. And, even if it could be argued that s 77(3)(b) ‘tacitly imposes on directors an 
implicit duty not to knowingly acquiesce to the company carrying on its business in a 
reckless manner,’ that duty is owed to the company since the liability imposed on directors by 
s 77(3)(b) is to the company, and not to any other person.
98
 
Therefore, while s 218(2) is an important provision which gives shareholders a direct 
remedy to recover any loss or damage from directors; the wording of certain provisions of the 
Act, such as s 22(1) read with s 77(3)(b) discussed above, may inhibit the ability of 
shareholders to hold directors personally liable in terms of s 218(2) as it may be difficult to 
show that the directors contravened a provision of the Act. Despite this, it is submitted that 
shareholders should still be able to obtain relief against directors in terms of s 20(6), even in 
the context of a breach of s 22(1) by the company. As noted in para 4.4.4.1 above, s 20(6) 
entitles a shareholder to bring a claim for damages against any person who intentionally, 
fraudulently or due to gross negligence causes the company to do anything inconsistent with 
the Act. Therefore a director who knowingly acquiesces in the carrying on of the company’s 
business in a manner prohibited by section 22(1) would be causing the company to do 
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something inconsistent with the Act and, thereby exposes himself/herself to a shareholders’ 
claim for damages in terms of s 20(6). 
4.4.4.3 Other supplementary liability provisions  
It is pertinent to note that apart from the liability in terms of s 77 as discussed above, a 
director may also face additional consequences as a result of remedies introduced by the new 
Act. For example, as a consequence of the remedy introduced by s 161 a director may find 
himself the subject of a court order designed to rectify any harm done to a securities holder 
by the director to the extent that the director is, or may be held liable in terms of s77.
99
  The 
remedy afforded to securities holders in terms of s 161 will be discussed in greater detail in 
chapter 6. At this point it will suffice to note with regard to this remedy that s 161(1)(b)(ii) 
empowers a court to make ‘any appropriate order’ necessary to protect any right of the 
security holder or to rectify any harm done to the securities holder. Therefore, the court has a 
wide discretion concerning the remedy that it may order. 
 
The directors’ duties in s 76, as well as the directors’ liability provisions in s 77 are 
supplemented by s 162 of the new Act which contains an innovative remedy for a court order 
declaring a director delinquent or placed under probation. For instance, s 162(5)(c) provides 
inter alia, that a court must declare a director delinquent if that director inter alia grossly 
abused the position of a director, took personal advantage of information or an opportunity, 
contrary to the statutory fiduciary duty imposed by s 76(2)(a) or if the director acted in a 
manner contemplated in s 77(3)(a), (b) or (c). A consequence of a declaration of delinquency 
is that the person declared delinquent is automatically disqualified, and prohibited, from 
becoming a director of a company in terms of s 69(8) of the new Act.
100
 A director may also 
be placed under probation by the court in terms of s 162(7). For instance, s 162(7)(a)(ii) 
provides that a court may place a person under probation if, while serving as a director, 
he/she acted in a manner materially inconsistent with the duties of a director. The possibility 
of having directors declared delinquent or placed under probation for breaching their 
statutory fiduciary duties is most welcome as it empowers shareholders to hold directors 
accountable. In Msimang NO and another v Katuliiba and others
101
 the court said that the 
remedy of having a director declared delinquent is aimed at ‘protecting companies and 
corporate stakeholders against directors, who have proven themselves to be unable to manage 
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the business of the company or have failed in, or are in neglect of, their duties and obligations 
as directors of a company.’ The remedy provided by s 162 will be more fully discussed in 
chapter 6. It suffices to say that s 162 has serious ramifications for directors who breach their 
statutory duties.   
4.4.5 Business judgment rule 
A discussion of directors’ liability in terms of the new Act would not be complete without 
mentioning the business judgment rule. The business judgment rule is a safe-harbour 
provision designed to shield directors from liability when they are sued for breach of their 
fiduciary duties and their duty to act with due care, skill and diligence. The essence of the 
business judgment rule as contained in s 76(4)(a)(i) to (iii) is that a director will be protected 
from liability for breach of his statutory duties in a particular matter if the director took 
reasonably diligent steps to become informed about the matter, and he or a person related to 
the director had no material personal financial interest; or, where such a personal financial 
interest existed, the director disclosed the interest as required by section 75 of the new Act. 
Further, the director must have made a decision, or supported the decision of a committee or 
the board, with regard to that matter, and the director must have had a rational basis for 
believing, and did believe, that the decision was in the best interests of the company. 
 While the inclusion of the business judgment rule in the new Act is something new, at 
common law the courts have not been inclined to second guessing directors’ judgments. 
Directors who make business judgments on an informed basis and in good faith are protected 
by the common law. For instance, in Levin v Felt and Tweeds Ltd,
102
 the court said the 
following: 
‘In the absence of any allegations that the directors acted mala fide this amounts to 
asking the court to usurp the functions of the directors and to consider what is in the 
best interest for the company from a business point of view ... this is not the function 
of a court of law ... the court is not concerned with the commercial wisdom of the 
scheme.’ 
 
In the case of Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen
103
 the court said that 
directors are not liable for mere errors of judgment. In other words, directors who act 
honestly and reasonably in making business judgments are adequately protected by the 
common law against liability for mere errors of judgment.   
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In the light of the above it is submitted that the inclusion of the business judgment 
rule in the Act does not influence the balance of power between shareholders and directors. 
Perhaps the major benefit of including the business judgment rule in the Act is to make the 
law on the point more understandable to the layman.  
 
4.5. Exemption from duty, indemnification and directors’ insurance 
4.5.1 General 
The value of the statutory directors’ fiduciary duties and the duty of care and skill in the new 
Act as a mechanism for protecting the company – and ultimately the shareholders – from 
directors’ malfeasance depends largely on whether, and to what extent, the law allows 
companies to exempt their directors or indemnify them from liability for breach of those 
duties. This is because the potential for attracting personal liability for breach of duty acts as 
an incentive for directors to uphold their duties; in the absence of such potential liability 
some directors could be casual in the observance of their duties. However corporate law 
allows for the indemnification of directors from liability in certain instances. Indemnities and 
directors’ liability insurance are tools companies have employed in some cases to exempt 
their directors from liability or to limit the extent of the directors’ liability for breach of their 
fiduciary duties or the duty of care and skill.
104
 For instance in Re City Equitable Fire 
Insurance Co Ltd
105
 the court found the directors of the company to have acted negligently by 
failing to detect the fraud perpetrated on the company by its managing director. However, the 
directors were protected from liability by a provision in the company’s constitution which 
exempted them from liability. It is therefore important to discuss whether, and to what extent 
the new Act permits the use of these tools to affect the liability of directors. 
 
4.5.2 Prohibition against exemption from duty or liability 
Section 78(2) prohibits the exemption of directors from their statutory duties or from liability 
for breach of duty.
106
 It provides as follows: 
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‘Subject to subsections (4) to (6), any provision of an agreement, the Memorandum of 
Incorporation or rules of a company, or a resolution adopted by a company, whether 
express or implied, is void to the extent that it directly or indirectly purports to-  
(a) relieve a director of-  
(i) a duty contemplated in section 75 or 76; or  
(ii) liability contemplated in section 77; or  
(b) negate, limit or restrict any legal consequences arising from an act or omission 
that constitutes wilful misconduct or wilful breach of trust on the part of the director.’ 
 
Section 78(2) is meant to ensure that a company cannot undertake not to hold a director liable 
for breach of the statutory fiduciary duties and the duty of care and skill or, to relieve him 
from any liability imposed by s 77.
107
 The section is a general prohibition against any 
measures designed to exempt or indemnify a director from liability for breach of their 
statutory fiduciary duties and the duty of care and skill or, the liability imposed by s 77. 
Subject to the exceptions contained in ss 78(4) to (6) relating to the indemnification of 
directors, the prohibition contained in s 78(2) effectively ensures that the statutory directors’ 
duties are mandatory. As such it is not open to companies to exempt their directors from the 
statutory duties as some companies were wont to do in their articles in respect of the common 
law directors’ duties.
108
  The ambit of the prohibition in s 78(2) is wide. It covers provisions 
in the company’s constitution – the memorandum of incorporation – and the company’s rules 
as well as provisions of agreements and any resolutions adopted by the company.  
 
It is important to note that the prohibition contained in s 78(2) of the new Act is not a 
first in South African corporate law. Section 247(1) of the old Act 61 of 1973 prohibited,  
‘any provision, whether contained in the articles of a company or in any contract 
with a company, and whether expressed or implied, which purports to exempt any 
director or officer or the auditor of the company from any liability which by law 
would otherwise attach to him in respect of any negligence, default, breach of duty 
or breach of trust of which he may be guilty in relation to the company or to 
indemnify him against any such liability...’ 
 
There was debate whether s 247(1) also prohibited provisions that purported to exempt a 
director from his duties.
109
 Apparently some argued that since s 247(1) prohibited provisions 
that exempted ‘any director… from liability which would otherwise attach to him in respect 
of…breach of duty...,’ the articles of the company could avoid a breach of duty by exempting 
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the director from the duty thereby ensuring that there was no duty to breach.
110
 In this regard 
s 78(2)(a)(i) and (ii) of the new Act is welcome in that it clarifies the position by prohibiting 
provisions that either relieve a director of his statutory duties or the liability attaching to the 
director for breach of those duties. 
 
From the perspective of shareholder protection the prohibition contained in s 78(2) is 
welcome. The new Act invests significant powers in the board of directors and, an important 
tool by which such powers can be checked is by way of the fiduciary duties and the duty of 
care and skill. Therefore, it would be detrimental to shareholder protection if directors could 
be exempted from their duties or from liability for breach of those duties. It is therefore a 
highly contentious issue whether and, to what extent, corporate law should allow companies 
to indemnify their directors or take out liability insurance to shield their directors against the 
financial consequences of making mistakes or, being in breach of their duties, in the course of 
their directorial duties. The discussion that follows below continues the discussion on 
indemnification of directors by focusing on other provisions of the Act other than s 78(2) 
discussed above.  
4.5.3 Other indemnification provisions 
4.5.3.1 Indemnification for payment of fines 
The new Act prohibits a company from directly or indirectly paying any fine that may be 
imposed on a director of the company, or a director of a related company, as a consequence 
of that director having been convicted of an offence, unless the conviction was based on strict 
liability.
111
 This prohibition is commendable. It would be contrary to principles of good 
corporate governance, and also undesirable that a company should pay a fine imposed on 
director convicted of an offence, for example, in terms of the Prevention and Combating of 
Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004.   
It seems that the prohibition is limited to fines imposed on a director as a 
consequence of that director having been convicted of an offence. Thus it would appear that 
the prohibition does not apply to administrative fines
112
 imposed upon directors. If this is the 
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case, then the prohibition is unnecessarily narrow. It is submitted that there is no good reason 
why a director upon whom an administrative fine has been imposed by the court in terms of s 
175(1) read with s 171(7) of the new Act for failure to comply with a compliance notice 
should be indemnified by the company. The prohibition against payment of fines and 
penalties ought to have been couched in such a way as to cover administrative fines imposed 
by regulatory authorities such as the Commission.  
 
It must also be noted that there is an exception to the prohibition; it does not apply to 
a private company or a personal liability company if a single individual is the sole 
shareholder and sole director of that company, or if two or more related individuals are the 
only shareholders of that company, and there are no directors of the company other than one 
or more of those individuals.
113
  It is submitted that this is a sensible and unproblematic 
exception because it relates to companies that are closely held and where ownership and 
control of the company resides in one or more related individuals. The same people who 
wield the power as directors of the company are also the shareholders of the company. 
Therefore, the agency problem – and hence shareholder protection issues – are unlikely to 
arise in such companies as there is no separation of ownership and control. 
To wind up this discussion concerning the indemnification of directors for fines 
imposed on a director for an offence in terms of the Act, it is pertinent to note that one of the 
objectives of the company law reform process was that ‘company law sanctions should be 
decriminalized where possible.’
114
 Pursuant to this objective a notable feature of the new Act 
is that, ‘while certain forms of conduct continue to carry a criminal sanction – such as 
falsification of records, publication of untrue or misleading statements and refusal to respond 
to a summons – the Act has largely moved away from criminal to administrative 
remedies.’
115
 Hence directors face fewer criminal sanctions under the new Act than they 
would have faced under the old Act.
116
 While this could be seen as yet another instance of the 
new Act favouring directors, the move is understandable. The new Act is a business 
legislative instrument whose purposes include encouraging entrepreneurship,
117
 promoting 
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innovation and investment in South African markets
118
 and reaffirming the concept of the 
company as a means of achieving economic and social benefits.
119
 Hence it would be 
inappropriate to impose too many criminal offences under the new Act because then it would 
begin to sound more like a criminal code than a business legislative instrument and, in the 
process discourage the realization of its stated objectives. Instead of relying largely on 
criminal sanctions for its enforcement the new Act appropriately ‘provides alternative non-
criminal avenues of enforcement.’
120
 
 4.5.3.2 Indemnification for expenses to defend legal proceedings
  
Section 78(4) relates to advances and indemnities concerning expenses associated with legal 
proceedings. It provides that: 
‘Except to the extent that a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation provides 
otherwise, the company-  
(a) may advance expenses to a director to defend litigation in any proceedings 
arising out of the director’s service to the company; and  
(b) may directly or indirectly indemnify a director for expenses contemplated in 
paragraph (a), irrespective of whether it has advanced those expenses, if the 
proceedings-  
(i) are abandoned or exculpate the director; or  
(ii) arise in respect of any liability for which the company may indemnify the 
director, in terms of subsections (5) and (6).’ 
 
It is important to note that this provision is an alterable provision in that it is made subject to 
what the memorandum of incorporation (MOI) says concerning such advances and 
indemnities.  
 
While the fact that s 78(4) is an alterable provision provides flexibility for companies 
to decide whether or not they want their company to have the ability to provide such 
advances and indemnities, it is submitted that this scheme of things favours directors. For, the 
default position is that if the MOI is silent on the subject then the company may provide 
advances to defend legal proceedings or indemnify the director against such expenses within 
the prescripts of s 78(4).  Moreover, in such an instance no shareholder approval is required 
before the company could make the advances or provide the indemnity. The implication is 
that shareholders who do not want their company to provide such advances or indemnities, or 
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who would want to have a say on the matter, must be pro-active in ensuring that the 
company’s MOI contains an appropriately worded provision to that effect. Otherwise, in the 
absence of such a provision it will be up to the board of directors to decide whether or not the 
company should provide an advance or indemnify the director for the legal expenses. It 
would seem that the advance contemplated by s 78(4)(a) could be in the form of a loan. The 
view has been expressed, in relation to s 78(4), that,  
‘A welcome change, however, in the new statutory provisions is that, unlike under the 
1973 Act, companies may now make a loan advance to directors to allow them to 
meet their legal costs to defend litigation arising out of their service to the company. 
This will include the fees of legal counsel. Legal costs frequently involve substantial 
amounts of money. It is not required that the company should wait until the court has 
made its decision in the legal proceedings. To put it differently, while an indemnity is 




It is noteworthy that, s 78(4) does not expressly require that the directors approving the 
advance must take into account the ability of the director concerned to repay the advance.
122
 
Notwithstanding this, the shareholders do have some measure of protection in that the 
directors would still be bound by their statutory and common law fiduciary duties to act in 
good faith and in the best interests of the company as well as with due care and skill.
123
 Our s 
78(4)(a) is similar to s 8.53 of the MBCA which also permits a company to advance funds to 
a director to enable him/her to defend litigation in any proceedings arising out of the 
director’s service to the company. Section 8.53 provides, inter alia, that: 
(a) A corporation may, before final disposition of a proceeding, advance funds to pay 
for or reimburse the reasonable expenses incurred by an individual who is a party to 
the proceeding because that individual is a member of the board of directors…’   
 
Like our s 78(4), s 8.53(b) also does not require that the directors’ financial ability to repay 
the advance be taken into account. 
 It is interesting to note that s 8.52 of the MBCA creates a statutory right of 
indemnification in favour of a director who successfully defends a legal suit to which he was 
a party. Section 8.52 provides as follows: 
‘A corporation shall indemnify a director who was wholly successful, on the merits or 
otherwise, in the defense of any proceeding to which he was a party because he was a 
director of the corporation against reasonable expenses incurred by him in connection 
with the proceeding fends the legal proceedings which he was a party to.’ 
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Similarly, section 145(c) of the Delaware General Corporation Law also provides for 
mandatory indemnification against expenses, including attorneys' fees, actually and 
reasonably incurred by a director where the director has been successful on the merits or 
otherwise in defense of any action, suit or proceeding to which he was a party in his capacity 
as a director. This mandatory indemnification contrasts sharply with the voluntary nature of 
the indemnification contemplated in our s 78(4)(b)(i). In this respect s 8.52 of the MBCA and 
s 145(c) of the Delaware General Corporation Law are more favourable to directors than our 
s 78(4)(b)(i). 
 
4.5.3.3 Indemnification for other liability 
Other significant provisions in the new Companies Act concerning the indemnification of 
directors are ss 78(5) and (6) which provide as follows: 
 
‘(5) Except to the extent that the Memorandum of Incorporation of a company 
provides otherwise, a company may indemnify a director in respect of any liability 
arising other than as contemplated in subsection (6).  
(6) A company may not indemnify a director in respect of-  
(a) any liability arising-  
(i) in terms of section 77(3)(a), (b) or (c); or  
(ii) from wilful misconduct or wilful breach of trust on the part of the director…’ 
 
Section 78(5) is an alterable provision since it provides that, ‘Except to the extent that the 
MOI provides otherwise, a company may indemnify a director in respect of any liability…’ 
Arguably this provides flexibility for companies to decide whether or not they want to 
indemnify their directors against any liability. Notwithstanding this it must be noted that the 
default position provided for in s 78(5) is framed in very wide terms. It enables a company to 
indemnify a director in respect of any liability except that which is referred to in s 78(6). 
Section 78(6)(a)(i) prohibits the company from indemnifying its director in respect of his/her 
liability arising in terms of s 77(3)(a), (b) or (c). Sections 77(3)(a), (b) and (c) provide that: 
 A director of a company is liable for any loss, damages or costs sustained by the 
company as a direct or indirect consequence of the director having-  
(a) acted in the name of the company, signed anything on behalf of the company, or 
purported to bind the company or authorise the taking of any action by or on behalf of 
the company, despite knowing that the director lacked the authority to do so;  
(b) acquiesced in the carrying on of the company’s business despite knowing that it 
was being conducted in a manner prohibited by section 22(1);  
 112 
(c) been a party to an act or omission by the company despite knowing that the act or 
omission was calculated to defraud a creditor, employee or shareholder of the 
company, or had another fraudulent purpose; 
 
Section 78(6)(a)(ii) prohibits a company from indemnifying its director from liability for 
willful misconduct or wilful breach of trust on the part of the director.  
Therefore apart from the exceptions listed in s 78(6), it would appear that in the 
absence of any provision in a company’s MOI to the contrary, a company is free to indemnify 
its directors in terms of s 78(5) against any liability incurred by the director in the 
performance of his duties towards the company, including instances where the director acted 
negligently. This default position in the new Act is wider than the indemnity that was allowed 
in terms of s 247(2) of the old Companies Act. There a company could indemnify its director 
in respect of, amongst other things, any liability incurred by him in defending any 
proceedings in which judgment was given in his favour or in which he was acquitted or in 
respect of any such proceedings that were abandoned. The wide ambit of s 78(5) of the new 
Act means that there is now greater scope for companies to indemnify their directors against 
any liability, not just liability incurred in defending legal proceedings. It must be noted that 
indemnification for expenses incurred in defending legal proceedings only applies if the legal 
proceedings are abandoned or exculpate the director in terms of s 78(4)(b)(i) as noted in 
paragraph 4.5.3.2 above.  
4.5.4 Directors’ liability insurance 
4.5.4.1 Directors’ liability insurance: section 78(7) of the Companies 
Act 71 of 2008 
The issue whether, and to what extent a company should provide liability insurance for its 
directors is a highly contentious subject.
124
 The approach of the new Companies Act on the 
subject is encapsulated in ss 78(7)(a) and (b) which provides that, 
Except to the extent that the company’s MOI provides otherwise, a company may  
purchase insurance to protect – 
(a) a director against any liability or expenses for which the company is permitted to 
indemnify a director in accordance with subsection (5); or  
(b) the company against any contingency including, but not limited to -  
(i) any expenses-  
(aa) that the company is permitted to advance in accordance with subsection (4)(a); or  
(bb) for which the company is permitted to indemnify a director in accordance with 
subsection (4)(b); or  
(ii) any liability for which the company is permitted to indemnify a director in  
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accordance with subsection (5). 
 
Related provisions are ss 78(5) and (6) which provide as follows: 
(5) Except to the extent that the Memorandum of Incorporation of a company 
provides otherwise, a company may indemnify a director in respect of any liability 
arising other than as contemplated in subsection (6).  
(6) A company may not indemnify a director in respect of-  
(a) any liability arising-  
(i) in terms of section 77(3)(a), (b) or (c);or  
(ii) from wilful misconduct or wilful breach of trust on the part of the director; or  
(b) any fine contemplated in subsection (3).  
 
It is important to note that a 78(7) does not permit insurance cover against all liability. Rather 
it allows cover against any liability or, expenses which the company is permitted to advance 
to a director or, for which the company is allowed to indemnify a director as provided in 
terms ss 78(4)&(5). 
 Section 78(7) is an alterable provision to the extent that it makes the company’s 
ability to purchase insurance subject to what is provided in the company’s MOI. Thus section 
78(7) provides flexibility; a company may elect not to purchase insurance to protect its 
directors from liability by inserting an appropriately worded provision in its MOI. This 
flexibility is important because, there are persuasive arguments both for and against giving a 
company the ability to purchase directors’ liability insurance. A key argument against the 
provision of directors’ liability insurance is that indemnifying directors against the 
consequences of breach of their duties effectively takes away the protection offered to 
shareholders by the directors’ duties; that is, protecting directors against the financial 
consequences of their negligent conduct drastically reduces the incentive for directors to take 
care in their conduct of the company’s affairs.
125
 On the other hand the duties imposed by the 
law on directors places them at risk of being held personally liable for losses suffered by the 
company as well as third parties in certain instances.
126
 This may deter talented individuals 
from taking up directorships. Hence it has been argued that to encourage skilled people to 
take up directorships as well as to encourage such individuals to take informed and rational 
risks, companies should be given some latitude in protecting themselves and their directors 
against liability through insurance.
127
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In the light of the above it is crucial that shareholders be given the opportunity to 
decide what is good for their company – and ultimately themselves. Given the flexibility 
provided by s 78(7), shareholders who are opposed to the idea of their company having the 
ability to take out directors’ liability insurance could, on the face of it, always insert a 
provision in their company’s MOI prohibiting the company from doing so. This is provided 
that the reluctant shareholders have sufficient voting power to amend the company’s MOI. 
The scope of the insurance cover that may be provided in terms of s78(7) of the new 
Act is wider than the cover that could be provided in terms of the proviso to s 247 of the old 
Act. In terms of the latter a company was allowed to take out insurance ‘as indemnification 
against any liability of any director or officer towards the company in respect of any 
negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust.’
128
 Thus the liability that could be 
covered was liability towards the company.  
On the other hand, s78(7) read with s 78(5) of the new Act permits the company to 
purchase insurance to protect a director against any liability. It would therefore appear that 
the new Act permits insurance not only against liability to the company but also against 
liability to third parties.  
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The statutory directors’ duties discussed in the previous chapter would be ineffective as a tool 
for constraining abuse of directors’ powers without any enforcement. At the same time 
enforcement that successfully produces the desired results calls for the law to prescribe 
straightforward, well-defined and readily available remedies accompanied by uncomplicated 
enforcement procedures.
1
  The new Act has introduced new remedies such as a shareholder’s 
right to seek a declaratory order concerning his/her rights under the Act or in terms of the 
company’s MOI and, an order to protect his rights in terms of s 161. Other remedies include 
the application to have a director declared delinquent or placed under probation in terms of 
162, and the dissenting shareholder’s appraisal remedy in terms of s 164. The new Act also 
amended some pre-existing remedies, such as the remedy against oppressive or prejudicial 
conduct in terms of s 163 and the statutory derivative action in terms of s 165. A discussion 
of these remedies is merited because the remedies are essential for holding directors 
accountable and therefore have a bearing on the balance of power in the company. 
5.2.0 Remedies in the new Companies Act 
5.2.1 The derivative action - general 
The statutory derivative action constitutes one of the key remedies available to shareholders 
in terms of the new Act. It is by no means a novel remedy in South African corporate law. 
Prior to the new Act coming into force the remedy existed at common law
2
 as well as in 
statute.
3
 The common law derivative action has been abolished by s 165(1) of the new Act. 
Generally the derivative action is a remedial device
4
 that enables a person, including a 
shareholder, to bring an action on behalf of the company where harm has been caused to the 
company but where those who are in control of the company use their control to prevent the 
company from taking legal action against the wrongdoer. An example would be where the 
                                                          
1
 R Kraakman, J Armour, P Davies et al The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional 
Approach 2 ed (2009) 45 
2
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3
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4
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directors themselves cause harm to the company.
5
 In such circumstances it is unlikely that the 
directors acting on behalf of the company would commence action against the malfeasant 
directors if the latter controlled the majority of the votes at a meeting of the board. Hence 
corporate law fashioned the derivative action as an answer to such a scenario. The term 
‘derivative action’ connotes the fact that the person who brings the action on behalf of the 




The principles associated with the derivative action were laid down in the old English 
case of Foss v Harbottle.
7
 One of those principles is that where harm is caused to the 
company or, where money or damages are due to the company, the proper plaintiff to bring 
legal action is none other than the company itself – this is the proper plaintiff rule.
8
 The 
proper plaintiff rule operated in tandem with the internal management rule. The essence of 
the internal management rule was that where the alleged wrong was a transaction that could 
be made binding on the corporation and on all its members by a simple majority of the 
members, no individual member of the corporation could bring an action in respect of that 
matter because the majority could confirm the transaction, thereby bringing the matter to an 
end.
9
 Simply stated the internal management rule meant that the courts would not interfere in 
the internal management of companies acting within their powers.
10
 
The principles discussed above were commonly referred to as the rule in Foss v 
Harbottle
11
. There were exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle whereby, despite the rule, 
a minority shareholder was allowed to bring an action on behalf of the company in certain 
circumstances.
12
 Some of these exceptions were stated in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v 
Newman Industries Ltd and Others
13
 where the court stated that the rule found no application 
in the following circumstances: 
 Where the alleged wrong was ultra vires the corporation, because the majority of 
members could not confirm the transaction.  
                                                          
5
 J T Pretorius, P A Delport, M Havenga and M Vermaas Hahlo’s South African Company Law through the 
Cases 6 ed (1999) 382 
6
 FHI Cassim, MF Cassim, R Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 2ed (2012) 775 
7
 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461 
8
 ibid; See also Mozley v Alston (1847) 1 Ph 790 
9
 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd and Others (No 2) [1982] CH 204 at 210 F – 211 A 
10
 HS Cilliers, ML Benade, JJ Henning et al Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 3 ed (2000) 296. 
11
 Roestof NO and another v Johns [2012] JOL 29255 (KZD) at 5 
12
 McLelland v Hulett and Others 1992 (1) SA 456 (D) at 467B-H 
13
 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd and Others (No 2) supra note 9 at 210 F – 211 A 
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 Where the transaction complained of could be validly done or sanctioned only by 
a special resolution or the like, because a simple majority could not confirm a 
transaction which required the concurrence of a greater majority.  
 Where what had been done amounted to fraud and the wrongdoers were 
themselves in control of the company. In this case the rule was relaxed in favour 
of the aggrieved minority, who were allowed to bring a minority shareholders' 
action on behalf of themselves and all others. The reason for this was that, if they 
were denied that right, their grievance could never reach the court because the 
wrongdoers themselves, being in control, would not allow the company to sue.  
 
Outside of these exceptions, the effectiveness of the common law derivative action was 
greatly limited by the rule in Foss v Harbottle as discussed above. This led the Van Wyk de 
Vries Commission to recommend the establishment of a statutory derivative action.
14
 The 
commission’s recommendation culminated in the enactment of the statutory derivative action 
in the form of s 266 of the old Act. The common law action was however retained and the 
two actions existed side by side. 
  In terms of s 266(1) of the old Act the derivative action could be brought on behalf of 
the company in situations where the company had suffered damages or loss or had been 
deprived of any benefit as a result of any wrong, breach of trust or breach of faith committed 
by any director or officer of that company or by any past director or officer while he was a 
director or officer of that company and the company had not instituted proceedings for the 
recovery of such damages, loss or benefit. Further, section 266(1) also provided that, amongst 
other things, the statutory derivative action could be brought notwithstanding that the 
company had in any way ratified or condoned any such wrong, breach of trust or breach of 
faith or any act or omission relating thereto. Accordingly, the fact that the wrong complained 
of was capable of being ratified by a simple majority vote was no bar to the derivative action 
in terms of s 266(1) of the old Act. On this count the statutory derivative action in the old Act 
was an improvement on the common law derivative action to the extent that the application 
of the rule in Foss v Harbottle – the internal management rule in particular – was blunted by s 
266(1). 
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 Further, the statutory derivative action could only be brought if a company had 
sustained damages or loss, or if it had been deprived of any benefit “as a result of any wrong, 
breach of trust or breach of faith committed by any director or officer of that company or by 
any past director or officer…of that company.”
15
 In this respect the statutory derivative action 
in s 266(1) of the old Act was wider in ambit than the common law action in the sense that 
potential defendants in terms of the statutory action included not only serving directors, but 
also past directors and officers of the company. Moreover, the only requirement for the 
availability of the derivative action in terms of s 266(1) was that the company must have 
suffered loss irrespective of whether or not the wrongdoers had profited at the company’s 
expense. By contrast at common law the defendants needed to have profited at the company’s 
expense for the action to be available.
16
  
 In certain respects the statutory derivative action in terms of s 266(1) of the old Act 
was narrower in ambit than the common law action. It was narrower in that it could not be 
resorted to where the general meeting could not function.
17
 In contrast the common law 
action was available where, for example, owing to the exigency of a case, it was not practical 
to convene a general meeting of the members in time for them to make a decision on a matter 
affecting the company.
18
 The statutory action was also narrower because it was only available 
against wrongdoing directors and officers, or past directors and officers of the company
19
 
whereas the common law action was also available where the company’s action was against 
the majority of its members.
20
   
5.2.2 The statutory derivative action – section 165 of the new Act 
The new Act not only repealed the old Act, but it also abolished
21
 the common law derivative 
action and substituted it with the statutory derivative action which is provided for in s 165(2) 
of the new Act. It is noteworthy that the derivative action in terms of s 165(2) is not only 
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available to shareholders, but also to other stakeholders namely, a director or prescribed 
officer of the company or a related company, a registered trade union that represents 
employees of the company, a representative of employees of the company and a person who 
has been granted leave of the court to bring the action where the court is satisfied that it is 
necessary or expedient to do so to protect a legal right of that person. This contrasts with s 
266(1) of the old Act whereby the statutory derivative action could be brought on behalf of 
the company only by a member/ shareholder of the company. 
A person intending to bring a derivative action in terms of s 165(2) of the new Act is 
required to first serve a demand upon a company asking the company to commence or 
continue legal proceedings, or take related steps, to protect the ‘legal interests’ of the 
company. No definition is provided in the new Act of the term ‘legal interests’ of the 
company. However the term encompasses, but is much wider, than the concept of ‘legal 
rights.’
22
 It has been observed that the term ‘legal interests’ can be broadly interpreted; 
‘interest’ has been defined as ‘a mere concern, involvement or investment, which could be of 
a financial, legal, employment or even an environmental nature.’
23
 Therefore the derivative 
action in terms of s 165(2) of the new Act has a broader ambit of application than the 
derivative action under s 266(1) of the old Act because the latter action was only available 
where the company had suffered damages or losses or had been deprived of any benefit as a 
result of a wrong, breach of trust or breach of faith committed by a current or past director or 
officer of the company. Under the new dispensation a company need not have suffered 
damages or loss before the derivative action becomes available.
24
  
Notably the derivative action in s 165 is exercisable against third parties, and not just 
directors or officers of the company as was the case under the old Act.
25
 To the extent that the 
derivative action is available to protect the interests of the company, and not just in cases of 
breach of duty by directors, the new Act has brought the scope of the South African 
derivative action in line with the American and Australian models
26
 thus realising the policy 
goal of modernising South African company law and bringing it in line with international 
best practices.
27
 The extension of the scope of the derivative action to cover third parties is 
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 See Department of Trade and Industry Policy Paper South African Company Law for the 21
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crucial. Sometimes a company is harmed by third parties who are connected with the 
company’s directors and, the directors would then use their control of the company to ensure 
action is not taken against the third parties. In such an instance the derivative action enables 
shareholders to by-pass the directors – who are invested with the power to make the decision 
whether or not to litigate – and ensure that the company’s interests are protected.  
5.2.3. Some procedural aspects and concerns 
5.2.3.1 The demand requirement 
Some procedural aspects regarding the derivative action in s 165 are of concern from a 
shareholder protection perspective. These include the demand requirement
28
 whereby the 
person desiring to bring derivative proceedings is required to ‘serve a demand upon a 
company to commence or to continue legal proceedings, or take related steps to protect the 
legal interests of the company…’
29
 In Mouritzen v Greystone Enterprises and Another
30
 the 
court held that the service of a demand on the company is an essential prerequisite for the 
institution of an application under s 165(5) without which the applicant is obviously barred 
from launching the application.  
An applicant can circumvent the demand requirement in exceptional circumstances 
and with the leave of the court.
31
 Some of the exceptional circumstances listed in s 165(6)(a) 
and (b) include the fact that the delay occasioned by the demand requirement and other 
related procedures may result in irreparable harm to the company or substantial prejudice to 
the interests of the applicant or another person, and that there is a reasonable probability that 
the company may not act to prevent that harm or prejudice.
32
 
The demand requirement in s 165(2) is not new; an equivalent requirement – though 
worded differently – was contained in s 266(2)(a) of the old Act. A comparison with the 
derivative action procedures in foreign jurisdictions also shows that the demand requirement 
is not unique to South Africa. In the USA a shareholder is generally required to make a 
demand on the board of directors to bring an action against a wrongdoing director before 
commencing a derivative suit.
33
 The requirement is a corollary of the principle that where the 
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company has suffered harm the company itself is the proper plaintiff and, the board of 
directors is the organ that acts on behalf of the company and therefore has the discretion to 
decide whether legal action must be instituted by the company.
34
  
Logically the demand requirement in s 165(2) of the new Act could be viewed as a 
tool for establishing a balance between the board’s autonomy to manage the company 
without interference and, on the other hand, the shareholders’ need to assert the company’s 
rights.
35
 It can also be seen as a procedural safeguard against the abuse of the derivative 
action.
36
 However it has also been said of the demand requirement in the USA that it is ‘a 
significant encumbrance to shareholder derivative litigation.’
37




‘At the heart of the criticisms against the demand requirement are questions 
concerning transparency, fairness, and justice. Shareholder derivative procedure 
debatably involves an inherent conflict of interest that could potentially allow the 
board of directors to block litigation against one of its members. The effect of these 
management friendly rules “is to make individual access on behalf of the company to 
the courts extremely difficult.” A corollary of this is that there may be less litigation 
than the interests of companies require. Thus, due to the obscure complexities and a 
lack of transparency, some argue that shareholder derivative procedure may 
effectively provide greater deference to the board of directors than it provides 
protection to the corporation and its shareholders. Moreover, the business judgment 
rule in the United States may make it even less likely that the directors would 
voluntarily choose to prosecute a claim against one of their fellow board members, 
knowing that a court will defer to their judgment in many cases.’ 
The new Act provides that a company upon which a demand has been served in terms of s 
165(2) may, within 15 business days, apply to a court for the demand to be set aside on the 
grounds that it is frivolous, vexatious or without merit.
39
 Failing this or, if the court does not 
set aside the demand, the company is obliged to appoint an independent and impartial person 
or, committee to investigate the demand and report to the board concerning inter alia, the 
probable cost of the suit and whether it appears to be in the best interests of the company to 
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 The company has 60 business days, or a longer period which may be 
allowed by the court upon application, after being served with the demand, to either institute 
proceedings or take related steps to protect the company’s interests or to serve a notice of 
refusal to comply with the demand upon the person who made the demand.
41
 
The person who served the demand on the company may apply to a court for leave to 
bring or continue an action in the name of, or on behalf of the company and the court may 
grant leave only if the company fails to take any particular step required in s 165(4) discussed 
above, or if the company does any of the things specified in s 165(5)(a)(ii) to (iv).
42
 Further, 
the court may only grant leave if it is satisfied that: 
(i) the applicant is acting in good faith 
(ii) the proposed or continuing proceedings involve the trial of a serious question of 
material consequence to the company, and 
(iii) it is in the best interests of the company that the applicant be granted leave to 




It is submitted that the demand requirement and the related procedural and substantive 
requirements has the effect of prolonging the derivative proceedings and possibly increasing 
the costs to the company; all this, in an attempt to maintain the supremacy of the board in 
deciding on legal claims belonging to the company.
44
 There is concern that the mere making 
of a demand which may, on the face of it, appear to have some merit would force the 
company to spend valuable time and effort dealing with the demand at its own cost.
 45
  
Another concern is that the demand requirement may generate negative publicity which may 
be detrimental to the directors and the company alleged to have done wrong and, the 
company’s business could be severely destabilised.
46
 It is submitted that there are other 
alternative derivative action models that South Africa could have followed which do not 
involve a demand requirement. For instance, Canada and Australia follow a somewhat 
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different approach; legislation in both countries prescribes similar leave and notice 
requirements,
 47
 rather than a demand requirement.  
For example, s 239(1) of the Canada Business Corporations Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. C-
44) provides as follows: 
‘239. (1) Subject to subsection (2), a complainant may apply to a court for leave to 
bring an action in the name and on behalf of a corporation or any of its subsidiaries, or 
intervene in an action to which any such body corporate is a party, for the purpose of 
prosecuting, defending or discontinuing the action on behalf of the body corporate.’ 
The preconditions to bringing a derivative suit in Canada are stated in s 239(2) which 
provides that; 
‘(2) No action may be brought and no intervention in an action may be made under 
subsection (1) unless the court is satisfied that 
(a) the complainant has given notice to the directors of the corporation or its 
subsidiary of the complainant’s intention to apply to the court under subsection (1) 
not less than fourteen days before bringing the application, or as otherwise ordered by 
the court, if the directors of the corporation or its subsidiary do not bring, diligently 
prosecute or defend or discontinue the action; 
(b) the complainant is acting in good faith; and 
(c) it appears to be in the interests of the corporation or its subsidiary that the action 
be brought, prosecuted, defended or discontinued.’ 
 
 
The United Kingdom’s Companies Act of 2006 [hereafter ‘the UK Companies Act’] is also 
an example of a derivative action model that does not require that a demand be made prior to 
bringing a derivative suit. Section 261 of the UK Companies Act provides as follows: 
‘(1) A member of a company who brings a derivative claim under this Chapter 
must apply to the court for permission (in Northern Ireland, leave) to continue 
it. 
(2) If it appears to the court that the application and the evidence filed by the 
applicant in support of it do not disclose a prima facie case for giving 
permission (or leave), the court— 
(a) must dismiss the application, and 
(b) may make any consequential order it considers appropriate. 
(3) If the application is not dismissed under subsection (2), the court— 
(a) may give directions as to the evidence to be provided by the company, 
and 
(b) may adjourn the proceedings to enable the evidence to be obtained. 
(4) On hearing the application, the court may— 
(a) give permission (or leave) to continue the claim on such terms as it thinks fit, 
                                                          
47
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(b) refuse permission (or leave) and dismiss the claim, or 
(c) adjourn the proceedings on the application and give such directions as 
it thinks fit.’ 
 
The derivative action procedure in terms of s 261(2) of the UK Companies Act gives the 
court a significant role as a watchman to sift unsound claims from sound ones.
48
 It is only 
after the court is satisfied that the applicant has made a prima facie case, in terms of s 261(2),  
that the company will be called upon to provide evidence in terms of s261(3)(a). 
Consequently, this two stage procedure enables ‘the courts to dismiss unmeritorious claims at 
an early stage without involving the defendants or the company.’
49
  
It is submitted that the UK and Canadian derivative action procedures are better than 
the procedure provided for in the new Act to the extent that they dispense with the time 
consuming, and potentially cost-inflating demand requirement provided for in the latter. 
While it is conceded that the new Act makes it possible for an applicant to be excused 
from making the demand, it must be noted that the applicant is only excused from this 
requirement in exceptional circumstances as discussed earlier.
50
 Moreover the applicant has 
to apply to court for leave to dispense with the requirement for a demand. It is submitted that 
this process for excusal from the demand requirement also adds another layer to the 
derivative action procedure thereby prolonging the process and potentially increasing the 
costs for the company and the individual applicant. Effectively the demand requirement, and 
the related procedure for leave to be excused from the requirement, makes for a cumbersome 




5.2.3.2 Best interests of the company, rebuttable presumption and 
the business judgement rule 
Another procedural aspect of s 165 which is of concern is the requirement that the granting of 
leave must be in the best interests of the company.
52
 Related to this is the rebuttable 
presumption that the granting of leave is not in the best interests of the company which 
                                                          
48
 KA. Goehre op cit note 33 
49
 UK Companies Act 2006, Explanatory Notes,  para 495 available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/pdfs/ukpgaen_20060046_en.pdf ,  accessed on 13 February 2015  
50
 Section 165(6) of the new Act 
51
 Kurt A. Goehre op cit note 33 at 147 
52
 Section 165(5)(b)(iii) of the new Act 
 125 
applies in the circumstances outlined in the new Act.
53
 Also associated with these is the 




The new Act provides that a court may grant leave for derivative proceedings only if 
it is satisfied that, amongst other things, it is in the best interests of the company that the 
applicant be granted leave.
55
 Section 165(7) further provides that, 
‘A rebuttable presumption that granting leave is not in the best interests of the 
company arises if it is established that— 
(a) the proposed or continuing proceedings are by— 
(i) the company against a third party; or 
(ii) a third party against the company; 
(b) the company has decided— 
(i) not to bring the proceedings; 
(ii) not to defend the proceedings; or 
(iii) to discontinue, settle or compromise the proceedings; and 
(c) all of the directors who participated in that decision— 
(i) acted in good faith for a proper purpose; 
(ii) did not have a personal financial interest in the decision, and were not 
related to a person who had a personal financial interest in the decision; 
(iii) informed themselves about the subject matter of the decision to the 
extent they reasonably believed to be appropriate; and 
(iv) reasonably believed that the decision was in the best interests of the 
Company.’ 
 
The operation of the presumption entails that the applicant for leave now bears a greater 
burden of proof to discharge; he must present evidence cogent enough to refute the 
presumption if he is to succeed. Paragraph (c) above amounts to an integration into the 
statutory derivative action of a modified version of the business judgment rule set out in s 
76(4) of the new Act.
56
 The overall effect of s 165(7) above is to create a derivative action 
procedure that favors the board’s decision not to sue. If the board has chosen not to sue the 
rebuttable presumption hedges against interference with that decision because it is assumed 
that doing otherwise would not be in the best interests of the company; in other words, the 
directors have decided in the best interests of the company. Further the business judgment 
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On the face of it there are logical reasons for the inclusion of the rebuttable 
presumption and the business judgement rule as part of the derivative action procedure. In 
part their inclusion is based on the need to ensure that the board is able to run the company 
without undue interference.
58
 The board is the organ legally mandated to manage the business 
and affairs of the company and thus shareholders should not be able to lightly arrogate to 
themselves the power to manage the company. In deciding whether or not to sue, the board 
not only takes into account the legal issues involved in the matter but it also weighs the 
commercial and business pros and cons of proceeding with the legal claim.
59
 Thus the 
inclusion of the business judgment rule as part of the derivative action procedure is an 
affirmation of the long held view that boards of directors, constituted as they are by 
professional business people, are better placed by the courts to make commercial business 
decisions.
60
 Therefore where a board has made a business decision not to sue that decision is 
presumed to be in the best interests of the company and the courts should not lightly interfere 
with the board’s business decision. 
Although the above constitute logical reasons for including the rebuttable 
presumption as part of the derivative action procedure, there is concern that the presumption 
is beset by weaknesses that significantly erode the effectiveness of the derivative action as a 
shareholder protection tool.
61
 The major concern is that the phraseology employed in s 165(7) 
is such that the rebuttable presumption operates to protect directors who cause harm to the 
company.
62
   
In terms of s 165(7)(a), the rebuttable presumption applies where the proceedings are 
between the company and a ‘third party.’ For the purposes of s 165(7) a person is a ‘third 
party’ if the company and that person are not related or inter-related.
63
 A person is related to a 
company if he/she directly or indirectly controls the company in the broad sense of him being 
able to exercise, or control the exercise of a majority of the voting rights associated with the 
securities of that company, or if he has the power to control the majority of the votes of the 
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 Section 165(8)(a) of the new Act 
 127 
board by virtue of the right to appoint or elect the members of the board.
64
 In the case of 
juristic persons a company is related to its holding company and its subsidiaries; companies 
are interrelated if they are mutually controlled by the same person.
65
 
It follows from the above that the rebuttable presumption that granting leave for 
derivative proceedings is not in the best interest of the company would not apply to 
proceedings between the wronged company and a related, or interrelated person since a 
related or interrelated person is not considered to be a third party by s 165(8)(a). As shown 
above the concept of related or interrelated persons with regard to a company revolves around 
the ability to control a company. There is greater scope for such related or interrelated 
persons to abuse their control of the company causing harm to the company and then using 
their control to prevent the company from taking legal action against them.
66
 Therefore it is 
only proper, for the sake of minority shareholder protection, that the Act precludes the 
operation of the rebuttable presumption in situations where the company is harmed by its 
controllers. 
Of concern however is the fact that the definition of a ‘third party’ for the purposes of 
s 165(7) includes directors of a company. In his capacity as such an individual director is not 
‘related’ or ‘interrelated’ to a company in the sense in which those terms are defined in the 
new Act,
67
 unless of course the director also happens to be in a position to control the 
company as discussed above, for instance as a majority shareholder. It follows that if a 
director is a third party in relation to a company, the rebuttable presumption that granting 
leave is not in the best interests of the company would arise in proceedings where it is sought 
to hold a director accountable for causing harm to the company. Cassim rightly observes that 
it is peculiar that the new Act provides for the exclusion of the presumption in the event of 
wrongdoing by majority shareholders, but fails to do the same in the case of directorial 
misconduct, and she aptly states that:
 68
 
‘This is most disturbing, as it overlooks the cardinal point that derivative actions in 
the vast majority of cases are brought to protect the company against its own errant 
directors. Under the Companies Act 61 of 1973, the statutory derivative action was 
devoted solely to misconduct by directors and officers. The derivative action is a 
vital weapon for empowering minority shareholders to monitor the board of 
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directors and to play an effective role in holding corporate management accountable 
for misconduct. In the key situation where directors have harmed the very company 
that they are bound to serve, the statutory derivative action should be more (and not 
less) flexible and readily available, because this is when the risk of conflicted or 
biased decision-making by the board is most acute. This risk cannot be 
overemphasised...the failure of s 165 to cater properly for wrongdoing by directors 
themselves creates a major predicament that could strangle the use and effectiveness 
of the derivative action where it is most needed.’ 
In Mouritzen v Greystone Enterprises
69
 a South African High Court said , regarding the 
derivative action provision in the new Act, that, ‘It appears that section 165 is a typical model 
of section 237 of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001…’ Yet it appears that South Africa 
followed a completely different trajectory from the Australian model with regard to the 
operation of the rebuttable presumption. Although s 237(3) of the Australian Corporations 
Act also provides for a similar rebuttable presumption which arises in proceedings between 
the company and third parties, that presumption does not operate to protect directors. This is 
because s 237(4) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 defines the ‘third party’ as 
excluding a ‘related party’ while the latter term is defined to include directors.
70
 Therefore, 
under that Act directors are not considered as ‘third parties’ who are covered by the 
protection of the presumption.  
Further, the definition of ‘related party,’ in relation to a company, as provided for in s 
228 of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 includes, not only the directors of the company, 
but also their spouses as well as the relatives of the directors and the directors’ spouses 
namely, their parents and children. Thus the rebuttable presumption in the Australian 
Corporations Act 2001 would not protect directors, their spouses and relatives. It is submitted 
that the expansive definition of related parties in the Australian Corporations Act 2001 makes 
for a derivative action that is superior as a tool for protecting minority shareholders than the 
one in the new South African Companies Act.
71
 Clearly the operation of the presumption as 
provided for in the Act makes for a derivative action procedure that favours management and 
which makes it difficult for shareholders to hold directors accountable.  
5.3 Relief from oppressive or prejudicial conduct 
The remedy against oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct provided for in s 163 of the 
new Act is another significant shareholder protection tool which serves to inter alia, shield 
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minority shareholders against oppressive or prejudicial conduct. Section 163(1) of the new 
Act provides as follows: 
‘(1) A shareholder or a director of a company may apply to a court for relief if-  
(a) any act or omission of the company, or a related person, has had a result that is 
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregards the interests of, the 
applicant;  
(b) the business of the company, or a related person, is being or has been carried on or 
conducted in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly 
disregards the interests of, the applicant; or  
(c) the powers of a director or prescribed officer of the company, or a person related 
to the company, are being or have been exercised in a manner that is oppressive or 
unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregards the interests of, the applicant.’ 
 
The remedy contained in s 163(1) of the new Act is not entirely new; its antecedent was s 252 
of the old Act.
72
 However, s 163(1) is wider than s 252 in the following respects: 
 Under the old provision only a shareholder could petition for relief but under s 163(1) 
the remedy is also available to a director.
73
 
 The remedy in terms of s 252 of the old Act was concerned with a particular act or 
omission of the company or the manner in which the affairs of the company were being 
conducted whereas s 163(1) of the new Act includes acts or omissions of a person 
related to the company or the manner in which the business of a related person is being 
conducted. 
 Section 163(1)(c) widens the scope of the remedy by extending its application to the 
manner in which the powers of a director or prescribed officer of the company, or a 
person related to the company, are being or have been exercised.
74
 
By extending the scope of the remedy to include related persons, s 163 (1) addresses an issue 
that arose in the past concerning whether, and to what extent, a shareholder of a company 
could bring an action complaining about the ‘conduct’ of the company’s holding company or 
subsidiary company.
75
 The extension to related persons significantly limits the scope for 
evading the application of the provision in the context of intra-group dynamics.
76
 Section 
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252(1) of the old Act was considered ineffectual because of its narrow scope as well as its 
stringent requirements. The broadened scope of s 163(1) of the new Act is welcomed.
77
 
It is also arguable that s 163(1) considerably broadens the range of acts or omissions 
in respect of which relief may be sought. Whereas s 252(1) of the old Act employed the key 
words ‘unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable,’ section 163(1) of the new Act on the other 
hand uses the words ‘oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregards the 
interests, of the applicant.’
78
 In Grancy Property Limited v Manala and Others
79
 the Supreme 
Court of Appeal noted that the concept of ‘interests’ is much wider than the concept of 
‘rights’ and thus the inclusion of the element of unfair disregard of the applicant’s interests 
underscores the extensive nature of the remedy provided for by s 163. 
Although section s 163 of the new Act may be wider in scope than its predecessor, 
there are similarities in the wording of the two sections. Hence the jurisprudence developed 
in relation to s252 is likely to guide the courts in construing what constitutes ‘oppressive’ or 
‘unfairly prejudicial conduct’ in the context of s 163.
80 
An examination of court decisions 
shows that conduct that is ‘burdensome, harsh and wrongful” . . . or which “involves at least 
an element of lack of probity or fair dealing” . . . or “a visible departure from the standards of 
fair dealing and a violation of the conditions of fair play on which every shareholder who 
entrusts his money to a company is entitled to rely,’ constitutes ‘oppressive conduct’ for the 
purposes of s 163.
81
  
To succeed with an action against oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct, 'an 
applicant…must establish the following: that the particular act or omission has been 
committed, or that the affairs of the company are being conducted in the manner alleged, and 
that such act or omission or conduct of the company's affairs is unfairly prejudicial, unjust or 
inequitable to him or some part of the members of the company...’
82
 In other words, the 
conduct departs from the accepted standards of fair play or it amounts to unfair 
discrimination of the minority.
83
 In Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and 
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 the court noted that where the conduct complained of was unlawful and had a 
consequence that was prejudicial to the applicant, the prejudice to or disregard of the 
applicant’s interests would invariably be unfair within the meaning of s 163.  
The facts in Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd and Others were 
that the board of Goede Hoop Sitrus had refused to approve a transfer by Visser Sitrus (the 
applicant) to Mouton Sitrus (the second respondent) of the shares held by Visser Sitrus in 
Goede Hoop Sitrus. Consequently Visser Sitrus brought an action in terms of s 163 of the 
new Act seeking to compel Goede Hoop Sitrus to register the transfer. One of the issues the 
court had to deal with was whether the directors of Goede Hoop had breached their fiduciary 
duties in refusing to register the transfer. In dealing with this issue the court also had to 
consider a related and interesting question concerning the inter-relationship between s 163 
and breach of duty by directors. The court noted that if the directors exercise a power 
conferred on them by the company’s MOI, and in so doing satisfy the standard imposed by s 
76, they act lawfully.
85
 It then considered whether in such circumstances a shareholder who is 
prejudiced by the decision could complain that the decision is ‘unfairly prejudicial to him? 
The court said that,
86
 ‘such cases potentially bring the invocation of the unfair-prejudice 
remedy into conflict with other principles of company law, such as majority rule and that the 
constitutional documents of the company are the compact between shareholders and the 
company by which they are all bound.’  
The court noted that in England it was acknowledged that the remedy could extend 
beyond unlawful conduct. It further noted that the principles of majority rule and the binding 
nature of the company’s constitution remain applicable and, the courts in England are 
cautious in extending the remedy beyond cases of illegality. In the light of this the court said 
that a South African court should take the principle of majority rule and the binding nature of 
the company’s constitution as its starting point. Further, ‘the circumstances would…have to 
be exceptional before one could find that a board decision, taken in accordance with the 
standard set by s 76, has caused a shareholder prejudice which can properly be described as 
‘unfair’ within the meaning of s 163.’
87
 The exceptional cases envisaged by the court of 
unfair conduct which is not also illegal include, the ‘legitimate expectation’ or ‘equitable 
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consideration’ cases arising from the informal arrangements or understandings among 
shareholders not contained in the company’s constitution.
88
 For example shareholders could 
have an informal arrangement or understanding pertaining to participation in management or, 
concerning dividend policy or remuneration.
89
 In this case the court found that in refusing to 
register the share transfer the board of Goede Hoop Sitrus had exercised its discretion in 
terms of a lawful provision of the company’s MOI and that in so doing the board had 
exercised its discretion rationally and that it had acted for a proper purpose, in good faith and 
in the best interests of the company in compliance with s 76. The court also found that the 
board’s refusal to register the transfer was not unfairly prejudicial to Visser Sitrus. 
The view has been expressed that,
90
 in order to avoid a conflict between s 76 and s 
163, the latter provision must ‘be interpreted in such a manner that excludes the element of 
unfairness in all cases where a board has acted lawfully.’ And, because the court did not 
make such a conclusion in the Visser Sitrus case, it has been observed that, ‘the door, 
therefore, remains open for the argument that despite complying with s 76 a decision of the 
board may still be subject to attack under s 163. What must a board do to protect itself in 
those circumstances – contravene s 76 to save itself from attack under s 163?’ While this 
viewpoint is understandable, it is submitted that the court’s decision in the Visser Sitrus case 
is sensible. It must be remembered that the court’s judgment emphasized that it would only 
be in exceptional circumstances where the lawful action of a board could be found to be 
‘unfair’ for the purposes of s 163. The court even noted the dearth of cases where a decision 
taken by independent directors in accordance with their fiduciary duties gave rise to unfair-
prejudice relief.
91
 Notwithstanding this the court said it could not rule out the possibility that 
such cases might notionally exist.
92
 Therefore the court’s decision wisely leaves the door 
open for it to intervene in appropriate cases and, to protect the legitimate expectations of 
minority shareholders, especially in small private companies, against the conduct of directors 
albeit such conduct might be lawful. It is further submitted that the perceived conflict 
between s 76 and s 163 may be more apparent than real. As the Visser Sitrus demonstrates, 
the court will be wary of making a finding that a board’s decision is unfairly prejudicial to the 
interests of one or, some of the company’s shareholders where the directors’ have complied 
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with their fiduciary duties in terms of s 76. Further, the dearth of cases where a decision taken 
by directors in compliance with their fiduciary duties has been successfully challenged using 
the unfair-prejudice remedy also suggests that as long as directors comply with their duties in 
terms of s 76 they have little to fear that their decision could be attacked under s 163. It 
remains to be seen under what circumstances a court would make a finding that a board’s 
decision made in compliance with the directors’ fiduciary duties is unfairly prejudicial. 
Section 163(2) provides a very wide, but not exhaustive list of remedial orders that a 
court may make upon considering an application for relief in terms of s 163(1). In terms of s 
163(2) the court may make any interim or final order it considers fit, including, inter alia-  
‘(a) an order restraining the conduct complained of;  
(b) an order appointing a liquidator, if the company appears to be insolvent;…  
(d) an order to regulate the company’s affairs by directing the company to amend its 
Memorandum of Incorporation or to create or amend a unanimous shareholder 
agreement;…  
(f) an order-  
(i) appointing directors in place of or in addition to all or any of the directors then in 
office; or  
(ii) declaring any person delinquent or under probation, as contemplated in section 
162...’; 
 
The wide-ranging nature of the oppression remedy provides wide latitude for courts to 
intervene in intra-corporate affairs thus providing a flexible tool for minority shareholder 
protection.
93
 It has been observed that
94
 the orders which the court can make in terms of s 
163, 
“…may involve a greater degree of judicial interference in the management of the 
company, being orders directed at realigning the balance of power established by the 
constitution(such as those directing an issue or exchange of shares, or appointing 
directors in place or in addition to the directors in office), or orders that actually 
change the rules of the company themselves ( eg an order regulating the company’s 
affairs by amending its Memorandum of Incorporation or creating or amending a 
unanimous shareholder agreement).” 
Although the range of orders which a court could have made in terms of s 252(3) of the old 
Act was open ended, just like the orders that may be made in terms of s 163, it would seem 
that the relief which may be ordered under the latter is wider than that which could have been 
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ordered under the former.
95
 For instance, it seems that under s 252(3) it was not competent 
for a court to make an order appointing directors in place of or, in addition to any or all of the 
directors then in office.
96
 In Ex Parte Avondzon Trust (Edms) Bpk
97
 two directors applied to 
court in terms of s 111 bis of the Companies Act, 46 of 1926 – the predecessor to s 252 – for 
an order extending their term of office. The court dismissed the application and held, inter 
alia, that if it extended the period of office, the Court would be exercising the power of 
appointing directors which was not authorised by section 111 bis.
98
 On the other hand, s 
163(2)(f)(i) expressly empowers the court to make ‘an order appointing directors in place of 
or in addition to all or any of the directors then in office.’ In Grancy Property v Manala
99
 the 
court ordered the appointment of two independent directors to the board of the company in 
question and it also ordered that the two directors had ‘the sole right, in their absolute 
discretion, to the exclusion of any other directors nominated by the shareholders of [the 
company], to determine whether an investigation into the affairs of [the company], in the 
light of the complaints made on behalf of Grancy Property Limited, is necessary and if so to 
conduct such an investigation.’  Hence the powers of the court in terms of s 163 are far 
reaching. 
It is noteworthy that the wording of the oppression remedy under s 163 is similar to 
the oppression remedy contained in s 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act (R.S.C., 
1985, c. C-44).
100
 It is also similar to s 248 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act which is 
also based on s 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act. Hence, in terms of s 5(2) of the 
new Act, Canadian legislation and court decisions are significant in interpreting s 163.
101 
  In terms of s 241(3) of the Canada Business Corporations Act, as well as s 248 of the 
Ontario Business Corporations Act, Canadian courts have, just like their South African 
counterparts under s 163(2), wide latitude in exercising their discretion concerning the type of 
relief they may order in the context of oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct. Notably one 
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of the orders Canadian courts can make under the oppression remedy is an order 
compensating an aggrieved person.
102
 This is equivalent to our s 163(2)(j) in terms of which 
the court may make ‘an order to pay compensation to an aggrieved person…’  Significantly, 
Canadian courts have held directors personally liable to compensate aggrieved persons in 
some cases.
103
 This is noteworthy because generally when a director acts for, and on behalf of 
a company his action is attributed to the company.
104
 Hence directors are generally not 
personally liable for the acts of the company.
105
 It is only in exceptional circumstances where 
a director attracts personally liability at common law in respect of an act that he performed on 
behalf of the company. The exceptional circumstances include instances where the director is 
at fault for breaching a duty he owes to the company or, where his action is tainted with 
fraud, or some impropriety in which case the corporate veil is pierced and the directors’ 
action is attributed to him and not the company.
 106
  
In Sidaplex-Plastic Suppliers Inc. v. Elta Group Inc
107
 the court noted that while the 
personal liability of a director in an oppression remedy situation may be founded upon 
piercing of the corporate veil in some cases, the issue was not so much one of piercing the 
corporate veil, as ‘it was a question of the overall application of s. 248(2) of the Ontario 
Business Corporations Act and the interplay between its various provisions.’
108
 The court 
said:  
‘When the power of the director is exercised in a fashion which causes an act or 
omission of the corporation which effects an unfairly prejudicial result, or a result 
which unfairly disregards the interests of the complainant -- or which causes the 
business or affairs of the corporation to be conducted in a manner which has the same 
effect -- those powers themselves have been "exercised in a manner" which is caught 
by the section, in my opinion. Liability therefore lies directly with the director, under 
the section, in appropriate cases. 
The court went on to make an order directing the director of Elta to personally pay an amount 
of $97,076.36 to the aggrieved party.  
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In Budd v Gentra
109
 the trial court dismissed an action brought under the oppression 
provisions in s 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act on the basis that, inter alia, 
directors and officers could only be held personally liable to compensate an aggrieved party 
under s. 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act where personal liability would attach 
in accordance with the common law principles. These principles were that ‘in the absence of 
fraud, deceit, dishonesty or want of authority on the part of a director, the director could not 
be held personally liable unless it could be shown that their actions are themselves tortious or 
exhibit a separate identity or interest from that of the company so as to make the act or 
conduct complained of their own.’
110
 
The Ontario Court of Appeal rejected the reasoning of the trial court in Budd v 
Gentra. It held that the case for holding a director personally liable in an oppression case 
under s 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act was fundamentally different from those 
cases where directors are held personally liable under the common law. It said that in 
oppression cases ‘the plaintiff is not alleging that he was wronged by a director or officers 
acting in his or her personal capacity, but is asserting that the corporation, through the actions 
of the directors or officers, has acted oppressively and that in the circumstances it is 
appropriate (i.e. fit) to rectify that oppression by an order against the directors or officers 
personally.’
111
 The court noted that,
112
 
‘to the extent that s 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act contemplates that 
individuals will bear the remedial burden flowing from the oppressive exercise of 
corporate powers, it [s. 241] takes a different approach to assigning responsibility for 
corporate conduct than does the common law. The section permits the court to address 
the harm done by the conduct described in s. 241 from a broader perspective than that 
permitted by a simple inquiry into the true identity of the actor.’  
It went on to caution against overlaying the restrictive common law principles on the broad 
statutory language of s 241.
113
 
The court noted that there were two criteria to be considered in deciding whether an 
oppression action claiming a monetary order reveals a reasonable cause of action against 
directors personally. First, there must be an act or omission ‘by the director that is directly 
linked to the conduct said to constitute the oppression; second, the circumstances of the case 
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must make it “fit” or “appropriate” for the director to personally compensate the aggrieved 
parties.’
114
  The court cited situations where orders against directors in their personal 
capacities may be appropriate such as: 
 where directors have obtained a personal financial benefit from the 
conduct in question; 
 where directors have increased their control of the corporation by means of 
oppressive conduct;  
 where directors have breached a personal duty that they owe qua director;  
 where directors have clearly misused corporate powers; and  




The principles developed by the Canadian courts in these cases regarding director liability in 
oppression cases may influence South African courts to also order directors to compensate 
shareholders in terms of s 163(2)(j). Plausibly the court could also have made compensation 
orders against directors in terms of s 252 given the wide discretion the court had under that 
section. However, there is a dearth of cases where courts actually ordered directors to 
personally compensate aggrieved parties in terms of s 252. The reason for this is not clear. 
One can only surmise that it may be that the applicants never sought relief of that nature and, 
hence the court never ordered it.  However, it must be noted that although it was incumbent 
on the applicant to formulate the relief sought for, the court had a discretion to order relief 
which it deemed fit and, it was not bound by the relief sought by the applicant.
116
 Hence it 
may be that the court did not perceive itself as having power to order directors to personally 
compensate the aggrieved party. Whatever the case may have been, it is submitted that the 
express wording of s 163(2)(j),  as well as the decisions of Canadian courts noted earlier, 
make it more likely than ever before that directors may be ordered to personally compensate 
aggrieved parties in oppression cases. 
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Hence s 163 of the new Act provides an expansive remedy which gives courts wide 
discretion to make remedial orders against oppressive or prejudicial conduct as they see fit. 
Experience elsewhere shows that the remedy can be used effectively as a judicial brake 
against abuse of corporate powers. It is encouraging that in Grancy Property Limited v 
Manala and Others
117
 the South African Supreme Court of Appeal took cognisance of the 
expansive nature of the oppression remedy as provided for in s 163(1) of the new Act and 
evinced its readiness to construe s 163(1) in a manner that will advance the remedy that it 
provides rather than limit it.  
 The oppression remedy and the derivative action discussed in this chapter are not the 
only remedies available to shareholders under the new Act. There are other remedies such as 
the application for an order declaring a director delinquent or under probation which is also 
significant in ensuring that directors are accountable to shareholders. The other remedies 
available under the new Act will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6: OTHER REMEDIES AND THE APPOINTMENT AND 
REMOVAL OF DIRECTORS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter continues the discussion commenced in chapter 5 concerning the remedies 
available to shareholders in the new Act and how these impact on the balance of power 
between shareholders and directors. The remedies discussed in this chapter include the 
innovative remedy entitling shareholders, amongst others, to apply to a court for an order 
declaring a director delinquent or placed under probation.
1
 The latter part of this chapter will 
discuss how the new Act regulates the power of shareholders to appoint and remove directors 
as this has a bearing on the balance of power between shareholders and directors.   
6.2.1 Application to declare a director delinquent or placed on 
probation 
Section 162 of the new Act entitles corporate stakeholders, including shareholders, to apply 
to court for an order declaring a director delinquent or placed under probation.  A diverse 
class of persons is accorded legal standing by s 162 to bring such an application. This 
includes a company, a shareholder, director, company secretary or prescribed officer of a 
company, a registered trade union that represents employees of the company or another 
representative of the employees of a company,
2
  the Commission, the Takeover Regulation 
Panel [hereafter ‘the TRP’]
3




Notably, the application for an order declaring a director delinquent or placed under 
probation may be made against a current director as well as a person who was a director of a 
company within the 24 months immediately preceding the application.
5
 This is 
commendable; it ensures that a director will not be able to escape the consequences of his 
wrong doing even if he resigns or is removed from his position as a director.  
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6.2.2 Grounds for and consequences of a declaration of 
delinquency 
The grounds upon which a court may declare a director delinquent are set out in s 162(5) 
which provides that:  
‘A court must make an order declaring a person to be a delinquent director if the 
person-  
(a) consented to serve as a director, or acted in the capacity of a director or prescribed 
officer, while ineligible or disqualified in terms of section 69, unless the person was 
acting-  
(i) under the protection of a court order contemplated in section 69(11); or  
(ii) as a director as contemplated in section 69(12);  
(b) while under an order of probation in terms of this section or section 47 of the 
Close Corporations Act, 1984 (Act No. 69 of 1984), acted as a director in a manner 
that contravened that order;  
(c) while a director-  
(i) grossly abused the position of director;  
(ii) took personal advantage of information or an opportunity, contrary to section 
76(2)(a);  
(iii) intentionally, or by gross negligence, inflicted harm upon the company or a 
subsidiary of the company, contrary to section 76(2)(a);  
(iv) acted in a manner-  
(aa) that amounted to gross negligence, wilful misconduct or breach of trust in 
relation to the performance of the director’s functions within, and duties to, the 
company; or  
(bb) contemplated in section 77(3)(a), (b) or (c);  
(d) has repeatedly been personally subject to a compliance notice or similar 
enforcement mechanism, for substantially similar conduct, in terms of any legislation;  
(e) has at least twice been personally convicted of an offence, or subjected to an 
administrative fine or similar penalty, in terms of any legislation; or  
(f) within a period of five years, was a director of one or more companies or a 
managing member of one or more close corporations, or controlled or participated in 
the control of a juristic person, irrespective of whether concurrently, sequentially or at 
unrelated times, that were convicted of an offence, or subjected to an administrative 
fine or similar penalty, in terms of any legislation, and -  
(i) the person was a director of each such company, or a managing member of each 
such close corporation or was responsible for the management of each such juristic 
person, at the time of the contravention that resulted in the conviction, administrative 
fine or other penalty; and  
(ii) the court is satisfied that the declaration of delinquency is justified, having regard 
to the nature of the contraventions, and the person's conduct in relation to the 
management, business or property of any company, close corporation or juristic 
person at the time.’  
 
The consequences of a declaration of delinquency are stated in s 69(8)(a) which provides 
that, ‘a person is disqualified to be a director of a company if a court has…declared the 
person to be delinquent in terms of section 162.’ In Kukama v Lobelo the court noted that an 
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order declaring a director delinquent has an automatic inherent effect of removing the 
director from his position as such hence it is not necessary for the court to order the removal 
of the delinquent director.
6
  
In terms of s 162(6)(a) and (b) a declaration of delinquency which is made in terms 
of: 
‘(a) subsection (5)(a) or (b) is unconditional, and subsists for the lifetime of the 
person declared delinquent; or  
(b) subsection (5)(c) to (f)-  
(i) may be made subject to any conditions the court considers appropriate, including 
conditions limiting the application of the declaration to one or more particular 
categories of companies; and  
(ii) subsists for seven years from the date of the order, or such longer period as 
determined by the court at the time of making the declaration, subject to subsections 
(11) and (12)’ 
 
Therefore, the duration and conditions attaching a declaration of delinquency is dependent on 
the grounds upon which the order is made. In terms of s 162(10)(a) to (c) a court may order, 
as conditions applicable or ancillary to a declaration of delinquency, that the person 
concerned: 
‘(a) undertake a designated programme of remedial education relevant to the nature of the 
person’s conduct as director;  
(b) carry out a designated programme of community service;  
(c) pay compensation to any person adversely affected by the person’s conduct as a 
director, to the extent that such a victim does not otherwise have a legal basis to claim 
compensation.’ 
In terms of s 162(11)(a) and (b) a person who has been declared delinquent, other than as 
contemplated in subsection (6)(a), may apply to a court-  
‘(a) to suspend the order of delinquency, and substitute an order of probation, with or 
without conditions, at any time more than three years after the order of delinquency 
was made; or  
(b) to set aside an order of-  
(i) delinquency at any time more than two years after it was suspended as 
contemplated in paragraph (a); or  
(ii) of probation, at any time more than two years after it was made.’  
 
And on considering an application contemplated in subsection (11), the court may-  
                                                          
6
 Msimang NO and another v Katuliiba [2013] 1 All SA 580 (GSJ) para 32. See also Kukama v Lobelo and 
Others [2012] JOL 28828 (GSJ) 
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‘(a) not grant the order applied for unless the applicant has satisfied any conditions 
that were attached to the original order, or imposed in terms of subsection (11)(a); and  
(b) grant an order if, having regard to the circumstances leading to the original order, 
and the conduct of the applicant in the ensuing period, the court is satisfied that-  
(i) the applicant has demonstrated satisfactory progress towards rehabilitation, and  
(ii) there is a reasonable prospect that the applicant would be able to serve 
successfully as a director of a company in the future.’  
 
The use of the word ‘must’ in s 162(5) of the new Act indicates that once any of the grounds 
listed in the section is established the court has no discretion whether or not to grant the order 
– it is obliged to make an order declaring the person concerned to be a delinquent director.
7
 It 
is clear from the above provisions that s 162 has serious repercussions for delinquent 
directors. Notably the consequences of a declaration of delinquency could potentially affect 
the director concerned even across the borders of South Africa.
8
 For instance, section 
206(B)(6) of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 prohibits a person from managing a 
corporation in Australia if that person is disqualified by a court order made by a court of a 
foreign jurisdiction from being a director of a company or, being concerned in the 
management of a company. Likewise a person who has been declared delinquent under s 
162(5) may also be prohibited from becoming a company director in New Zealand in terms 
of s 383(1)(ca) of the New Zealand Companies Act of 1993. Section 383(1)(ca) provides that: 
Where a person has been prohibited in a country, State, or territory outside New 
Zealand from carrying on activities that the court is satisfied are substantially similar 
to being a director or promoter of or, being concerned or taking part in the 
management of a body corporate… the court may make an order that the person must 
not, without the leave of the court, be a director or promoter of, or in any way, 
whether directly or indirectly, be concerned or take part in the management of a 
company permanently or for a period specified in the order. 
As noted earlier, the ultimate consequence of a declaration of delinquency is the 
disqualification, and removal of the director concerned. Comparative jurisdictions such as, 
for example Australia, UK and New Zealand also have provisions in terms of which directors 
may be disqualified albeit such provisions are not worded like our s 162. For instance, s 
383(3) of the New Zealand Companies Act, accords standing to, inter alia, a person who is, 
or has been a shareholder of a company to apply to court for an order disqualifying a person 
from being a director of a company where any of the grounds set out in s 383(1) of that Act 
are satisfied. The grounds in respect of which a director may be disqualified under s 383 are 
                                                          
7
 Msimang NO & Another v Katuliiba and Others supra note 6 at para 31.  
8
 Lewis Group Limited v Woolman and Others [2016] ZAWCHC 130  
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generally similar to the grounds upon which a director may be declared delinquent under our 
s 162. For example, a director may be disqualified where he has been convicted of an 
offence
9
 or, has been guilty of a breach of duty to the company;
10
 or, where he has acted in a 
reckless or incompetent manner in the performance of his or her duties as a director.
11
 This 
echoes the grounds in ss 162(5)(e) & (c)(i)-(iv) of our Act.  
It appears that under s 383(1) of the New Zealand Act a court has discretion as to 
whether or not to disqualify a director where any of the grounds contemplated in that section 
has been satisfied. Where any of the grounds has been satisfied, s 383(1) provides that ‘the 
court may make an order…,’ that the person concerned must not, inter alia, become a director 
of a company without the leave of the court (writer’s emphasis). This contrasts with our s 
162(5) in terms of which, as noted above, the ‘court must make an order declaring a person to 
be a delinquent director,’ – and hence disqualified – where any of the grounds prescribed by 
the Act is satisfied. In this respect our Act is less forgiving of directors than the New Zealand 
Act – the court is obliged to declare a director delinquent once any one of the prescribed 
grounds has been proved. With regard to the period which a disqualification order remains in 
force, s 383(1) provides that in serious cases the court may make an order that is permanent 
or, which subsists for a period longer than 10 years. This is similar to our s 162(2) in terms of 
which, as noted above, a declaration of delinquency may subsist for the lifetime of the person 
declared delinquent or, it may subsist for seven years or such longer period as determined by 
the court. 
 In the UK directors may be disqualified in terms of the Company Directors’ 
Disqualification Act, 1986. In terms of that Act there are three broad categories of conduct in 
respect of which a court may, or in certain circumstances must
12
, make a disqualification 
order prohibiting the person concerned from inter alia becoming a director of a company 
except with the leave of the court. The first category of conduct is general misconduct in 
connection with companies. In this category a director may be disqualified if he has, for 
                                                          
9
Section 383(1)(a) &(b) of the New Zealand Companies Act of 1993 
10
 Section 383(1)(c)(ii) of the New Zealand Companies Act of 1993 
11
 Section 383(1)(c)(iii) of the New Zealand Companies Act of 1993 
12
 Section 1(1) of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act of 1986. the court is obliged to make a 
disqualification order against a person in any case where it is satisfied that the person is or has been a director of 
a company which has at any time become insolvent (whether while he was a director or subsequently), and that 
his conduct as a director of that company (either taken alone or taken together with his conduct as a director of 
any other company or companies) makes him unfit to be concerned in the management of a company. 
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example, been convicted of an indictable offence,
13
 or has persistently been in default in 
relation to provisions of the companies legislation as per section 3(1) of the UK Company 
Directors Disqualification Act 1986. The latter provision is similar to, but more flexible and 
narrower than, our s 162(5)(d). It is more flexible in that the court has discretion whether or 
not to make an order disqualifying the director in question. In terms of s our 162(5)(d) the 
court has no discretion. It is narrower in that the conduct in respect of which a director may 
be disqualified is limited to persistent default in relation to companies legislation. Under our 
s 162(5)(d) a director must be declared delinquent if he ‘has repeatedly been personally 
subject to a compliance notice or similar enforcement mechanism, for substantially similar 
conduct, in terms of any legislation’ (own emphasis). It is also notable that in terms of s 3(5) 
of UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 the maximum disqualification period 
for persistent breaches of companies legislation is 5 years. This is more lenient than the 7 
years or more which the court may impose in terms of our s 162(6)(b)(ii).  
The second category of conduct relates to disqualification for unfitness.  Under this 
category the court must make a disqualification order against a person if, for example, it is 
satisfied that the person is or has been a director of a company which has become insolvent 
and, that his conduct as a director of that company makes him unfit to be concerned in the 
management of a company.
14
 Matters that may be taken into account in determining the 
unfitness of a director include, inter alia, any misfeasance or breach of any fiduciary or other 
duty by the director in relation to the company.
15
  
 The third category of conduct in respect of which a director may be disqualified in 
the UK is classified as ‘other cases of misconduct.’
16
  Under this category the court may 
make a disqualification order against a director if for example, the director in question 
participated in wrongful trading with the result that a court makes a declaration in terms of s 
section 213 or 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 that the director is liable to make a 
contribution to a company’s assets.
17
  While a UK court has discretion in this circumstance, 
our Act adopts a different approach by requiring the court to declare a director delinquent if 
                                                          
13
 Section 2 of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 
14
 Section 6 of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 
15
 Section 9 read with Schedule 1, para 1 of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 
16
 See the heading before section 10 of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 
17
 Section 10 of the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 
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It is notable that in Australia only ASIC is empowered to apply to court for  
disqualification orders.
19
 Hence it seems the Australian Corporations Act 2001 disempowers 
shareholders in this respect. The MBCA does not have what one might call director 
disqualification provisions as such. However a court may remove a director upon application 
by the corporation or by its shareholders if the court finds that the director engaged in 
fraudulent or dishonest conduct, or gross abuse of authority or discretion, with respect to the 
corporation and that removal is in the best interest of the corporation.
20
 The court that 




In the light of the foregoing it appears that the remedy provided for in s 162(5) for a 
court declaring a director delinquent compares favourably with comparable provisions in 
other jurisdictions. 
6.2.3 Grounds for and consequences of an order of probation 
The grounds upon which a court may make an order place a person under probation are stated 
in s 162(7) which provides that: 
‘A court may make an order placing a person under probation, if-  
(a) while serving as a director, the person-  
(i) was present at a meeting and failed to vote against a resolution despite the inability 
of the company to satisfy the solvency and liquidity test, contrary to this Act;  
(ii) otherwise acted in a manner materially inconsistent with the duties of a director; 
or  
(iii) acted in, or supported a decision of the company to act in, a manner contemplated 
in section 163(1); or  
(b) within any period of 10 years after the effective date-  
(i) the person has been a director of more than one company, or a managing member 
of more than one close corporation, irrespective of whether concurrently, sequentially 
or at unrelated times; and 
(ii) during the time that the person was a director of each such company or managing 
member of each such close corporation, two or more of those companies or close 
corporations each failed to fully pay all of its creditors or meet all of its obligations, 
except in terms of-  
                                                          
18
 Section 162(5)(c)(iv) read with s 77(3)(b) and s 22(1) of the new Act 
19
 See sections 206C(1); 206D(1) and 206E(1) of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 
20
 Section 8.09(a) of the MBCA 
21
 Section 8.09(b) of the MBCA 
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(aa) a business rescue plan resulting from a resolution of the board in terms of section 
129; or  
(bb) a compromise with creditors in terms of section 155.’ 
 
The use of the word ‘may’ in s 162(7) means that even where the above grounds have been 
established the court has a discretion whether or not to make an order declaring a director 
under probation. This contrasts with the position under s 162(5) where a court ‘must’ declare 
a director delinquent if any of the grounds under that section is established. The essence of an 
order placing a person under probation, as per s 162(7), is that the person who has been 
placed under probation may not serve as a director except to the extent permitted by the order 
of probation. Section 162(9) provides that: 
‘A declaration placing a person under probation-  
(a) may be made subject to any conditions the court considers appropriate, including 
conditions limiting the application of the declaration to one or more particular 
categories of companies; and  
(b) subsists for a period not exceeding five years, as determined by the court at the 
time it makes the declaration, subject to subsections (11) and (12).’ 
 
Some of the orders which a court may make as conditions applicable, or ancillary to an order 
placing a director on probation are similar to those listed in s 162(10)(a) to (c) with regard to 
a declaration of delinquency.
22
  In addition, s 162(10)(d) further provides that in the case of 
an order of probation the court may order that the person concerned:  
‘(i) be supervised by a mentor in any future participation as a director while the order 
remains in force; or  
(ii) be limited to serving as a director of a private company, or of a company of which 
that person is the sole shareholder.’ 
 
Hence probation may be seen as a period in which a person has to prove his fitness to hold 
office as a director by, amongst other things, undertaking a designated programme of 
remedial education relevant to the nature of the person’s conduct as director as provided for 
in s 162(10). 
 
                                                          
22
 See para 6.2.2 where s 162(10)(a) to (c) is quoted 
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6.2.4 Evaluation of the remedy for declaring a director delinquent or 
under probation 
The remedy provided for in section 162 for declaring a director delinquent or under probation 
has no equivalent in the old Act.
23
 In Grancy Property Limited and Another v Gihwala and 
Others; In Re: Grancy Property Limited and Another v Gihwala and Others
24
 the court said 
that s 162 ‘introduces a new civil remedy for those harmed by the conduct of delinquent 
directors.’ However it should be noted that the remedy is not only available to those that have 
suffered harm. It is more correct to say that the remedy is available to any of the classes of 
persons mentioned in ss 162(2), (3) and (4) in any of the circumstances prescribed in s 162(5) 
as discussed in 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 above.  
Although the remedy can be said to be innovative, it is comparable in its effect to s 
219 of the old Act. As stated earlier the effect of a declaration of delinquency is 
disqualification from the office of director. A similar result was obtainable under s 219(1) 
which provided that: 
The Court may make an order directing that, for such period as maybe specified in the 
order, a person, director or officer shall not without the leave of the Court be a 
director of or in any way, whether directly or indirectly, be concerned or take part in 
the management of any 
company when- 
(a) such person, director or officer, has been convicted of an offence in connection 
with the promotion, formation or management of a company; or  
(b) the Court has made an order for the winding-up of a company and the Master has 
made a report under this Act stating that in his opinion a fraud has been committed- 
(i) by such person in connection with the promotion or formation of the company; or 
(ii) by any director or officer of the company in relation to the company since its 
formation; or 
(c) in the course of the winding-up or judicial management of a company it appears 
that any such person- 
(i) has been guilty of an offence referred to in section 424, whether or not he has been 
convicted of that offence; or 
(ii) has otherwise been guilty while an officer of the company of any fraud in relation 
to the company or of any breach of his duty to the company; or 




It can be seen from the above that there are similarities regarding the grounds for 
disqualification in terms of s 219 and the grounds for a declaration of delinquency – and 
                                                          
23
 Msimang NO & Another v Katuliiba and Others supra note 6 at para 29 
24
 [2014] ZAWCHC 97 para 155 
25
 Section 424(1) provided for the personal liability of a director who acquiesced in carrying on the business of a 
company recklessly or with intent to defraud creditors or for any fraudulent purpose 
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hence disqualification – in terms of s 162. In Grancy Property Limited and Another v 
Gihwala and Others
26
the court said that ‘it is clear that all the categories of conduct provided 
for in section 162(5)(c) of the 2008 Companies Act, would have been covered by section 
219(1)(c)(ii) of the 1973 Companies Act (dealing with the disqualification of a director).’ 
The High Court rightly noted in Grancy Property Limited and Another v Gihwala and 
Others
27
 that, ‘a comparison of the severity of the respective sanctions under the two Acts 
cannot really be made in the abstract, but should rather be done on a case by case basis.’ 
Some significant differences between s 162 and s 219(1) are highlighted below. 
In terms of the severity of a disqualification order, the old Act did not stipulate 
minimum or maximum periods of removal. The court had discretion in terms of s 219(1) to 
make a disqualification order and to set the period for its operation.
28
 On the other hand, as 
observed earlier, s 162(5) obliges a court to make a declaration of delinquency where the 
grounds listed in that section are satisfied. Further, the new Act prescribes minimum periods 
for which a declaration of delinquency subsists; this could be seven years or, the lifetime of 




With regard to the effect of a disqualification order in terms s 219(1), the affected 
person was not only disqualified from acting as a director of a company but, he also could not 
‘in any way, whether directly or indirectly, be concerned or take part in the management of 
any company…’ On the other hand, the effect of s 162(6) read with s 69 of the new Act is 
that a person who is declared delinquent is disqualified from being a company director but, it 
seems that he/she can take part in the management of a company. When considered from this 
perspective the old Act appears to have more severe consequences than the new Act for the 
person concerned. 
Another significant difference between s 219(1) and s 162 is that in terms of the latter 
provision the court has a discretion to make a declaration of delinquency ‘subject to any 
conditions the court considers appropriate, including conditions limiting the application of the 
                                                          
26
 Grancy Property Limited and Another v Gihwala and Others; In Re: Grancy Property Limited and Another v 
Gihwala and Others supra note 24 at para 175 
27
 Ibid at para 178 
28
 MS Blackman, RD Jooste & GK Everingham et al Commentary on the Companies Act (2002) Volume 2 at 8 
– 278  
29
 See s 162(6)(a) and (b) quoted in para 6.2.2 above 
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declaration to one or more particular categories of companies.’
30
 By contrast it would seem 
that in terms of s 219(1) the court did not have the discretion, when disqualifying a person 
from acting as a director to grant that person leave to be a director of, or to be concerned with 
or take part in the management of, a particular company or companies.
31
 In this respect a 
disqualification order in terms of s 219(1) always had a blanket effect in that it disqualified 
the affected person from being a director or from participating in the management of any 
company and not just a particular company or companies.  
Further the discretion conferred on the court by s 162 enables the court to make 
significant remedial orders ancillary to a delinquency declaration. For instance, in terms of s 
162(10)(a) and (c) respectively, the court can, in addition to declaring a director delinquent, 
order that the director in question: 
‘(a) undertake a designated programme of remedial education relevant to the nature of 
the person’s conduct as a director… 
(c) pay compensation to any person adversely affected by the person’s conduct as a 
director, to the extent that such a victim does not otherwise have a legal basis to claim 
compensation...’  
In comparison the court could only make a disqualification order in terms of s 219(1) but it 
could not for instance order the director concerned to pay compensation to any person 
adversely affected by the directors’ conduct. 
Some commentators have questioned why s 162(10) of the new Act makes provision 
for an order to pay compensation where the victim would otherwise not have a legal basis to 
claim compensation.
32
 They question why a director who has been declared delinquent or 
placed under probation should be ordered to pay compensation to a victim in circumstances 
when such an order would not ordinarily have been made under the principles of contract or 
the law of delict.
33
  It is submitted that the answer to this is that by enacting s 162 the 
legislature sought to ensure that a person adversely affected by a director’s conduct would 
have an effective remedy.
34
 To this end the legislature, in the very clear language of s 162, 
created a cause of action that is in its own class and, quite distinct from the principles of 
contract or law of delict. Overlaying the principles of the law of delict or contract on s 162 
                                                          
30
 Section 162(6)(b)(i) 
31
 See MS Blackman, RD Jooste and GK Everingham et al op cit note 28 at 8 – 278  
32




 Grancy Property Limited and Another v Gihwala and Others; In Re: Grancy Property Limited and Another v 
Gihwala and Others supra note 24 at para 154.3 
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would diminish the effectiveness of this corporate law remedy and it would fly in the face of 
the clear intention of the legislature expressed in s 162(10)(c) that an effective remedy should 
be available in those circumstances where the victim ‘does not otherwise have a legal basis 
to claim compensation.’  
Apart from the consequences discussed above, s 69(13) of the Act requires the 
Commission to establish and maintain a public register of persons disqualified from serving 
as a director or who are subject to an order of probation as a director in terms of a court order 
pursuant to the Act or any other law. This requirement is similar to the requirement contained 
in s 219(4A)(c) of the old Act where the Registrar of companies was required to establish and 
maintain a register of disqualification orders and the names of the persons to which the orders 
relate. Section 69(13) is supported by the Johannesburg Stock Exchange(JSE) Listing 
Requirements which prescribe that details of any court order declaring directors of an issuer –
a company admitted to the list – delinquent or placing them under probation be included in 
pre-listing statements and circulars relating to rights offers, capitalisation issues and Category 
1 or 2 transactions.
35
  
It is submitted that the exposure to negative publicity likely to arise from the inclusion 
of one’s name in such public documents should motivate directors to honour their duties 
conscientiously. These public records of directors who have been declared delinquent or 
placed on probation should also assist companies in appointing fit and proper individuals to 
their boards by avoiding those candidates who have proven themselves incapable of 
managing companies or who failed to honour their duties as directors. All of this should 
generally contribute to good corporate governance in South Africa. 
To the extent that s 162 provides shareholders a remedy against directors who inter 
alia grossly abuse their positions or, fail to honour their statutory duties, it complements and 
strengthens other mechanisms in the Act for holding directors accountable such as the 
statutory duties. Although there is a possibility that a director who has been declared 
delinquent may apply for relief in terms of s 162(11) by asking for the suspension of the 
order of delinquency or for the setting aside of an order of delinquency or probation under 
certain circumstances, such relief will only be ordered if the court is satisfied that, amongst 
                                                          
35
 Section 7. B.2. (m) of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) Listing Requirements, available at 
https://www.jse.co.za/content/JSERulesPoliciesandRegulationItems/JSE%20Listings%20Requirements.pdf , 
accessed 23 March 2015. Category 1 and 2 transactions are mainly acquisitions and disposals by listed 
companies as described in s 9 of the Listings Requirements. See R Cassim ‘Delinquent directors under the 
Companies Act 2008’ [2013] DEREBUS 14 
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other things, the applicant has satisfied any conditions that were attached to the original order 
and if the applicant has demonstrated satisfactory progress towards rehabilitation.
36
  
Accordingly the relief contemplated in s 162(11) is not simply there for the applicant’s 
asking. Moreover, even if the court grants the relief, the director concerned would still have 
to contend with the dishonour and damage to reputation arising from the fact that an order of 
delinquency or probation was made.
37
  
 The remedy of having a director declared delinquent or placed under probation 
should prove to be effective in holding directors accountable. It is encouraging that thus far 
the courts have shown their readiness to declare errant directors delinquent in the case of 
Msimang NO & Another v Katuliiba and Others and also in Kukama v Lobelo and Others. In 
Msimang NO & Another v Katuliiba and Others
38
 the court found that the failure of the 
directors concerned to attend to the preparation of the annual financial statements of the 
company since the financial year ending 28 February 2004 and also to convene the 
company’s annual general meeting since the financial year ending 28 February 2006 
constituted gross negligence and wilful misconduct. Accordingly, the court declared the 
directors delinquent in terms of s 162(5)(c)(iv)(aa). In Kukama v Lobelo and Others  the court 
also declared the director concerned delinquent in terms of the same provision. In that case 
the court found the director guilty of, amongst other things, gross negligence for failing to 
detect a fraud of R39 million perpetrated against the South African Revenue Service (SARS) 
and which resulted in a refund to the company in that amount. The court also found that the 
director’s failure to pay back a refund to SARS or, to the bank account that had been opened 
to service the company’s value added tax obligations constituted ‘wilful misconduct or 
breach trust as envisaged in section 162(5)(c)(iv)(aa) and (bb).’39  
The constitutional validity of s 162 was challenged by the respondent directors against 
whom a delinquency declaration was sought in Grancy Property Limited and Another v 
Gihwala and Others
40
. In particular, the respondents argued, inter alia, that s 162(5)(c) was 
unconstitutional in that, ‘the wide scope, inflexible application and severe consequences 
thereof violate the constitutional rights of directors to dignity and to freely practise their 
                                                          
36
 Section 162(12) 
37
 R Cassim op cit note 35 
38
 Msimang NO & Another v Katuliiba and Others supra note 6 at paras 69-70 
39
 Kukama v Lobelo and Others supra note 6 at para 13 
40
 Grancy Property Limited and Another v Gihwala and Others; In Re: Grancy Property Limited and Another v 
Gihwala and Others supra note 24 
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trade, occupation or profession (sections 10 and 22 of the Constitution, 1996).’
41
 They further 
argued that the provision ‘affords the court no discretion to refrain from granting a 
delinquency declaration or to shorten the duration thereof. To that extent, the section deprives 




The court held that s 162(5)(c) did not infringe the rights of the respondents under ss 
10 and 22 of the Constitution. It concluded inter alia that the lack of a discretion regarding an 
order of delinquency and also in relation the period of the order of delinquency was rationally 
related to the objectives of s 162 namely, to eliminate rogue directors from operating in South 
Africa to protect investors, as well as to boost confidence in the South African Regulatory 
System in order to attract investments and stimulate growth. With regard to the argument that 
s 162(5)(c) infringed the director in question’s right to human dignity and integrity the court 
said it was difficult to understand how this right could be violated where a director is 
removed on valid and substantial grounds as set out in the Act. It noted that ‘if this were to be 
the case, then it would be impossible for shareholders to remove rogue directors because such 
a removal would inevitably affect the directors’ dignity and integrity.’
43
 
The court went on to find that on the facts of the case the directors in question had 
grossly abused their positions as directors in that they had taken personal advantage of 
information or opportunities at their disposal, in their capacity as directors, to gain 
advantages for themselves. Further the court found their conduct constituted repeated 
unlawful misappropriation of funds involving substantial amounts. Accordingly, it declared 
them delinquent in terms of s 162(5)(c).  
These cases demonstrate that s 162 is a potent remedy which provides protection to 
companies and their stakeholders. In the light of the foregoing discussion it is submitted that 
though the new Act appears to have shifted the balance of power between shareholders and 
directors in favour of the latter by increasing the powers of directors, the new Act has also 
exposed directors to greater liability through the innovative remedy in s 162. Not only does s 
162 make directors accountable to the company, it also makes them accountable to 
shareholders and other stakeholders such as employees and enforcement institutions such as 
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the Commission. In this respect it is encouraging that recent press reports show that the 
Commission is taking an ‘increasingly proactive approach’ in holding boards of companies to 
account for failures in corporate governance.
44
 It is submitted that s 162 is set to contribute to 
higher standards of directors’ conduct and thus enhance corporate governance in South 
Africa. 
6.3 Application to protect the rights of securities holders 
In terms of s 161(1)(a) a securities holder
45
 may apply to court for an order determining any 
rights of that securities holder in terms of the Act, the company’s memorandum of 
incorporation (MOI) or any rules of the company. Section 161(1)(b) further provides that: 
‘(1) A holder of issued securities of a company may apply to a court for-  
(b) any appropriate order necessary to-  
(i) protect any right contemplated in paragraph (a);or  
(ii) rectify any harm done to the securities holder by-  
(aa) the company as a consequence of an act or omission that contravened this Act or 
the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation, rules or applicable debt instrument, or 
violated any right contemplated in paragraph (a);or  
(bb) any of its directors to the extent that they are or may be held liable in terms of 
section 77.’ 
 
The remedy introduced by s 161 is new and it is supplementary to any other remedy available 
to a securities holder in terms of the Act or in terms of the common law.
46
 Arguably the 
remedy contemplated by a 161(1)(b)(ii)(bb) to rectify any harm done to the securities holder 
by any of the company’s directors may include an order that the director in question 
compensate the securities holder for any damage suffered. In this regard it is noteworthy that 
the shareholder’s right to apply for a court order to rectify any harm caused by any of the 
company’s directors is based on ‘the extent that they are or may be held liable in terms of 
section 77.’
47
 Section 77 deals with the liability of directors for, inter alia, breach of their 
duties and which duties are generally owed to the company.
48
 In the light of this and, 
depending on the facts of the case, it is likely that the reflective loss principle could apply.  
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In terms of the reflective loss principle, if a company suffers loss as a result of breach 
of a duty owed to it, ‘no action lies at the suit of a shareholder, suing in that capacity and no 
other, to make good a diminution in the value of the shareholder’s shareholding where that 
merely reflects the loss suffered by the company.’
49
 The reflective loss principle also dictates 
that, ‘where a company suffers loss caused by a breach of duty to it, and a shareholder suffers 
a loss separate and distinct from that suffered by the company caused by breach of a duty 
independently owed to the shareholder, each may sue to recover the loss caused to it by 
breach of the duty owed to it…’ Therefore it would seem that a shareholder would be able to 
seek redress under s 161 where the shareholder has suffered harm independent from the harm 
suffered by the company.   
6.4 Remedies in terms of ss 20(4), (5) and (6)  
Other notable new shareholders’ rights and remedies introduced by the new Act are to be 
found in ss 20(4), (5) and (6).  
In terms of s 20(4) a shareholder, amongst other classes of people, may apply to the 
High Court for an appropriate order to restrain the company from doing anything inconsistent 
with the Act. Although this remedy is against the company per se, it impacts on the balance 
of power between directors and shareholders. For it must be remembered that the company is 
a juristic person
50
 and that the Act invests the board of directors with the authority to exercise 
all the powers and perform any functions of the company
51
. Therefore, s 20(4) provides the 
means by which shareholders may check the exercise of those powers vested in the directors 
should the directors, in the exercise of the powers and, in the performance of the functions of 
the company, cause the company to do anything contrary to the Act. 
Section s 20(4), is supported by s 20(5) which enables, inter alia, a shareholder to 
apply to a High Court for an appropriate order to restrain the company or the directors from 
doing anything inconsistent with any limitation, restriction or qualification of the company’s 
capacity or the directors authority in terms of the company’s MOI.  
A shareholder may also be able to bring an action for damages against directors in 
terms of s 20(6). This has already been discussed in chapter 4 so no further discussion will be 
undertaken here.   
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6.5 Dissenting shareholders’ appraisal right 
The dissenting shareholders’ appraisal right [hereafter ‘the appraisal remedy’] provided for in 
s 164 of the new Act is another innovative remedy available to shareholders. There are 
various views concerning the purpose of the appraisal right.
52
 One of the oft-cited purposes is 
that the appraisal right is an exit mechanism for shareholders who are opposed to 
fundamental corporate changes whose views are thwarted by majority approval of the 
fundamental transaction. The remedy allows the dissenters to sell their shares and exit the 
fundamentally changed company which no longer meets their investment expectations.
53
   
More pertinently in the context of this thesis, it has also been said that the appraisal 
remedy constitutes a strategy for shareholders to exit the company with the fair value of their 
shares and thus reducing the agency costs caused by opportunistic agents namely the majority 
shareholders and, in some cases the directors who are in control of the company.
54
 For 
instance, in the context of takeovers directors of a company may be tempted to act in their 
own interests because of financial perquisites promised them by a particular bidder whilst 
being biased against a rival offer that does not provide much in benefits for the directors 
personally but is actually better for the shareholders.
55
 In such a case those who do not wish 
to carry the agency costs occasioned by the directors’ opportunistic behaviour could exit the 
company with the fair value of their investment by using the appraisal right. 
Another argument that has been advanced concerning the purpose of the dissenting 
shareholder’s appraisal remedy is that the remedy acts as a check on management’s bad 
decisions. The argument is that, the greater the number of dissenting shareholders who 
demand to be bought out, the greater the chance that the board will review the bad decision. 
If the board fails to reconsider the bad decisions by taking heed of the dissenting voices, the 
company could be faced with a huge cash drain. In the context of the new Act one of the 
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policy objectives was to come up with ‘a remedy to avoid locking in minority shareholders in 
inefficient companies.’
56
 It was said that an exit and appraisal remedy was needed to ‘provide 
smaller investors the ability to make informed choices, where they are unable to influence 
company direction and decisions effectively or to pursue private actions against the company 
in civil courts.’
57
   
It is conceded that the appraisal right may not squarely fulfil all the purposes 
discussed above in every given circumstance. For it is conceivable that there may be a merger 
transaction in which the directors are not conflicted at all and where they have made a good 
business decision but the law still makes the remedy available in those circumstances. The 
availability of the remedy in such instances is not so much to provide an escape from the 
opportunism of directors or to provide a check against bad decisions by management. Rather 
the remedy is available to provide liquidity to the dissenter who is then able to cash in his 
investment in the company if he disagrees with the takeover deal. Notwithstanding the fact 
that the appraisal remedy may not fulfil all the purposes discussed above in every given 
circumstances, the remedy can plausibly fulfil one or the other of those functions depending 
on the facts of each case. Therefore, while the remedy is not a tool for directly holding 
directors accountable to shareholders, it does have an important role to play in corporate 
governance in that in certain instances it may act as a check against bad managerial decisions 
or it may also act as a strategy for shareholders to avoid the agency costs arising from 
fundamental transactions that are tainted by directors’ self-interest. 
The appraisal remedy is not unique to South Africa. It also exists in foreign legislation 
such as, inter alia, the MBCA
58
, the Delaware General Corporations Law
59
 and Canada 
Business Corporations Act.
60
 Some of our appraisal right provisions are similar to the 
provisions of the Canada Business Corporations Act. For instance, our s 164 is similar to s 
190 of the Canada Business Corporations. In terms of s 164 the dissenting shareholder’s 
appraisal right is triggered when the company has given notice to shareholders of a meeting 
to consider adopting a resolution to do any one of the following:
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 amend its MOI by altering the rights of any class of its shares in any manner 




 enter into a fundamental transaction such as the disposal of all or a greater part 




This is comparable to s 190(1) of the Canada Business Corporations Act which provides as 
follows: 
Subject to sections 191 and 241, a holder of shares of any class of a corporation may 
dissent if the corporation is subject to an order under paragraph 192(4)(d) that affects 
the holder or if the corporation resolves to  
(a) amend its articles under section 173 or 174 to add, change or remove any 
provisions 
restricting or constraining the issue, transfer or ownership of shares of that class; 
(b) amend its articles under section 173 to add, change or remove any restriction on 
the 
business or businesses that the corporation may carry on; 
(c) amalgamate otherwise than under section 184; 
(d) be continued under section 188;
63
 
(e) sell, lease or exchange all or substantially all its property under subsection 189(3); 
or 
(f) carry out a going-private transaction or a squeeze-out transaction. 
 
The trigger events prescribed by our s 164 are also comparable to, but narrower than those 
contained in s 13.02(a) of the MBCA. In terms of the latter provision the appraisal remedy is 
triggered by a merger, a share exchange, disposition of a corporation’s assets, and certain 
amendments to the corporation’s articles of incorporation, conversion of the incorporation to 
non-profit status or, into an unincorporated entity. Section 164 is wider than s 262(6) of the 
Delaware General Corporation Code in terms of which the appraisal remedy is available in 
the event of a merger or consolidation of the corporation only. Hence the Delaware General 
Corporation Code is limited in the extent to which it protects minority shareholders in the 
context of fundamental corporate changes. For instance, minority shareholders in Delaware 
would not have the benefit of the appraisal right where a corporate takeover is effected by 
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means of a sale of the corporation’s assets.
64
 Hence our s 164(2) better protects minority 
shareholders than s 262(6) of the Delaware General Corporation Code in that it makes the 
appraisal remedy available in the event of inter alia, a disposal of all or a greater part of a 
company’s assets. 
In terms of s 164(5) a tacit requirement for standing to exercise the appraisal remedy  
is that one must inter alia, be a shareholder of the company. It is not clear whether the term 
‘shareholder’ in the context of s 164(5) includes a beneficial shareholder, hence it has been 
observed that it is not certain whether a beneficial shareholder would be entitled to exercise 
the appraisal right.
65
 Beukes notes that in the context of s 190 of the Canada Business 
Corporations Act the general rule is that to have standing to exercise the appraisal remedy a 
dissenting shareholder must be a registered shareholder when the resolution approving the 
triggering transaction is passed.
66
 He further notes that the rule is not strictly followed by the 
court and, ‘it seems that a dissenting shareholder can employ the appraisal remedy whether 
he is a registered or beneficial shareholder.’
67
 It appears the court in Canada makes an 
exception to the general rule by allowing beneficial shareholders to exercise the appraisal 
right in exceptional cases only, such as when a corporation files an inadequate or misleading 
circular regarding the triggering transaction.
68
 Based on the approach of the court in Canada 
in relation to s 190 and, the similarity between that section and our s 164, Beukes argues
69
 
that since our Act does not explicitly restrict standing to registered shareholders, both 
registered and beneficial shareholders ought to have standing in terms of s 164. A contrary 
view is advanced by Delport et al
70
 who argue that under s 164 beneficial shareholders are 
precluded from exercising the appraisal remedy and, that the ‘Canadian authorities should not 
apply here due to the differences in the definitions of “shareholder.”’ However, it is not clear 
what the ‘differences in definitions’ referred to by Delport et al are. Section 190 of the 
Canada Business Corporations Act uses the terms ‘holder of shares’ and ‘shareholder’ but 
these terms are not defined in that Act. The terms have traditionally been defined by the court 
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to refer to a registered shareholder and not a beneficial shareholder.
71
 This is generally 
similar to the definition of ‘shareholder’ in s 1 of our new Act. The traditional definition by 
the Canadian court forms the basis of the general rule noted earlier that, only registered 
shareholders can exercise the appraisal remedy under s 190. But as noted by Beukes, in some 
cases the Canadian court has deviated from the rule and allowed beneficial shareholders to 
exercise the appraisal remedy.
72
  
While Beukes’ argument referred to above is appealing in that it would protect the 
rights of beneficial shareholders, it is not certain whether our courts would generally allow 
beneficial shareholders to exercise the appraisal right under s 164 by following what is 
essentially an exception to the general rule in Canada. It is likely that our court will take the 
literal meaning of the provisions of s 164 and hold that the term ‘shareholder’ in that section 
refers to a registered shareholder as defined in s 1. It is submitted that if the legislature had 
intended to expand the meaning of the term ‘shareholder’ in s 164 to include beneficial 
shareholders it would have done so expressly.
73
 The fact that it did not do so is indicative of 
an intention to limit standing under s 164 to registered shareholders. Interpreting s 164 in this 
literal and narrow fashion would preclude beneficial shareholders from exercising the 
appraisal right and, it would be in accord with the general rule in Canada. The rationale for 
the general rule in Canada is to avoid placing an onerous burden and uncertainty on the 
corporation in question.
74
 While this approach is rational and, it facilitates certainty for 
companies proposing to enter into fundamental transactions, its appropriateness has been 
questioned ‘in the context of modern capital markets where significant numbers of shares are 
registered in the names of depository agencies, brokerage firms or other nominees.’
75
 
Similarly, in South Africa some investors own shares through nominees who participate in 
the central securities depository (CSD) system managed by STRATE Ltd. Unless the 
nominee shareholder agrees to exercise the appraisal right for and on behalf of the beneficial 
shareholder, the latter would be precluded from exercising the appraisal rights under s 164 if 
a narrow and literal interpretation of that section is adopted.
76
 In the light of the foregoing it 
would be helpful if the legislature could clarify the rights of beneficial shareholders with 
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regard to the appraisal remedy by amending s 164 in such a way that it spells out whether, 
and under what circumstances a beneficial shareholder would be entitled to exercise the 
appraisal right. 
It must be noted that granting beneficial shareholders standing to exercise the 
appraisal remedy is not without precedent, some foreign legislation
77
 allows either the 
nominee shareholder to exercise the appraisal right on behalf of the beneficial shareholder or, 
the beneficial shareholder to exercise the appraisal right on his own behalf. For instance, s 
13.03 of the MBCA provides as follows:   
(a) A record shareholder may assert appraisal rights as to fewer than all the shares 
registered in the record shareholder’s name but owned by a beneficial shareholder 
only if the record shareholder objects with respect to all shares of the class or 
series owned by the beneficial shareholder and notifies the corporation in writing 
of the name and address of each beneficial shareholder on whose behalf appraisal 
rights are being asserted. The rights of a record shareholder who asserts appraisal 
rights for only part of the shares held of record in the record shareholder’s name 
under this subsection shall be determined as if the shares as to which the record 
shareholder objects and the record shareholder’s other shares were registered in 
the names of different record shareholders. 
(b) A beneficial shareholder may assert appraisal rights as to shares of any class or 
series held on behalf of the shareholder only if such shareholder: 
(1) submits to the corporation the record shareholder’s written consent to the 
assertion of such rights no later than the date referred to in section 
13.22(b)(2)(ii); and 
(2) does so with respect to all shares of the class or series that are beneficially 
owned by the beneficial shareholder 
In Delaware the effect of s 262(d) read with s 262(a) of the Delaware General Corporation 
Code is that only the registered stockholder is entitled to deliver the appraisal demand to the 
corporation.
78
 However, s 262(e) permits a beneficial shareholder to bring a petition for 
appraisal in his own name; it provides that, 
Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, a person who is the beneficial owner of 
shares of such stock held either in a voting trust or by a nominee on behalf of such 
person may, in such person's own name, file a petition or request from the corporation 
the statement described in this subsection. 
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Hence to be entitled to bring an appraisal petition in Delaware, a beneficial shareholder must 
ensure that the record holder of his or her shares makes the demand.
79
  
In the light of the foregoing, foreign legislation could provide guidelines as to how 
our s 164 could be amended in order to clarify the rights of beneficial shareholders with 
regard to the appraisal remedy. 
The complex and technical requirements of the appraisal procedure have also been 
flagged as factors that could impede the effectiveness of the appraisal remedy as a 
shareholder protection tool.
80
 The Act sets out a series of mandatory procedural steps and 
notices that must be given within prescribed time limits failing which the dissenter may lose 
the appraisal right. In brief some of the pertinent provisions include 164(2) which require the 
dissenter to give the company written notice of his/her objections to the proposed transaction 
before the resolution proposing the transaction is voted on. Section 164(5) is also another key 
provision. It provides that a shareholder may make a demand that the company pay him the 
fair value for his shares if certain requirements set in that section are satisfied. The demand 
must be sent to the company within twenty business days after the dissenter received notice 
from the company that the resolution has been accepted.
81
 A copy of the demand must also be 
delivered to the Takeovers Regulation Panel in terms of s 165(8). Beyond these and other 
procedural steps that must be fulfilled, it is important to note that the courts may also end up 
being involved in the appraisal process if a shareholder applies to court for the court to 
determine a fair value for his/her shares in terms of s 164(14).  
Although the consequences of non-compliance with the procedural requirements of s 
164 are not expressly stated, it is implicit in that section that failure to comply with the 
prescribed procedures and time limits on the part of the dissenting shareholder would result in 
him/her losing the appraisal right.
82
 On the other hand failure on the part of the company to 
comply with its procedural obligations under s 164 does not appear to have any adverse 
repercussions for the company.
83
 Hence the appraisal procedure affects the shareholder – who 
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it is supposed to protect – more negatively than it does the company. It seems non-
compliance with the time periods prescribed by s 164 cannot be excused under the substantial 
compliance provisions of the Act
84
 because those provisions deal with condonation for non-
compliance with the prescribed form, content or, manner of delivery of any document or 
notice.
85 
 In the absence of an express provision in s 164 empowering the court to condone 
non-compliance with the procedural requirements of that section it is possible that the court 
could consider that the provisions of the section preclude it from doing so. In Vlok NO and 
Others v Sun International South Africa Ltd and Others
86
 a minority shareholder that was 
challenging a squeeze-out
87
 applied to court for condonation of its non-compliance with a 30-
day time period prescribed by s124(2) of the Act. The court dismissed the application for 
condonation and held inter alia, that
88
 ‘despite the words of s 124(2) being concededly 
neutral and containing no express exclusion of a power to condone, the exclusion of a power 
to condone had to be implied into the subsection by way of necessary construction.’ In 
arriving at its decision the court took into account, amongst other things, the fact that the 
major purpose of s 124(2) was to avoid allowing the minority to oppress the new majority by 
holding the fate of its take-over bid to ransom. It noted that strict and absolutely applied time 




Similar reasoning to that applied by the court in the Vlok case could plausibly be used 
by the court to read into s 164 an implied exclusion of the court’s power to condone non-
compliance with the procedural requirements of that section.
90
 This would lead to dissenting 
shareholders losing their appraisal rights for failure to comply with the time periods 
prescribed by s 164. Therefore there is need to amend the Act so that it expressly empowers 
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the court to condone non-compliance with the requirements of s 164 in order to protect 
dissenting shareholders in appropriate circumstances such as, when there is a minor deviation 
from the prescribed procedure and where the deviation causes no harm to the company .  
As discussed above, the appraisal procedure established by the Act envisages that the 
court may become involved in the appraisal process in particular, to determine the fair value 
of the shares that are the subject of a demand.
91
  The involvement of the courts in the 
appraisal procedure gives rise to a number of issues that impact on the effectiveness of the 
appraisal remedy. One issue is that the court processes in South Africa are characterised by 
delays.
92
 Consequently, a dissenting shareholder who does not accept an offer made by the 
company in terms of s 164(11) may have to wait a long time before he is paid the fair value 
of his shares as determined by the court. In this respect it is noteworthy that the shareholder 
will only be paid the fair value of his shares at the conclusion of the court proceedings in 
terms of s 164(15)(c)(v)(bb). This may act as a disincentive to the use of the appraisal remedy 
because a shareholder who makes a demand to be paid the fair value for his shares in terms of 
s 164(5) loses his rights in respect of those shares.
93
 Moreover the delay occasioned by the 
enforcement of the appraisal remedy through the courts adds to the cost of litigation and, this 
may inhibit small shareholders from exercising the appraisal remedy.
94
 With regard to the 
costs of litigation in South Africa it has been noted that,
 95
   
‘The most common general complaint about the current justice system in South Africa 
is that the cost of litigation is prohibitive. This prevents meaningful access to courts 
and even those with access are often victims of delay. For most litigants, delay means 
added expense and for many people justice delayed is justice denied. Delay combined 
with the cost of litigation has put justice beyond the reach of the ordinary citizen.’  
The foregoing discussion highlighted some of the issues that could impact on the 
effectiveness of the appraisal remedy in protecting the interests of shareholders. Insight into 
possible solutions for some of the challenges discussed above can be gathered from the 
approaches taken in comparable jurisdictions. With regard to the challenge of the delays and 
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costs of enforcing the appraisal right in court, it is notable that in other jurisdictions a 
company is obliged to or, is permitted to make a provisional payment to the dissenting 
shareholders pending a final determination of the fair value of the shares. For instance, s 
112A(1)(b) of the New Zealand Companies Act of 1993 requires that where the share price 
determined by the company is objected to, the company must, within 5 working days of 
receiving the objection, pay to the shareholder a provisional price in respect of each share 
equal to the price offered by the board. Similarly s 13.24(a) of the MBCA obliges a 
corporation to pay the qualifying dissenting shareholders, prior to the conclusion of the 
appraisal proceedings, the amount which the corporation estimates to be the fair value of their 
shares.  
A different approach is followed in s 262(h) of the Delaware General Corporation 
Law, as amended in 2016, which provides inter alia that, 
At any time before the entry of judgment in the proceedings, the surviving corporation 
may pay to each stockholder entitled to appraisal an amount in cash, in which case 
interest shall accrue thereafter as provided herein only upon the sum of (1) the 
difference, if any, between the amount so paid and the fair value of the shares as 
determined by the Court, and (2) interest theretofore accrued, unless paid at that time. 
The amended s 262(h) thus allows a corporation to make cash payments to dissenting 
shareholders prior to the conclusion of the appraisal proceedings. It is notable that the 
prepayments in terms of 13.24(a) of the MBCA and s 112(A)(1)(b) of the New Zealand 
Companies Act are obligatory while the prepayment in terms of s 262(h) of the Delaware 
Code is optional. 
The prepayment provided for in the foreign legislation discussed above is significant 
in two respects. As is evident from s 262(h) of the Delaware Code quoted above, making a 
prepayment is beneficial for the company because it reduces interest accruals on the final fair 
value award made by the court. More pertinently, the prepayment provides funds for some 
dissenting shareholders’ who might otherwise not have the cash to finance the appraisal 
proceedings.
96
 Hence including a provision in our Act requiring the company to pay a 
dissenting shareholder a provisional amount pending a final determination of the fair value of 
the shares could financially empower shareholders to exercise the appraisal remedy. 
It is also interesting to note that in other jurisdictions disputes concerning the fair 
value of shares in appraisal situations are not resolved through the courts. For instance, in 
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New Zealand a dispute relating to the fair value of shares in an appraisal situation must be 
submitted to arbitration as per s 112A(1)(a) of the New Zealand Companies Act. This 
represents a legislative choice to make arbitration compulsory in the context of appraisal 
rights. This writer agrees with Yeats’ observation that
97
, 
‘Arbitration has some significant potential advantages over litigation in the context of 
appraisal rights because the parties can choose their own adjudicator (a significant 
advantage when dealing with complex valuation methodologies) and there is not 
much emphasis on formalistic legal proceedings which implies a greater ability to 
focus on the issues at hand and ultimately results in more efficient, private 
proceedings.’ 
It is noteworthy that s 166(1) of the new Act envisages that as an alternative to applying for 
relief to a court, or filing a complaint with the Commission, a person who would be entitled 
to apply for relief, or file a complaint in terms of the Act, may refer a matter that could be the 
subject of such an application or complaint for resolution by mediation, conciliation or 
arbitration. However, as discussed in para 6.7 below, the alternative dispute resolution 
process envisaged by s 166(1) is voluntary and parties are not obliged to participate in the 
proceedings.
98
 Thus even if the company and a particular shareholder agree to refer a dispute 
concerning the valuation of shares in an appraisal situation to arbitration, other dissenting 
shareholders may refuse to participate in those proceedings. They could in fact choose to 
follow the litigation procedure provided for in s 164(5). This would put the company in an 
unenviable position of having to engage with more than one group of shareholders in 
different forums over the same matter.
99
  In view of the advantages of arbitration over 
litigation alluded to above, our legislature should consider making arbitration compulsory in 
the context of s 164.  
6.6.0 Appointment/election & removal of directors  
6.6.1 Appointment/election of directors under the Companies Act 
61 of 1973 
The power of shareholders to elect and remove directors from a company’s board – 
shareholders appointment rights – is considered as one of the fundamental rights of 




 Omar v Inhouse Venue Technical Management (Pty) Limited and Others  2015 (3) SA 146 (WCC) at para 75 
99
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shareholders in corporate law.
100
 Appointment rights provide scope for shareholders to 
determine who sits on the company’s board; therefore the power to appoint and remove 




Section 208(1) of the old Act required a public company to have at least two directors 
and at least one director in the case of a private company. Only the shareholders had the 
power to appoint directors subject to the provisions of the company’s articles.
102
 In some 
cases the company’s articles or a shareholders’ agreement empowered a shareholder or a 
third party to nominate a director of their choice.
103
  
6.6.2 Removal of directors under the Companies Act 61 of 1973 
With regard to the removal of directors, s 220(1)(a) of the old Act provided that,  
‘A company may, notwithstanding anything in its memorandum or articles or in any 
agreement between it and any director, by resolution remove a director before the 
expiration of his period of office.’ 
In Swerdlow v Cohen
104
 the court considered whether the reference to a ‘resolution’ in s 
220(1)(a) referred to a special or an ordinary resolution. It held that ‘there can be little doubt 
that Parliament’s intention was to empower a company to exercise the rights accorded by the 
section by means of an ordinary resolution.’ Therefore the statement by Olson
105
 that the old 
Act required a special resolution to remove a director is, with due respect, erroneous. Where a 
company proposed to remove a director by ordinary resolution the director concerned was 
entitled to be given notice of the proposed resolution. He was also entitled to be heard on the 
proposed resolution at the meeting in terms of s 220(2)(b). Section 220(1) was not the only 
avenue through which directors could be removed; s 220(7) provided inter alia that ‘nothing 
in this section shall be construed….as derogating from any power to remove a director which 
may exist apart from this section.’ Hence a company had an election concerning which 
procedure to follow when removing a director. For instance, instead of proceeding in terms of 
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s 220(1)(b), it could remove a director in terms of the provisions of the company’s articles or, 
in terms of the common law if the articles were silent regarding the power to remove 
directors and the director’s term of office.
106
  
Therefore, section 220 accorded shareholders in general meeting an unrestricted 
power to remove directors in the sense that the power overrode any contrary provisions in the 
company’s memorandum, or articles or in any agreement between the company and the 
director. Moreover, the company was not limited to the procedure set by s 220 when 
removing a director.  
Significantly a director removed in terms of s 220(1) before the expiration of his term 
of office had a right of recourse against the company for breach of contract or damages in 
terms of s 220(7). That section provided that:  
‘Nothing in this section shall be construed as depriving a person removed thereunder 
of compensation or damages which may be payable to him in respect of the 
termination of his appointment as director or of any appointment terminating with that 
of director…’ 
The damages contemplated in s 220(7) were payable if, inter alia, the director in question had 
a contract with the company and, if the director had not committed a breach of the contract 
which entitled the company to terminate it.
107
 Hence if a director occupied the position of a 
director in terms of a company’s articles in the absence of a separate contract between him 
and the company, such a director had no claim for damages upon removal.
108
 The reason for 
this was that the articles do not constitute a contract between the company and a director in 
his capacity as such.
109
  
Although s 220(1) empowered shareholders to remove directors by ordinary 
resolution, it is noteworthy that the section could be circumvented by means of inter alia, an 
agreement between shareholders and a director or, a voting agreement between 
shareholders.
110
 For instance, in Amoils v Fuel Transport (Pty) Ltd
111
 the court granted the 
applicant – a director – an interdict prohibiting shareholders from voting in support of a 
resolution for the removal of the applicant in contravention of a voting agreement that had 
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been entered into between the shareholders.
112




‘Section 220, in its terms, affords the company a statutory right to remove a director 
from its board notwithstanding an agreement between it and the directors to the 
contrary. It does not give those shareholders, who by contract have bound themselves 
to vote for the retention of the director in office the right to breach their agreement.’ 
In Civils 2000 Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Black Empowerment Partner Civils 2000 (Pty) Ltd
114
 it 
was held that the plaintiff who held 70% of the shares in the company could not use its 
majority votes to remove two directors of the company because a provision in a shareholders’ 
agreement required 76% shareholder support to remove a director. Hence in the context of s 
220(1) an agreement amongst shareholders could be used to prevent majority shareholders 
from using their vote to remove a director(s) from the board.
115
  
Another means by which the removal of a director in terms of s 220(1) could be 
circumvented was the use of loaded voted rights. In Bushell v Faith
116
 the House of Lords 
held that a provision of a company’s constitution which conferred loaded voting rights on the 
shareholders, who were also directors of the company, was valid and applicable despite the 
provisions of s 184(1) of the then English Companies Act 1948 – that section was the exact 
counterpart of s 220(1).  
Loaded voting rights as a tool for circumventing a director’s removal in terms of s 
220(1) only applied in the context of private companies; with regard to public companies 
there was no room for allocating weighted or loaded voting rights to certain shares or classes 
of shares because of the provisions of s 195(1) of the old Act.
117
 Section 195(1) provided 
that: 
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A member of a public company having a share capital shall- 
(a) if the share capital is divided into shares of par value, be entitled to that proportion 
of the total votes in the company which the aggregate amount of the nominal value of 
the shares held by him bears to the aggregate amount of the nominal value of all the 
shares issued by the company; 
(b) if the share capital is divided into shares of no par value, be entitled to one vote in 
respect of each share he holds. 
 
Apart from removal in terms of s 220(1), it was also possible to remove a director in terms of 
s 219 by way of a court order declaring that director disqualified from serving as a director.
118
 
6.6.3 Appointment/election of directors under the Companies Act 
71 of 2008 
It appears that there are three ways in which one becomes entitled to serve as a director in 
terms of the new Act. Section 66(4)(a) provides that: 
‘A company’s Memorandum of Incorporation-  
(a) may provide for-  
(i) the direct appointment and removal of one or more directors by any person who is 
named in, or determined in terms of, the Memorandum of Incorporation;  
(ii) a person to be an ex officio director of the company as a consequence of that 
person holding some other office, title, designation or similar status, subject to 
subsection (5)(a); or  
(iii) the appointment or election of one or more persons as alternate directors of the 
company and…’ 
 
Section 66(7) provides further that, 
 
‘A person becomes entitled to serve as a director of a company when that person -  
(a) has been appointed or elected in accordance with this Part, or holds an office, title, 
designation or similar status entitling that person to be an ex officio director of the 
company, subject to subsection (5)(a); and  
(b) has delivered to the company a written consent to serve as its director.’ 
 
As will be shown below in the discussion on removal of directors, it would appear that the 
Act makes a distinction between ‘elected’ and ‘appointed’ directors and that this distinction 
has a bearing on how a director can be removed from office.
119
 Although the Act does not 
define the terms ‘election’ or ‘appointment’ one can infer that the term  ‘election’ is used in 
reference to a competitive voting process whereby shareholders choose from a pool of 
candidates the individual(s) who should serve as directors.
120
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On the other hand, s 66(4)(a)(i) refers to the ‘direct appointment and removal of one 
or more directors by any person who is named in, or determined in terms of, the 
Memorandum of Incorporation’ (writer’s emphasis). Hence the term ‘appointment’ appears 
to refer to a process whereby one party who is named in the MOI designates a person or 
persons to be members of the board of directors and the person(s) so designated become 
directors without any poll being conducted. Usually a person is designated or directly 
appointed to be a director to represent the interests of the person(s) that appoint him to the 
board.  
 Section 66(4)(b) provides that the MOI of a profit company other than a state-owned 
company must provide for the election by shareholders of at least 50% of the directors and 
50% of any alternate directors.
121
 This means that it is possible that the other 50% of the 
board may be directly appointed by any person named in the MOI in terms of s 66(4)(a)(i). 
Since a company’s MOI may name any person it means that, for example, a shareholder or 
group of shareholders, an employee or even a director of the company may be given the 
power to directly appoint up to 50% of a company’s directors. The possibility that a director 
or directors of a company may have the power to appoint 50% of the board members is of 
concern especially if, as will be discussed below, s 71 is construed to mean that directors who 
are directly appointed by a person named in the MOI can only be removed by the person who 
appointed them.  
6.6.4 Removal of directors in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008 
6.6.4.1 Removal by shareholders 
Section 71(1) of the new Act provides as follows: 
‘Despite anything to the contrary in a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation or 
rules, or any agreement between a company and a director, or between any 
shareholders and a director, a director may be removed by an ordinary resolution 
adopted at a shareholders meeting by the persons entitled to exercise voting rights in 
an election of that director, subject to subsection (2).’ 
Prima facie s 71(1) appears to give shareholders control of the company by empowering them 
to remove directors without cause by means of an ordinary resolution of the shareholders. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
‘Unless the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation provides otherwise, in any election of directors the 
election is to be conducted as a series of votes, each of which is on the candidacy of a single individual to fill a 
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121
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Although the new Act allows companies to prescribe in their MOIs a threshold of votes 
higher than 50%
122
 to pass an ordinary resolution, s 65(8) makes an exception with regard to 
the ordinary resolution required to remove a director.  Hence a company may not increase the 
threshold of votes required to pass such a resolution beyond 50 % of the votes exercised on 
the resolution.
123
 This indicates an intent on the part of the legislature to ensure that 
companies do not make it difficult to remove directors by prescribing in their MOIs 
prohibitively high threshold of votes required to remove a director.  
Section 71(1) is similar to s 220(1)(a) of the old Act to the extent that it provides for 
the removal of directors by ordinary resolution of the shareholders, and also to the extent that 
the right to remove a director by ordinary resolution prevails over anything to the contrary in 
the company’s MOI or rules, or between the company and the director concerned.   However, 
it differs significantly from s 220(1)(a) with regard to its impact on an agreement between 
shareholders and a director precluding the shareholders from removing the director. As 
discussed earlier, the import of cases such as Stewart v Schwab
124
 and Amoils v Fuel 
Transport (Pty) Ltd
125
 was that under s 220(1)(a)
126
; 
‘an agreement between the shareholders and a director not to remove the director 
from office was valid and enforceable, and a director was able to interdict or restrain 
the shareholders from voting for his or her removal as a director in breach of the 
shareholder agreement’ (writer’s emphasis). 
In contradistinction, s 71(1) provides for the removal of a director by ordinary resolution of 
the shareholders, ‘despite anything to the contrary in…any agreement between a company 
and a director, or between any shareholders and a director’ (writer’s emphasis). Hence 
unlike s 220(1)(a) of the old Act, s 71(1) overrides any agreement between the shareholders 
and a director which seeks to preclude shareholders from removing the director.
127
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Like s 220(1)(a), s 71(1) does not refer to an agreement between shareholders to 
which a director is not a party.
128
 As observed earlier, in the context of s 220(1)(a) the court 
ruled that an agreement between shareholders not to vote for the removal of a director was 
valid and binding.
129
 It would appear that such an agreement between shareholders would 
also be valid and binding under s 71(1)
130
 because the section does not refer to an agreement 
between shareholders. A question that arises is whether an agreement between shareholders 
not to vote for the removal of a director could be invalidated in terms of s 15(7) for being 
inconsistent with the Act.
131
 Section 15(7) of the new Act provides that: 
‘The shareholders of a company may enter into any agreement with one another 
concerning any matter relating to the company, but any such agreement must be 
consistent with this Act and the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation, and any 
provision of such an agreement that is inconsistent with this Act or the company’s 
Memorandum of Incorporation is void to the extent of the inconsistency’ 
It seems unlikely that an agreement between shareholders not to vote for the removal of a 
director could be invalidated under s 15(7) for being inconsistent with the Act. It is submitted 
that such an agreement is not inconsistent with the Act because s 71(1) of the Act does not 
bring such agreements within its scope. If the legislature intended such shareholders’ 
agreements to be invalid under the new Act, it would have ensured that s 71(1) expressly 
overrides them.  
Another concern that has been raised is whether a shareholder’s agreement that 
precludes shareholders from voting for the removal of a director could also possibly be 
nullified in terms of the anti-avoidance provisions of s 6(1) of the new Act.
132
 Section 6(1) 
empowers a court to declare inter alia, any agreement to be primarily or substantially 
intended to defeat or reduce the effect of a prohibition or requirement established by or in 
terms of an unalterable provision of the Act and to declare that agreement void to that extent. 
However, Ncube argues, and it is submitted rightly so, that a shareholder’s agreement that 
thwarts removal of directors by shareholders is unlikely to be subject to s 6(1).
133
 She argues 
that s 6(1) applies to inter alia, agreements that seek to defeat or minimise the effect of an 
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unalterable prohibition or requirement and that s 71(1) does not contain an unalterable 
prohibition or requirement.  
It is submitted that the right of shareholders to remove a director in terms of s 71(1) is 
also weakened by the fact that the new Act permits loaded voting rights.
134
 Section 37(2) 
provides that each issued share of a company, regardless of its class, has associated with it 
one general voting right, except to the extent provided otherwise by the Act or the 
preferences, rights, limitations and other terms determined by or in terms of the company’s 
MOI in accordance with section 36. Section 37(5)(a) also provides that subject to any other 
law, a company’s MOI may establish, for any particular class of shares, preferences, rights, 
limitations or other terms that confer special, conditional or limited voting rights. It is 
significant to note that while the old Act prohibited loaded voting rights in respect of public 
companies, the new Act permits them in both private and public companies. Hence the 
decision in Bushell v Faith
135
 will have a wider impact than before. 
It is noteworthy that where it is proposed to remove a director in terms of s 71(1) the 
Act requires that the director concerned be given notice of the meeting and the resolution and, 
he/she must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to make a presentation to the meeting 
before the resolution is put to the vote.
136
  
Section 71 appears to have been influenced by equivalent provisions found in 
corporate legislation in foreign jurisdictions. For instance, s 109(1) of the Canada Business 
Corporations Act empowers shareholders in general meeting to remove directors by ordinary 
resolution. Similarly, in the USA s 8.08(a) of the Model Business Corporations Act 
empowers shareholders in general meeting to remove directors but this right is restricted by s 
8.08(b) which provides that, ‘If a director is elected by a voting group of shareholders, only 
the shareholders of that voting group may participate in the vote to remove him.’   
Although s 71(1) appears to empower shareholders, it is submitted that the section 
suffers from an ambiguity which potentially limits the right of shareholders to remove 
directors. Based on the language of s 71(1) one could conclude that only the shareholders 
who are entitled to vote in an election of a particular director are entitled to participate in the 
voting process to remove that director. This is because s 71(1) provides that ‘a director may 
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be removed by an ordinary resolution adopted at a shareholders meeting by the persons 
entitled to exercise voting rights in an election of that director…’ Moreover, the language in 
the section appears to preclude the removal of an appointed director by means of an ordinary 
resolution of the shareholders.
137
 This is because such a director is not ‘elected.’ Cassim
138
 
rightly notes that,  
‘On a strict interpretation of section 71 if a director has been directly appointed to the 
board of directors by other directors, the shareholders do not have the power any more 
to remove such director from office by ordinary resolution.’  
The view has also been advanced to the effect that a director who is appointed – as opposed 
to being elected – could also be removed by means of an ordinary shareholders’ resolution.
139
 
This view is based on the argument that any provision in a MOI which confers exclusive 
power to remove a particular director on a person named in the MOI pursuant to s 66(4)(a)(i) 
would be overridden by the words, ‘despite anything to the contrary in a company’s 
Memorandum of Incorporation or rules, or any agreement between a company and a director, 
or between any shareholders and a director, a director may be removed by an ordinary 
resolution..,’ contained in s 71(1).
 140
  However, the correctness of this argument is debatable 
because s 71(1) refers to removal by ‘an ordinary resolution adopted at a shareholders 
meeting by the persons entitled to exercise voting rights in an election of that 
director.’(writer’s emphasis). This begs the question how does this apply to a director who 
was directly appointed by a person who is named in the MOI in terms of s 66(4)(a)(i). For 
such a director is not elected by any of the company’s shareholders, therefore there can be no 
question of there being persons entitled to exercise voting rights in an election of that 
director. 
It is submitted that there appears to be no cogent reason why in principle shareholders 
should be precluded from removing, by ordinary resolution, a director appointed in terms of s 
66(4)(a)(i). Perhaps a plausible argument that could be raised against this submission would 
be that a director appointed pursuant to s 66(4)(a)(i) is usually a representative director who 
is expected to represent the interests of the appointing party on the company’s board;
141
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therefore only the appointing party should have the power to remove that director. For 
example, it is conceivable that a company’s MOI may give a major creditor, bank or lender to 
the company the right to appoint a director to represent the interests of that institution on the 
company’s board.
142
 Hence allowing shareholders in general meeting to remove such a 
representative by ordinary resolution would prejudice the interests of the appointing party. 
However, it is submitted that the interests of the appointing party must be viewed in the light 
of the principle that a director who is appointed by a particular person is not the servant or 
agent of that appointing party; and, while he may represent the interests of the appointing 
party, he is in law obliged to serve the best interests of the company to the exclusion of the 
interests of the appointing party when carrying out his duties as a director.
143
 Therefore since 
his primary duty is to serve the interests of the company there is no reason in principle why 
the shareholders in general meeting – acting for the company – should be precluded from 
removing the director. Moreover, such an appointed director could in any event still be 
removed, in the case of a company with more than two directors, by the board
144
 or, in the 
case of a company with less than three directors, by the Companies Tribunal.
145
 If it is 
possible for an appointed director to be removed in this fashion by parties other than the 
appointing party, there is no reason why shareholders in general meeting should be precluded 
from removing an appointed director in terms of s 71(1). This appears to be an unwarranted 
restriction of the shareholders’ right to remove directors. 
It is submitted that, if the objective of denying shareholders the right to remove an 
appointed director by ordinary resolution was to protect the interests of the appointing party 
then, there is a better way of achieving this without compromising the shareholders’ right to 
remove directors. For instance, s 71(1) could have been modelled on s 203D(1) of the 
Australian Corporations Act 2001 which provides that, 
‘a public company may by resolution remove a director from office despite anything 
in the company’s constitution or an agreement between the company and the director, 
or an agreement between any or all members of the company and the director.’
146
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Section 203D(1) makes no distinction between elected and appointed directors. Hence 
shareholders in Australian public companies have the power to remove representative 
directors appointed by a particular party. Further, with regard to representative directors, 
section 203D(1) protects the interests of the appointing party by providing that,  
‘If the director was appointed to represent the interests of particular shareholders or 
debenture holders, the resolution to remove the director does not take effect until a 
replacement to represent their interests has been appointed.’ 
Modelling our s 71(1) along the lines of s 203D(1) would ensure that shareholders would not 
only have power to remove elected directors, but also ex officio directors as well as directors 
directly appointed by parties named in the MOI. A narrow interpretation of s 71(1) read with 
s 66(4)(a)(i) would be a fundamental departure from the position under the old Act.  There 
was no provision in the old Act to the effect that only the party who appointed a director 
could remove that director.  Hence it did not matter then whether a director was elected or 
directly appointed by a particular party – shareholders could remove any director by ordinary 
resolution in terms of s 220(1). 
 Denying shareholders the power to remove directors appointed in terms of s 
66(4)(a)(i) would be incongruent with current trends in corporate law where the right of 
shareholders to remove all, or any of the directors, by ordinary resolution at any time and, for 
any reason, is considered a powerful tool to make the board accountable.
147
 It would set 
South Africa apart from other jurisdictions such as America, Canada, Australia and the 
United Kingdom because none of these jurisdictions curtails the shareholders’ power to 
remove directors in the manner which s 71(1) read with s 66(4)(a)(i) appears to do.
 148
 Hence 
a strict interpretation of these provisions would frustrate the realisation of one of the 
objectives of the law reform process namely, to harmonise South African law with the law in 
other best practice jurisdictions.
149
 
6.6.4.2 Removal by the board  
Apart from removal by shareholders, the new Act also provides for the removal of directors 
by the board of directors in terms of s 71(3). Section 71(3) provides as follows: 
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If a company has more than two directors, and a shareholder or director has alleged 
that a director of the company-  
(a) has become-  
(i) ineligible or disqualified in terms of section 69, other than on the grounds 
contemplated in section 69(8)(a); or  
(ii) incapacitated to the extent that the director is unable to perform the functions of a 
director, and is unlikely to regain that capacity within a reasonable time; or  
(b) has neglected, or been derelict in the performance of, the functions of director,  
the board, other than the director concerned, must determine the matter by resolution, 
and may remove a director whom it has determined to be ineligible or disqualified, 
incapacitated, or negligent or derelict, as the case may be. 
 
Section 71(3) is a novel provision in that it, for the first time in South Africa, gives the board 
of directors statutory power to remove a director.
150
 The old Act did not confer power on the 
board to remove directors. Rather s 220(7) of the old Act left it open for companies to choose 
whether or not they wanted to empower their directors, via a provision in the articles, to 
remove a director from office.
151
 Section 220(7) of the old Act provided inter alia that 
‘nothing in this section shall be construed as…derogating from any power to remove a 
director which may exist apart from this section.’  
Removal in terms of s 71(3) can only be carried out on the grounds specified in 
paragraphs (a) and (b) of that section. In other words, removal by the board must be for 
cause. This contrasts with the removal by shareholders in terms of s 71(1) where the removal 
can be without cause.
152
  
Unlike the shareholder’s power to remove a director in terms of s 71(1), the board’s 
removal power is not restricted to elected directors only.
153
 It extends to all categories of 
directors, whether they are directly appointed by a person named in the MOI, elected by 
shareholders or they are ex-officio directors.  
The board’s removal power is significant especially if it is considered in the light of s 
66(4)(a)(i) in terms of which the MOI of a company may empower, inter alia, the board to 
appoint up to 50% of the board members. Therefore, s 71(3) read with s 66(4)(a)(i) 
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potentially shifts the balance of power in favour of the board at the expense of shareholders. 
As Cassim,
154
 commenting on the director removal provisions in s 71, says: 
“These entirely innovative statutory provisions have taken away from shareholders 
their sole privilege to remove a director from office. Section 71(3) is not only unique, 
but also flouts the important principles of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (2004) that state categorically that the election and the 
removal of directors must be treated as a ‘basic shareholder right.’” 
Concern has been expressed that giving the board of directors power to dismiss one of their 
own could inhibit free and open debate on the board; fear of removal may cause directors to 
be wary about expressing their views on a particular issue, especially if their view is opposed 
to the majority view on the board.
155
 However, it is must be noted that in the event of 
directors holding different views concerning a particular matter the majority view generally 
prevails.
156
 In view of this Knight
157
 rightly states that, 
 ‘It is difficult to see what incentive exists for directors in the majority on a particular 
issue to rid themselves of a minority director when that director is not in a position to 
obstruct the workings of the board or to frustrate the will of the majority of directors.’  
It is also submitted that the Act adequately protects directors
158
 from unwarranted removals 
by the board hence directors should be able to freely express their views on the board without 
fear of removal. 
Notwithstanding the above, this writer is of the view that giving the board power to 
remove a director could potentially lead to boardroom battles that destabilise the company 
and attract negative publicity regarding a company’s internal governance matters. This is 
especially so in the context of removals by the board in terms 71(3) where the board’s 
decision may end up being the subject of court proceedings pursuant to s 71(5). Recently the 
media reported on a boardroom battle at a JSE listed mining company involving two directors 
who were removed by the board for alleged corporate governance breaches.
159
 Subsequent to 
the removal some shareholders requisitioned a shareholders’ meeting and, at the resulting 
meeting shareholders re-appointed the two directors who had been removed by the board and, 
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they simultaneously removed some of the directors who had participated in the decision to 
remove the two directors.
160
 It is submitted that s 71(3) could potentially lead to situations 
such as this where the board’s removal power may result in unnecessary boardroom battles 
that unsettle the company. 
It is submitted that the question whether a board should have power to remove a 
director is a matter that should have been left for companies to decide on their own by 
inserting appropriate provisions in their MOI. This would have given companies the 
flexibility to order their internal corporate governance procedures in the manner they see fit. 
Section 220(1) read with s 220(7) of the old Act provided such flexibility. As it is, by making 
s 71(3) an unalterable provision the legislature has made this the default position for both 
public and private companies. This one size fits all approach may not be appropriate for some 
companies.  
The board’s statutory power to remove directors in terms of 71(3) appears to set South 
Africa apart from other jurisdictions. For instance, in Australia the position with regard to 
public companies is that directors can be removed by the shareholders in terms of s 203D of 
the Australian Corporations Act 2001. Section 203E further provides that, 
A resolution, request or notice of any or all of the directors of a public company is 
void to the extent that it purports to: 
(a) remove a director from their office; or 
(b) require a director to vacate their office. 
 
Hence in Australia only shareholders can remove directors of public companies and board 
removals are expressly prohibited.
161
 It is interesting to note that the Australian Institute of 





In the United Kingdom a director may be removed by ordinary resolution before the 
expiration of his period of office, notwithstanding anything in any agreement between the 
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company and the director.
163
 The UK Companies Act 2006 does not give the board statutory 
power to remove directors. However, s 168(5)(b) of the UK Companies Act permits 
companies to provide for other ways of removing directors other than what is provided for in 
the Act. Hence it is possible that the articles of a company could provide for board removals.  
 
In the USA the Model Business Corporations Act which, as observed earlier, has been 
adopted by most states, provides that the shareholders may remove one or more directors 
with or without cause unless the articles of incorporation provide that directors may be 
removed only for cause.
164
 There is no provision in the Model Business Corporations Act 
granting the board power to remove directors. In Delaware the general position is that any 
director or the entire board of directors may be removed, with or without cause, by the 
holders of a majority of the shares then entitled to vote at an election of directors.
165
 The 
General Corporation Law of Delaware does not give the board power to remove directors. On 
the other hand, the California Corporations Code, apart from providing for removal of 
directors by shareholders, also provides that ‘the board may declare vacant the office of a 





Although the California Corporations Code gives the board power to remove a 
director, it is submitted that this power is less of a concern than the power given to the board 
in terms of s 71(3) of the new Act. This is because the power of the board under the 
California Corporations Code relates to situations that are straightforward and therefore 
unlikely to give rise to any disputes as to whether the board’s decision was right or wrong. 
The circumstances in which the power may be exercised do not require the board to exercise 
its own judgment, rather the board’s decision follows on a court order declaring the director 
in question to be of unsound mind or, upon a court convicting the director of a felony. By 
contrast a board deciding whether or not remove a director in terms of s 71(3)(a)(ii), or 
71(3)(b) would have to evaluate the facts and come to its own judgment concerning whether 
the director in question is incapacitated to the extent that he/she is unable to perform the 
functions of a director, and is unlikely to regain that capacity within a reasonable time or, 
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whether in fact the director has neglected, or been derelict in the performance of the functions 
of a director respectively. 
 
6.6.4.3 Removal by the tribunal 
Section 71(8) is another novel provision of the Act which provides for the removal of 
directors by the Tribunal in the case of companies with less than three directors. Removal by 
the Tribunal does not apply to public companies because they are required to have at least 
three directors.
167
 In terms of s 71(8)(b) the Tribunal may remove a director on grounds 
similar to those applicable in the case of board removals. Hence removals by the Tribunal are 
for cause. Removals by the Tribunal also take place at the instance of a shareholder or a 
director of the company.
168
  
It is important to note that s 71(8) makes no distinction between appointed or elected 
directors. This is important because, as noted earlier, it would seem that it is not possible to 
remove an appointed or an ex-officio director by ordinary resolution of the company’s 
shareholders. Therefore, s 71(8) offers shareholders an indirect way of removing appointed 
directors. The only drawback from a shareholder’s perspective is that such removals may 
only be effected on the specific grounds specified in the Act. Moreover, removals by the 
Tribunal are reviewable by the court.
169
  
6.6.5 Directors’ remedies consequent to removal 
It is important to note that while s 71(3) empowers shareholders to remove directors at any 
time before the expiration of their terms, the director concerned may, depending on the 
circumstances of the case, claim damages for breach of contract against the company as per s 
71(9) of the Act. Section 71(9) provides that: 
Nothing in this section deprives a person removed from office as a director in terms of 
this section of any right that person may have at common law or otherwise to apply to 
a court for damages or other compensation for-  
(a) loss of office as a director; or  
(b) loss of any other office as a consequence of being removed as a director 
 
Under the old Act a director who had been removed from office before the expiration of his 
term of office had a claim for damages against the company only if he had a fixed term 
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contract of service with the company whereby the company contracted to compensate him or 
not to terminate his office and, if he had not breached the contract entitling the company to 
terminate it.
170
 In the absence of a separate fixed term contract with the company the director 
could not rely on the fact that he assumed the office of a director on the terms contained in 
the articles of association; the reason for this is that the articles do not constitute a contract 
between a company and a director in his capacity as such.
171
  
Interestingly, it would appear that under the new Act a director does not need to have 
a separate service contract with the company in order to have a claim for damages for 
removal from office as a director or, for loss of any other office as a result of being removed 
as a director.
172
 This is a result of s 15(6) which provides that the MOI is binding inter alia 
between the company and each director. Hence a MOI constitutes a contract between the 
company and a director with the consequence that if the director is removed from office he 
may be able to base his claim for damages on a breach of the terms of the MOI. This is yet 
another instance of the new Act giving directors rights that they did not have before. The 
ability to bring a claim for damages helps the director to entrench himself in office and, the 
fact that there no longer has to be a separate service contract further enhances a director’s 
ability to entrench himself.  
6.6.6 Does section 71 constitute an exclusive code? 
 
The foregoing discussion has shown that s 71 provides for three modes of director 
removals.
173
 The section also prescribes the procedure to be followed in each case. It is 
noteworthy that the new Act does not have a provision equivalent to s 220(7) of the old Act, 
which permitted companies to set out in their constitutions procedures for the removal of 
directors as an alternative to the procedure provided for in s 220(1).
174
 Where a company’s 
constitution established such an alternative procedure shareholders had an election to follow 
that procedure rather than the one set up in s 220 of the Act.
175
 The absence of a provision 
similar to s 220(7) in the new Act raises the question whether it would be permissible for a 
company to set out in its MOI a procedure for the removal of directors as an alternative to the 
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procedures in s 71. In other words, the question is whether s 71 constitutes an exclusive code 
for removing directors?  
This question is of practical importance as can be seen in the Australian experience 
where courts have come up with conflicting decisions in relation to the procedural 
requirements set by s 203D of the Australian Corporations Act 2001.
176
 Section 203D is the 
equivalent of, and its wording is similar to the wording in s 71(1) of the new Act. It provides 
that a public company may by resolution remove a director from office at any time despite 
anything that may be found in the company's constitution, an agreement between the 
company and the director, and an agreement between the members and the company. Like its 
South African counterpart, s 203D prescribes the procedure to be followed in such a removal. 
This includes inter alia the requirement that a notice of intention to move the resolution to 
remove the director must be given to the director concerned.
177
 Further, the director 
concerned is entitled to put his case to the members by giving the company a written 
statement for circulation to members and to speak to the motion at the meeting.
178
  
In the case of Scottish & Colonial Ltd -v- Australian Power and Gas Co Ltd
179
 one of 
five directors of a listed public company called a shareholders’ meeting to consider a 
resolution to remove the other four directors and appoint one other. The director did not 
follow the procedure stipulated in s 203D of the Corporations Act. The company’s 
constitution provided for the removal of directors by a shareholders’ resolution, but it did not 
contain any procedural requirements similar to those in s 203D. The court held that 
compliance with s 203D was necessary and made an order restraining the company from 
considering the resolution to remove the directors. In arriving at its decision the court noted 
that s 203D was different from the previous legislation which had consistently been 
interpreted by the courts as allowing companies to proceed in accordance with either the 
legislation or with provisions in their articles regulating removal of directors. It noted that the 
language used in s 203D was clear and that the use of the words ‘despite anything’ in s 203D 
(1) emphasized the attainment of the purpose that directors be given an opportunity to put 
their case to the members when removal is proposed. 
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Given that s 203D of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 is similar to s 71 of the 
new Act it is possible that South African courts may follow the decision in Scottish & 
Colonial Ltd -v- Australian Power and Gas Co Ltd pursuant to s 5(2) which allows the courts 
to consider foreign law when interpreting the Act. It must be pointed out that there are other 
decisions of the Federal Court of Australia and the Supreme Court of Western Australia
180
 
that interpret section 203D differently to Scottish & Colonial Ltd by holding that the statutory 
procedures are not mandatory. Notwithstanding these other contrary decisions, it is submitted 
that South African courts are likely to follow the Scottish & Colonial Ltd decision for the 
reasons discussed below. 
First, it must be remembered that s 71 is an unalterable provision. And, s 15(2)(d) of 
the new Act prohibits the inclusion in a company’s MOI of any provision that negates, 
restricts, limits, qualifies, extends or otherwise alters the substance or effect of an unalterable 
provision of the Act. Hence it is submitted that the validity of a provision in the MOI that 
establishes an alternative procedure for the removal of directors would be questionable, 
particularly if the provision in the MOI does not incorporate the requirements set out in s 71 
such as, in the case of a removal by shareholders, the giving of notice to the director 
concerned and, also affording the director an opportunity to address the shareholders’ 
meeting.
181
 Such a provision in the MOI would be invalid because it negates or alters the 
substance and effect of s 71 which is an unalterable provision. Furthermore, such a provision 
would be inconsistent with s 71 and consequently void in terms of s 15 (1) which requires 
that each provision of a company’s MOI must be consistent with the Act otherwise the 
provision would be void to the extent that it is inconsistent with the Act.   
It must be noted though that s 15(2)(a)(iii) read with s 15(2)(d) contemplate that a 
provision may be included in a company’s MOI which, amongst other things, qualifies, 
extends or otherwise alters the substance or effect of an unalterable provision of the Act.
182
 
However such a provision may only be included in the MOI if it meets the requirement of 
imposing on the company a higher standard, greater restriction, longer period of time or any 
similarly more onerous requirement, than would otherwise apply to the company in terms of 
the unalterable provision.
183
 A provision in the MOI providing for the removal of elected 
directors without the need for a shareholder’s resolution or, without giving notice to the 
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director concerned or, without giving the director an opportunity to address the shareholders 
as required by s 71 can hardly be said to impose a higher standard or more onerous 
requirement on the company. It would therefore appear, in the light of the above, that the 
requirements of s 71 are mandatory and, that a provision in a company’s MOI which 
establishes an alternative procedure for the removal of elected directors that does not 
incorporate the requirements of s 71 would be invalid. 
It is unfortunate that the new Act does not have a provision equivalent to s 220(7) of 
the old Act that would enable companies to include provisions in their MOI establishing 
alternative procedures for the removal of directors. It is not clear whether the legislature’s 
failure to include in the new Act a provision similar to s 220(7) of the old Act was a mere 
oversight or, it was a well-considered policy decision. Inclusion of a provision similar to s 
220(7) would have given shareholders the choice, when removing directors, to either proceed 
in terms of the statutory procedure set in s 71 of the new Act or in terms of the procedure set 
in the MOI.  As argued above, it is likely that the courts will find that the requirements of s 
71 are mandatory and thus effectively precluding the possibility that a company’s MOI could 
provide for an alternative removal procedure giving shareholders the freedom of choice as to 
which procedure to follow.  It is submitted that the shareholders power to remove directors is 
such an important accountability tool that it should be made available with very limited, if 
any, restrictions.  
 
6.7 Shareholder apathy 
In discussing how the new Act has changed the balance of power between shareholders and 
directors and how this impacts on corporate governance, especially the protection of 
shareholders, the issue of shareholder apathy bears consideration. For if shareholders do not 
make effective use of the power given to them by the Act this would not enhance corporate 
governance or improve the protection of shareholders. The problem of shareholder apathy or 
passivity, especially in companies with widely dispersed shareholding, has been a topical 
issue locally and abroad.
184
 The discussion below briefly highlights some of the reasons for 
shareholder apathy and how the new Act attempts to encourage shareholder activism. 
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Some of the reasons that have been advanced
185
 to explain why shareholders take a 
passive role in corporate governance include the following: that shareholders are not aware of 
their rights; that shareholders do not appreciate the influence they can have on corporate 
governance and they believe that their efforts would not bear meaningful results; the 
prohibitive costs of monitoring compliance with corporate governance principles – these 
include costs of attendance at meetings and litigation costs; lastly, shareholders are only 
interested in the return on their investment in a company and they are not really concerned 
about corporate governance issues – if a company ceases to yield the expected return the 
shareholders will simply sell their shares. Some of these reasons are generalised of course 
and therefore do not apply universally to all shareholders. For instance, while some 
unsophisticated individual shareholders may not be aware of their rights and powers as 
shareholders, institutional investors would be aware given that they are professional 
investors.
186
 Moreover while the issue of the costs involved in monitoring compliance with 
corporate governance principles could be significant for individual shareholders it might not 
be of great consequence for institutional investors.  
In 2002 the King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (hereafter the 
King II Report) noted the critical role played by shareholder activism in encouraging good 
corporate governance.
187
 The King II Report made a number of recommendations on how to 
encourage shareholder activism. These included educating shareholders on corporate 
governance.
188
 Undoubtedly this education drive would benefit the individual and 
unsophisticated shareholder. It also recommended that ‘institutional investors should be more 




To address the perceived high costs of monitoring and enforcing compliance with 
corporate governance regulations the King II Report recommended the introduction of class 
actions and a contingency fees system.
190
 With regard to the problem of low attendances at 
shareholders’ meetings the Report recommended that quorum requirements for ordinary 
resolutions be increased to at least 25% of the total shares in issue having voting rights.
191
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The rationale for increasing the quorum requirements for shareholders’ meetings is that, ‘this 
would encourage companies to solicit attendance at meetings or receipt of proxies and 
highlight the need for shareowners to give due consideration to the use of their votes.’
192
  
A problem with this recommendation is that shareholder apathy could make it 
difficult for companies to conduct shareholders’ meetings if they could not get the required 
number of shareholders to attend the meeting. It is significant that the King Committee 
acknowledged at the time that ‘considerable public comment was received suggesting that 
this recommendation was both impractical and unduly onerous.’
193
  
Another criticism of the recommendation to increase the quorum for shareholders’ 
meetings is that this would not guarantee good corporate governance because the board 
members were likely to lobby for the attendance of only those shareholders who are friendly 
to the board, and therefore unlikely to ask difficult questions.
194
 Moreover, even if 
shareholders could be persuaded to attend the meetings, there is no guarantee that they would 
undertake due diligence research concerning the governance of the company or, that they 
would commit to monitoring managerial actions on a continuing basis, especially if such 
shareholders perceived their shareholding as too small to warrant any active involvement 
beyond attendance at meetings.
195
 Hence increasing quorum requirements without more only 
addresses the quantitative aspect of shareholder activism – attendance at shareholders’ 
meetings without addressing the qualitative aspect of informed, and pro-active shareholder 
engagement on matters impacting on corporate governance. 
The new Act appears to have heeded the King Committee’s recommendation to 
increase quorum requirements for shareholders’ meetings. Section 64(1)(a) provides that a 
shareholders meeting may not begin until sufficient persons are present at the meeting to 
exercise, in aggregate, at least 25 percent of all of the voting rights that are entitled to be 
exercised in respect of at least one matter to be decided at the meeting. This contrasts with s 
190 of the old Act which prescribed a quorum of three members entitled to vote in the case of 
a public company and two members entitled to vote in the case of a private company. The 
concerns noted above regarding the King Committee’s recommendation to increase quorum 
requirements for shareholders’ meetings apply equally to the change made by s 64(1)(a). 
Notably s 64(2) provides that a company’s MOI may specify a lower or higher percentage in 
place of the 25 percent required to satisfy the quorum requirements. The flexibility offered by 






 See C Rademeyer and J Holtzhausen op cit note 184 at 770 
195
 Ibid at 771 
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this provision could be helpful for those companies that might find the 25% requirement too 
onerous albeit reducing the requirement to below 25% would run contrary to the rationale 
behind the change brought by s 64(1) regarding quorum requirements. 
Shareholder meetings are a key platform for shareholders to influence corporate 
governance therefore it is critical that the law makes it as easy as possible and less costly for 
shareholders to participate at shareholders’ meetings. In this regard s 63(2)(a) of the Act 
provides that unless the MOI of a company prohibits it, a company may provide for a 
shareholders’ meeting to be conducted electronically.  
The new Act also encourages shareholder activism by empowering shareholders to 
call for a shareholder’s meeting; s 61(3) provides as follows: 
 
‘Subject to subsection (5) and (6), the board of a company, or any other person 
specified in the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation or rules, must call a 
shareholders meeting if one or more written and signed demands for such a meeting 
are delivered to the company, and-  
(a) each such demand describes the specific purpose for which the meeting is 
proposed; and  
(b) in aggregate, demands for substantially the same purpose are made and signed by 
the holders, as of the earliest time specified in any of those demands, of at least 10% 
of the voting rights entitled to be exercised in relation to the matter proposed to be 
considered at the meeting.’ 
 
The threshold of 10% of voting rights specified in s 61(3)(b) may be reduced but it cannot be 
increased by a company’s MOI.
196
 The 10% threshold is unlikely to be a difficult hurdle for 
institutional shareholders who usually hold a considerable number of shares in the companies 
they invest in, so they can easily satisfy the requirement acting singly or in concert with other 
institutional investors.
197
 For instance, an announcement posted on the JSE Stock Exchange 
News Service (SENS) recently shows that two institutional shareholders namely, the Public 
Investment Corporation [hereafter the PIC] and the Bidvest Group limited [hereafter 
Bidvest], managed to compel the board of Adcock Ingram Holdings Limited to call a special 
shareholder’s meeting in terms of s 61(3) and also to force the resignation of the chairman of 
the board.
198
 According to the announcement the PIC and Bidvest held 21% and 34.5% 
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percent respectively of the shareholding in the company. For individual shareholders the 10% 
threshold could be difficult to meet.  
In the USA there is an on-going debate concerning whether shareholders should have 
the right to call special shareholders’ meetings without board approval and if so, what 
threshold of shares must be held by a shareholder to have the locus standi to call such a 
meeting.
199
 The position varies amongst the states. In states such as California, shareholders 
have a statutory right to call a special shareholders’ meeting. Section 600(d) of the California 
Corporations Code provides that,  
 
‘Special meetings of the shareholders may be called by the board, the chairperson of 
the board, the president, the holders of shares entitled to cast not less than 10 percent 
of the votes at the meeting, or any additional persons as may be provided in the 
articles or bylaws.’ 
 
However, the law in Delaware, which is considered the leading corporate law jurisdiction in 
the USA, is less accommodating of shareholders in this regard. In terms of s 211(d) of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law generally only the board can convene a special meeting, 
but there is scope for the certificate of incorporation or by-laws of a corporation to authorise 
other persons – who may include shareholders – to call a special meeting.
200
 Other states such 
as New York follow the Delaware law.
201
 Hence in Delaware and New York shareholders do 
not have a statutory right to call a shareholders’ meeting. In such states a shareholder would 
have to examine the by-laws of his/her target investment company to establish whether they 
permit shareholders to call a special meeting and the requirements that the shareholder would 
have to satisfy in that respect. This is unsatisfactory because a company’s by-laws may allow 
shareholders to call a special meeting but then set stringent requirements which a shareholder 
has to satisfy in order to be able to call a shareholder’s meeting and hence inhibit the ability 
of shareholders to have a say in the governance of a company.  
Canada on the other hand is more permissive, s 143(1) of the Canada Business 
Corporations Act provides that, 
‘The holders of not less than five per cent of the issued shares of a corporation that 
carry the right to vote at a meeting sought to be held may requisition the directors to 
call a meeting of shareholders for the purposes stated in the requisition.’ 
 
Similarly, s 249D of the Australian Corporations Act provides that: 
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‘The directors of a company must call and arrange to hold a general meeting on the 
request of:  
(a) members with at least 5% of the votes that may be cast at the general meeting; or  
(b) at least 100 members who are entitled to vote at the general meeting.’ 
 
Hence Canada and Australia make it easier than the South African Act for shareholders to 
call a special shareholders’ meetings by prescribing a lower threshold of 5% of the votes that 
may be cast. It could be said that s 249D(b) of the Australian Corporations Act also makes it 
easier for individual minority shareholders to call for a special meeting in public companies 
since the support of only 100 people, irrespective of the percentage of their shareholding in 
the company, is required to call such a meeting. 
The enforcement provisions of the Act are also another attempt to enhance 
shareholder activism by reducing the costs associated with enforcing compliance with the 
Act. For instance, s 156 read with s 167 provide for the resolution of disputes through 
mediation, conciliation and arbitration. These methods of dispute resolution were enacted on 
the back of concerns that ‘the traditional method of resolving commercial disputes through 
adversarial litigation had become expensive, sluggish due to the high caseload in courts, and 
cumbersome as a result of the formalities required in terms of the court processes.’
202
 These 
alternative dispute resolution methods [hereafter ADR] were geared to provide a simple, 
speedy and cost effective method of resolving disputes. However, the weakness of the ADR 
methods in the Act is that they are voluntary and parties cannot be compelled to participate in 
the proceedings. If a party refuses to participate the Tribunal or an accredited entity to which 
the dispute has been referred can only issue a certificate in terms of s 166(2) to the effect that 
the process has failed. Section 166(2) provides that:  
‘If the Companies Tribunal, or an accredited entity, to whom a matter is referred for 
alternative dispute resolution concludes that either party to the conciliation, mediation 
or arbitration is not participating in that process in good faith, or that there is no 
reasonable probability of the parties resolving their dispute through that process, the 
Companies Tribunal or accredited entity must issue a certificate in the prescribed 
form stating that the process has failed.’ 
 
It is reported that because of the voluntary nature of the ADR proceedings under the Act one 
of the cases brought before the Tribunal could not proceed because one of the parties failed to 
attend and the Tribunal had to issue a certificate in terms of s 166(2)
203
 In another case the 
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proceedings could not continue because the respondent refused to give its consent for the 
matter to be resolved by ADR.
204
  
 Section 157(1)(c) of the Act appears to be a response to one of the recommendations 
in the King Report II in that it introduces the possibility of class actions in South African 
company law. Section 157(1)(c) provides that ‘when, in terms of this Act, an application can 
be made to, or a matter can be brought before, a court, the Companies Tribunal, the Panel or 
the Commission, the right to make the application or bring the matter may be exercised by a 
person acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of affected persons, or an 
association acting in the interest of its members.’ It is submitted that the possibility of class 
actions introduced by this section could potentially enhance shareholder activism by reducing 
the costs faced by individual shareholders in trying to ensure that directors comply with 
principles of good corporate governance. Further, a shareholder will have more confidence 
acting as part of a group. 
Another factor which, in conjunction with the Act, is likely to enhance shareholder 
activism is the Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa [hereafter CRISA]. CRISA 
was issued by the Committee on Responsible Investing by Institutional Investors in South 
Africa which was established subsequent to the King II Report.
205
 CRISA is applicable to 
institutional investors
206
 and their service providers.
207
 It is also proposed that foreign pension 
funds, insurance companies, investment trusts and other collective investment vehicles should 
apply CRISA to the extent that they invest in South African companies.
208
 Like the King 
Code on Corporate Governance, CRISA is a non-mandatory market-based code of 
governance. 
The purpose of CRISA is to ‘give guidance on how the institutional investor should 
execute investment analysis and investment activities and exercise rights so as to promote 
sound governance.’
209
 Principle 2 of CRISA provides that, ‘an institutional investor should 
demonstrate its acceptance of ownership responsibilities in its investment arrangements and 




 See the Introduction to the Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa published by the Institute of 
Directors of South Africa (2011) Available at 
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investment activities.’ This principle requires an institutional investor to demonstrate a 
responsible approach to shareholding by inter alia developing a policy that deals with 
mechanisms of intervention and engagement with the company when concerns have been 
identified and the means of escalation of activities as a shareholder if these concerns cannot 
be resolved. The policy should also specify the institutional investor’s approach to voting at 
shareholder meetings, including the criteria that are used to reach voting decisions and for 
public disclosure of full voting records. Principle 3 requires institutional investors to consider 
a collaborative approach to promote acceptance and implementation of the principles of 
CRISA and other codes and standards applicable to institutional investors. In this respect an 
institutional investor is enjoined to consider a cooperative approach to work jointly with other 
shareholders, service providers, regulators, investee companies and ultimate beneficiaries to, 
where appropriate, promote acceptance and implementation of CRISA and sound 
governance. It is noteworthy that these principles and practices contained in CRISA are also 




‘The governing body of an institutional investor organisation should ensure that 
responsible investment is practiced by the organisation to promote the good 
governance and the creation of value by the companies in which it invests.’ 
 
Like CRISA, the King IV Code also enjoins the governing body of an institutional investor to 
approve a policy that articulates its direction on responsible investment and this policy should 
provide for the adoption of a recognized responsible investment code, principles and 
practices.
211
 Moreover the responsible investment code adopted by the institutional investor 




Thus CRISA as well as the King IV Code address some of the qualitative issues 
surrounding shareholder activism by prescribing reporting requirements for institutional 
investors concerning their engagement with their investee companies on corporate 
governance matters. Moreover, CRISA supported by the King IV Code play a significant role 
in educating institutional investors as to their role in corporate governance. To this extent 
CRISA complements the Act whose provisions are mainly geared towards the quantitative 
aspect of shareholder activism that is, getting more shareholders to participate in corporate 
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governance matters. Although CRISA is a voluntary code which does not have the force of 
law, it is supported by key role players in the market such the JSE and the Financial Services 
Board (FSB).
213
 It is to be hoped that CRISA, the reporting requirements of which became 
effective on 1 February 2012,
214
 will, alongside the King IV Code and the provisions of the 
Act, enhance shareholder activism in South Africa.  
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This thesis set out to show where there has been a shift in the balance of power between 
shareholders and the board of directors in the new Act. It also sought to illustrate how this 
shift is potentially detrimental to shareholder protection and, to establish whether the new Act 
has balanced the shift in power with increased shareholder protection. In a bid to answer 
these questions this thesis considered the changes brought about by those provisions of the 
new Act which give, or appear to give, power to the board of directors and examined how the 
changes brought about by the Act impact on shareholder protection. The shareholder 
remedies contained in the new Act, as well as other measures designed to make directors 
accountable for the exercise of their powers, were critically examined to establish whether 
they adequately protect shareholders. The findings from this discussion are summarised 
below.  
7.2. Shift of power & impact on shareholders 
The discussion in chapter two and three showed that the new Act has altered the default 
position concerning the division of powers by giving directors original power to manage the 
business and affairs of the company. This change does not necessarily amount to a shift in 
power in itself because under the old Act the articles routinely delegated the power to manage 
the business of the company to the board of directors.
1
 Moreover the default position in s 
66(1) can be still be changed via the MOI.  
The division of powers provided for in s 66(1) is not necessarily a bad thing, 
especially for public companies. Generally public companies have a dispersed shareholding 
and therefore the arrangement whereby a board of directors manages the business and affairs 
of the company on behalf of the shareholders is optimal for such companies. However, s 
66(1) may be a challenge for private companies who wish to establish a different division of 
powers. Changing the effect of s 66(1) via the MOI or a shareholders’ agreement might not 
be easy because both the MOI and a shareholders agreement must be consistent with the Act, 
otherwise they could be invalidated in terms of s 15(1) and s 15(7) respectively. The 
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challenge is that it is difficult to know in advance whether any proposed alternative 
governance arrangement in the MOI or in a shareholders’ agreement would be considered 
inconsistent with the Act and therefore invalid.  Hence there is a need to amend s 66(1) as 
recommended in paragraph 7.5.1 below in order to make it possible for companies, especially 
closely held private companies, to validly establish governance arrangements that meet their 
needs.  
Chapter two and three showed that the new Act has shifted the balance of power 
between shareholders and directors by bestowing upon the latter power to authorise the 
issuing of shares in terms of s 38, the repurchase of its shares by a company in terms of s 48 
and to authorise company distributions in terms of s 46. There is a shift in this regard because 
under the old Act the board did not, for example, have power to issue shares or authorise a 
share repurchase without prior shareholder approval. The new Act does not require a 
company to have authority in its MOI before it can enter into any of these transactions.  
Companies ought to have the flexibility to determine whether or not they want their directors 
to have these powers and if so, the conditions that should be attached to the exercise of those 
powers. 
The protective measures in the new Act include the fact that the Act requires 





   The pre-emptive right in s 39 is also another protective measure in the 
context of new share issues.  However, this right only applies to private companies and 
personal liability companies but not to public companies.
4
 There is need to amend the Act to 
ensure that it prescribes pre-emptive rights even for public companies. 
The new Act does not adequately protect shareholders in the context of share 
repurchases. It does not make a distinction between general and selective offers by a 
company to repurchase its share. It also does not require companies to disclose information to 
shareholders to enable them to make informed decisions when faced with an offer to 
repurchase their shares. The provisions in the new Act which empower directors to issue 
shares and authorise distributions are unalterable provisions. Therefore there is very limited 
scope for companies to alter the effect of these unalterable provisions in terms of s 
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15(2)(a)(iii). There is a risk that attempts to alter the effect of these provisions in the MOI or 
a shareholders’ agreement may be invalidated in terms of s 15(1) or 15(7). It is crucial that 
companies be given the flexibility to decide whether or not they want their directors to have 
the power to issue shares or to authorise share repurchases and, if so, to determine the 
conditions under which those powers may be exercised. Hence there is need to amend the 
new Act as suggested in the recommendations section below.  
7.3. Shareholder remedies and accountability of directors 
The discussion in chapter four of this thesis showed that the new Act attempts to make 
directors accountable by imposing certain duties upon the directors. However, these are ex-
post facto measures that can only be used after the company has already suffered harm. 
Section 76(3)(c) which imposes on directors a duty of care, skill and diligence, is ambiguous 
and could be interpreted in such a way that the test of care and skill under it is similar to the 
overly subjective test at common law. There is need to amend s 76(3)(c) as suggested below 
so that it imposes a stricter test of care and skill.  
There is an attempt in the new Act to make directors liable to the company, as well as 
to the shareholders, for certain acts or omissions. These include inter alia s 77 and s 218(2), 
as well as s 20(6) by means of which shareholders could recover damages from directors 
should the latter intentionally, fraudulently or due to gross negligence cause the company to 
do anything inconsistent with the Act or the MOI . However it was noted that the effect of 
these liability provisions is blunted by other provisions such as s 77(5) which make it 
possible for a director to apply to court to be excused from liability.   
Chapters five and six discussed the various remedies available to shareholders under 
the new Act. It was noted that the new Act contains new and improved remedies. These 
include the remedy of having a director declared delinquent or placed under probation and the 
remedy against oppressive or prejudicial conduct which should prove useful to shareholders 
in holding directors accountable. However, the effectiveness of some remedies such as the 
derivative action in s 164 is hampered by certain procedural requirements such as, for 
example, the peremptory demand requirement set in s 165(2) and the rebuttable presumption 
that the granting of leave to bring a derivative action is not in the best interest of the 
company.
5
 It was noted in chapter 6 that the effectiveness of the appraisal remedy contained 
in s 164 is hampered by the complex and technical procedural requirements that a shareholder 
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must satisfy to be entitled to exercise the remedy. The possible involvement of the court in 
the appraisal process could also result in delays and high costs of litigation which may inhibit 
small shareholders from exercising the remedy.  
It was also noted in chapter six that the new Act empowers shareholders to appoint 
and remove directors in terms of ss 66 and 71. However the language used in s 71(1) read 
with s 66(4)(a)(i) appears to unduly limit the right of shareholders to remove directors that 
are directly appointed by persons named in the MOI in terms of s 66(4)(a)(i).  
Although the new Act tries to balance the increased powers of directors through the 
use of directors’ duties, imposition of civil liability on directors, as well as new and improved 
remedies, certain weaknesses in the Act which leave shareholders vulnerable to the abuse of 
directors’ powers were identified in this thesis. Overall, it can be concluded from the 
discussion in chapters 2 to 6 that the changes brought about by the new Act have shifted the 
balance of power between shareholders and directors in favour of the latter, especially in the 
area of corporate finance. A comparison of various provisions of the Act with comparative 
provisions in foreign legislation showed that our law compares favourably with the law in 
foreign jurisdictions such as the USA, Canada, the UK, Australia and New Zealand on certain 
aspects. However, it was shown that some of the new changes brought about by the new Act 
leave shareholders exposed to the abuse of power by directors. Therefore there is room to 
enhance the protection of shareholders under the new Act. In this respect provisions from 
various foreign legislation that were considered in the comparative discussion can provide 
guidelines as to how our Act can be improved as recommended below. 
7.5.0 Recommendations 
7.5.1 Recommendation on the division of power 
It is recommended that s 66(1) and s 15(7) of the new Act be amended by adopting wording 
similar to that found in s 8.01(b) read with s 7.32(a) respectively of the MBCA. The amended 
s 66(1) should read as follows: 
66(1) Board, directors and prescribed officers 
(a) Except as provided in section 15(7), each company must have a board of directors. 
(b) The business and affairs of a company must be managed by or under the direction 
of its board, which has the authority to exercise all of the powers and perform any of 
the functions of the company, subject to any limitation set forth in the company’s 
memorandum of incorporation or in an agreement authorized under section 15(7). 
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Section 15(7) of the new Act governing shareholders’ agreements should also be amended to 
read as follows: 
 
(a) An agreement among the company’s shareholders that complies with this section 
is effective among the shareholders and the company even though it is inconsistent 
with one or more other provisions of this Act in that it: 
(i) eliminates the board of directors or restricts the discretion or powers of the board 
of directors; 
(ii) governs the authorization or making of distributions whether or not in proportion 
to ownership of shares, subject to the limitations in section 46; 
(iii) establishes who shall be directors or officers of the company, or their terms of 
office or manner of selection or removal; 
(iv) transfers to one or more shareholders or other persons all or part of the authority 
to exercise the company’s powers or to manage the business and affairs of the 
company, including the resolution of any issue about which there exists a deadlock 
among directors or 
shareholders; 
(v) otherwise governs the exercise of the company’s powers or the management of the 
business and affairs of the company or the relationship among the shareholders, the 
directors and the company, or among any of them, and is not contrary to public 
policy. 
(b)An agreement authorized by this section that limits the discretion or powers of the 
board of directors shall relieve the directors of, and impose upon the person or 
persons in whom such discretion or powers are vested, liability for acts or omissions 
imposed by law on directors to the extent that the discretion or powers of the directors 
are limited by the agreement. 
 
The suggested amendment would ensure that a provision in a shareholders agreement could 
validly change the default division of powers in s 66(1), even in a manner that is inconsistent 
with the Act. This would provide flexibility for companies, particularly small closely held 
companies, to establish management structures that meet their specific needs in line with one 




The new s 15(7)(a)(ii) would ensure that the directors’ power to authorise 
distributions in terms of s 46 may be validly altered by a provision in a shareholders’ 
agreement. Other suggested amendments to the new Act relating to distributions are 
discussed below. 
The proposed s 15(7)(b) would ensure that the liability imposed by the law on 
company directors is appropriately assigned to the person or persons upon whom the 
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shareholders’ agreement confers the power to manage the business and affairs of the 
company in place of the board. 
7.5.2 Recommendation on distributions to shareholders 
To give companies the flexibility to validly alter the effect of s 46, regarding the directors’ 
power to authorise distributions, it is recommended that s 46(1) of the new Act be amended 
by adopting the wording in s 6.40 of the MBCA so that it reads as follows: 
46. Distributions to Shareholders  
(1)(a) A board of directors may authorize and the corporation may make distributions 
to its shareholders subject to any restrictions in the memorandum of incorporation and 
the limitations in subsections (b), (c) and (d).  
(b) A company must not make any proposed distribution unless the distribution- 
(i) is pursuant to an existing legal obligation of the company, or a court order; or 
(ii) has been authorised by a resolution of the board in terms of paragraph (a) above 
and; 
(c)  it reasonably appears that the company will satisfy the solvency and liquidity test 
immediately after completing the proposed distribution; and 
(d) the board of the company, by resolution, has acknowledged that it has applied the 
solvency and liquidity test, as set out in section 4, and reasonably concluded that the 
company will satisfy the solvency and liquidity test immediately after completing the 
proposed distribution. 
 
The proposed amendment, in particular the proposed s 46(1)(a) would make it clear that the 
power of directors to authorise distributions is subject to what is stated in the MOI. This 
empowers shareholders to determine what the directors may or may not do on behalf of the 
company in relation to distributions. It provides companies with greater scope for altering the 
effect of the current s 46 than would be possible in terms of s 15(2)(a)(iii) which, as noted in 
chapter 3
7
, limits the extent to which an unalterable provision such as s 46 can be altered by a 
provision in the MOI.  
In addition to amending s 46(1), it is recommended that s 4(2)(c) of the new Act be 
amended by adopting wording similar to that contained in s 52(4) of the New Zealand 
Companies Act,1993 in order to address the issue identified in chapter 3
8
 concerning the 
protection of the interests of preference shareholders when applying the solvency and 
liquidity test. The amended s 4(2)(c) should read as follows: 
(c) In applying the solvency and liquidity as required by this Act,  
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(i) debts includes fixed preferential returns on shares ranking ahead of those in 
respect of which a distribution is made (except where that fixed preferential return 
is expressed in the constitution as being subject to the power of the directors to 
make distributions), but does not include debts arising by reason of the 
authorisation; and 
(ii) liabilities includes the amount that would be required, if the company were to be 
deregistered after the distribution, to repay all fixed preferential amounts payable 
by the company to shareholders, at that time, or on earlier redemption (except 
where such fixed preferential amounts are expressed in the constitution as being 
subject to the power of directors to make distributions); but, subject to paragraph 
(i), does not include dividends payable in the future 
 
It is also recommended that the definition of the term ‘distribution’ in s 1 of the Act be 
amended by the addition of a paragraph (d) to the definition. The proposed paragraph (d) 
should provide that, for the purposes of paragraphs (b) and (c), the term obligation includes 
both a monetary and non-monetary obligation. This amendment would close the loophole 
noted in chapter 3.
9
 
7.5.3 Recommendation on share issues and pre-emption rights 
The limited extent to which unalterable provisions of the Act, such as s 38(1), can be 
restricted or qualified by the MOI in terms of s 15(2)(a)(iii) was highlighted in chapter 3. To 
get around the limitations of s 15(2)(a)(iii) it is recommended that s 38(1) of the new Act be 
amended so that the power of directors to issue shares is made subject to any restrictions in 
the MOI. The amended section should read as follows: 
38. Issuing shares  
(1) Subject to any restrictions contained in a company’s memorandum, the board of a 
company may resolve to issue shares of the company at any time, but only within the 
classes, and to the extent, that the shares have been authorised by or in terms of the 
company’s Memorandum of Incorporation, in accordance with section 36.  
 
It is further recommended that ss 39(1) to (3) of the Act which govern the pre-emption right 
with regard to share issues be amended so that the pre-emption right in the new Act is made 
applicable to all profit companies and not just private and personal liability companies. The 
amended ss 39(1) to (3) could be based on s 45 of the New Zealand Act and should read as 
follows: 
                                                          
9
 See discussion in para 3.4.4 in chapter 3 
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39 Pre-emptive rights 
(1) Shares issued or proposed to be issued by a company that rank or would rank as to 
voting or distribution rights, or both, equally with or prior to shares already issued by 
the company must be offered for acquisition to the holders of the shares already 
issued in a manner and on terms that would, if accepted, maintain the existing voting 
or distribution rights, or both, of those holders. 
(2) An offer under subsection (1) must remain open for acceptance for a reasonable 
time. 
(3) A company’s memorandum of incorporation may negate, limit, or modify the 
requirements of this section 
 
7.5.4 Recommendations on share repurchases 
It is recommended that s 48(2)(a) of the new Act be amended so that it provides that: 
‘Subject to section 46, a company may purchase or otherwise acquire shares issued by 
it if it is expressly permitted to do so by its memorandum of incorporation.’ 
The proposed amendment is based on an adaptation of s 58(1) of the New Zealand 
Companies Act, 1993. The terms of the amended s 48(2)(a) would enable a company to 
validly include a provision in its MOI that precludes the company from buying back its own 
shares or, impose restrictions on the exercise of the company’s power to buy back its own 
shares. The amendment obviates the need to comply with the restrictive requirements of s 
15(2)(a)(iii) when trying to limit, qualify or restrict the directors’ power to authorise share 
repurchases via the MOI. 
To protect shareholders against the abuse inherent in selective share repurchases as 
discussed in chapter 3, it is recommended that s 48 be further amended by the addition of a s 
48(2)(A) requiring that selective offers to repurchase a company’s shares must be approved 
by special resolution of the company’s shareholders, and that the company disclose relevant 
information to shareholders. The proposed s 48(2)(A) would be based on an adaptation of s 
257D of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 and would read as follows: 
(1) Where a company offers to buy-back shares issued by it from 1 more of its 
shareholders, the terms of the buy-back agreement must be approved before it is 
entered into by either: 
 (a) a special resolution passed at a general meeting of the company, with no votes 
being cast in favour of the resolution by any person whose shares are proposed to be 
bought back or by their associates; or  
(b) a resolution agreed to, at a general meeting, by all ordinary shareholders; or the 
agreement must be conditional on such an approval.  
(2) The company must include with the notice of the meeting a statement setting out 
all information known to the company that is material to the decision as to how to 
vote on the resolution. However, the company does not have to disclose information if 
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it would be unreasonable to require the company to do so because the company had 
previously disclosed the information to its shareholders. 
  
Apart from requiring disclosure in respect of selective repurchases, it is also recommended 
that s 48 be amended by the addition of a s 48(2)(B) which provides for a general disclosure 
requirement for any share buy-back offer as follows: 
(i) Before making an offer to any of its shareholders to buy-back any shares issued by it, 
a company must send to each shareholder a disclosure document that complies with 
sub-section (2) of this section. 
(ii) For the purposes of sub-section (1), a disclosure document is a document that sets out— 
(a) the nature and terms of the offer, and if made to specified shareholders, to whom it 
will be made; and 
(b) the nature and extent of any relevant interest of any director of the company in any 
shares the subject of the offer; and 
(c)  any such further information and explanation as may be necessary to enable a  
      reasonable shareholder to understand the nature and implications for the company and  
            its shareholders of the proposed acquisition. 
 
The proposed s 48(2)(B)(i) is based on an adaptation of s 61(5) of the New Zealand 
Companies Act of 1993 while s 48(2)(B)(ii) is based on an adaptation of s 62 of the same 
Act. The requirement for a disclosure document would facilitate transparency and also 
empower shareholders to protect their interests by ensuring that they are provided with 
adequate information to enable them to make informed decisions in the context of selective 
share repurchases. 
 
7.5.5 Recommendations on the derivative action 
To address the concerns noted in chapter 5 regarding the derivative action such as, the role of 
the board and, procedural concerns such as the demand requirement and, the rebuttable 
presumption that the granting of leave is not in the best interests of the company, it is 
recommended that the derivative action be streamlined and placed under the control of a 
neutral body – the courts. In particular, it is recommended that s 165 of the Act be amended 
and recast along the lines of s 261 of the UK Companies Act 2006 which reads as follows: 
“(1) A member of a company who brings a derivative claim under this Chapter must 
apply to the court for permission to continue it. 
(2) If it appears to the court that the application and the evidence filed by the applicant 
in support of it do not disclose a prima facie case for giving permission (or leave), the 
court— 
(a) must dismiss the application, and 
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(b) may make any consequential order it considers appropriate. 
(3) If the application is not dismissed under subsection (2), the court— 
(a) may give directions as to the evidence to be provided by the company, and 
(b) may adjourn the proceedings to enable the evidence to be obtained. 
(4) On hearing the application, the court may— 
(a) give permission (or leave) to continue the claim on such terms as it thinks 
fit, 
(b) refuse permission (or leave) and dismiss the claim, or 
(c) adjourn the proceedings on the application and give such directions as it 
thinks fit.” 
 
7.5.6 Recommendations on liability for share issues and 
distributions 
There is a need to rationalise the liability of directors in terms of s 77(3)(e) and the orders 
which a court may make in terms of s 77(5). The rationalisation is required to address the 
anomalous situation whereby a court could order a company, in terms of s 77(5), to 
indemnify a director who was present at a meeting, but who failed to vote against a decision 
taken at that meeting authorising inter alia a share issue or, a distribution where the director 
knew the transaction was contrary to or inconsistent with the Act. In this respect it is 
recommended that s 77(5) be amended by the deletion of paragraph b(ii)(bb).   
7.5.7 Recommendations on s 76(3)(c): duty of care, skill and 
diligence 
To address the ambiguity in s 76(3)(c) and also to ensure that the statutory duty imposes a 
stricter standard of care and skill on company directors it is recommended that the section be 
amended along the lines of the South African Banks Act 94 of 1990 so that it should read as 
follows: 
‘A director of a company, when acting in that capacity, must exercise the powers and 
perform the functions of director with the degree of care, skill and diligence that may 
reasonably be expected of a diligent person-  
(i) carrying out the same functions in relation to the company as those 
carried out by that director; and  
(ii) who possesses the general knowledge, skill and experience that may 
reasonably be expected of a person holding a similar appointment and 
carrying out similar functions as are carried out by the director and any 
such additional knowledge and skill as the director in question may 
have.’ 
 
7.5.8 Recommendations concerning the appraisal remedy 
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The recommendations that follow below are meant to provide guidelines as to how s 164 
could be amended in order to enhance the effectiveness of the appraisal remedy. Obviously 
incorporating the suggested changes would call for a relook of the whole of s 164 to ensure 
coherence throughout all its provisions. However, it is not intended to provide here a 
comprehensive presentation of how the complete and amended s 164 should read.  
In order to provide clarity concerning the standing of beneficial shareholders with 
regard to the appraisal remedy it is recommended that s 164 be amended by the addition of a 
new s 164(3)(A) modeled along the lines of s 13.03 of the MBCA. Subparagraph (a) of the 
new s 164(3)(A) would permit a registered shareholder who holds shares on behalf another – 
the beneficial shareholder – to assert appraisal rights on behalf of the beneficial shareholder. 
The provision should also make clear that the registered shareholder is allowed to assert the 
right on behalf of the beneficial shareholder only if he objects with respect to all shares of the 
class or series owned by the beneficial shareholder. This restriction serves to curb abuse of 
the appraisal remedy by beneficial shareholders who may seek to sell some, but not all, of 
their shares in the hope of extracting a higher price for their shares out of the appraisal 
process when they are in principle not against the triggering transaction.
10
 The provision 
should also require the registered shareholder who demands appraisal on behalf of a 
beneficial shareholder to notify the company of the name and address of the beneficial 
shareholder on whose behalf the demand is made. 
Subparagraph (b) of the new s 164(3)(A) would permit the beneficial shareholder to 
assert appraisal rights as to shares of any class or series held on his behalf if the beneficial 
shareholder submits to the company the registered shareholder’s written consent to the 
assertion of such rights and if he does so with respect to all shares of the class or series that 
are held on his behalf by the registered shareholder. 
The amendment suggested above would not only clarify the position of beneficial 
shareholders but, it would also bring internal coherence within the Act. Section 56(1) of the 
new Act permits, subject to a company’s MOI, the shares of a company to be held by, and 
registered in the name of, one person for the beneficial interest of another person. This is in 
                                                          
10
 See Official Commentary on s 13.03(a) of the MBCA 
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line with modern commercial practice.
11
 In the light if this it would be odd if the Act did not 
clarify the position of beneficial shareholders regarding the exercise of the appraisal right.  
With regard to the procedural requirements of the appraisal remedy, it was noted that 
a shareholder who fails to comply with the time periods prescribed by s 164 loses his 
appraisal right and that such a shareholder would not be saved by the substantial compliance 
provisions of the Act.
12
 To address this and, to prevent a situation where a shareholder could 
lose his appraisal right because of a minor deviation from the statutory procedure, it is 
recommended that s 164 be amended so that the court is given a discretion to condone non-
compliance with the statutory requirements where the deviation from procedure causes little 
or no harm to the company.
13
  
With regard to the issue of costs and delays associated with pursuing the appraisal 
right in court as discussed in chapter 6, it is imperative that our Act be improved by including 
a provision requiring a company to make a preliminary payment to the dissenting 
shareholders pending a determination of the fair value of the concerned shares by the court or 
an arbitrator. In this respect s 164(11) should be substituted by a provision modelled on s 
13.24 of the MBCA requiring the company to pay in cash to all the shareholders who 
complied with the requirements of subsections (3) to (5) the amount which the company 
estimates to be the fair value of their shares, plus interest. The proposed provision should also 
inform the qualifying shareholders that if they are dissatisfied with the amount offered by the 
company they have a right to demand further payment under the proposed subsection (12) 
(see discussion in the next paragraph) and, that if any such shareholder does not do so within 
the time period specified therein, such shareholder shall be deemed to have accepted such 
payment in full satisfaction of the company’s obligations 
Of course the inclusion of the suggested s 164(11) would necessitate amendments to 
other provisions of s 164 in order to remove references to an offer in terms of subsection (11). 
For example, subsection (12) would have to be repealed because then the offer envisaged in 
that provision would have fallen away. It is recommended that subsection (12) be substituted 
by a new provision modelled on s 13.26 of the MBCA which would spell out the procedure to 
                                                          
11
 Harry Sutherland, David B Horsely, Graham Turner et al ‘Fraser & Stewart Company Law of Canada’ 6ed 
(1993) at 575-576 
12
 See discussion in para 6.5 
13
 Jacqueline Yeats ‘The effective and proper exercise of appraisal rights under the South African Companies 
Act, 2008: developing a strategic approach through a study of comparable foreign law’ (Unpublished PhD 
thesis, UCT 2016) at para 7.5.1.4 
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be followed if a shareholder is dissatisfied with the payment made in terms of the new s 
164(11). The new s 164(12) should provide as follows: 
(i) A shareholder paid pursuant to section 164(11) who is dissatisfied with the 
amount of the payment must notify the company in writing of that 
shareholder’s estimate of the fair value of the shares and demand payment of 
that estimate plus interest (less any payment under section 164(11) 
(ii) A shareholder who fails to notify the company in writing of that shareholder’s 
demand to be paid the shareholder’s stated estimate of the fair value plus 
interest under paragraph (i) within 30 days after receiving the company’s 
payment under section 164(11) waives the right to demand payment under this 
section and shall be entitled only to the payment made in terms of section 
164(11). 
The advantages of arbitration over litigation in the context of appraisal rights were discussed 
in chapter 6 and it was shown that arbitration could address some of the issues such, as the 
costs and delays associated with litigation. Therefore it is recommended that subsection (14) 
of s 164 be amended to provide for the determination of the fair value of shares by 
arbitration. The proposed s 164(14) should be modelled along the lines of s 112A(1) of the 
New Zealand Companies Act and should read as follows: 
If a shareholder is dissatisfied with the amount paid by the company and, the 
shareholder makes a demand for payment under subsection (12) which remains 
unsettled the company shall submit the issue of the fair value of the shares for 
determination by arbitration. 
7.5.9 Recommendations on removal of directors 
To ensure that a company may remove directors, whether appointed or elected, by ordinary 
resolution of the shareholders, it is recommended that s 71(1) of the new Act be amended as 
shown below: 
(1) Despite anything to the contrary in a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation or 
rules, or any agreement between a company and a director, or between any 
shareholders and a director, a director may be removed by an ordinary resolution of 
the company’s shareholders adopted at a shareholders meeting by the persons entitled 
to exercise voting rights in an election of that director, subject to subsection (2).  
(2) Before the shareholders of a company may consider a resolution contemplated in 
subsection (1)-  
(a) the director concerned must be given notice of the meeting and the resolution, at 
least equivalent to that which a shareholder is entitled to receive, irrespective of 
whether or not the director is a shareholder of the company; and  
(b) the director must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to make a presentation, in 
person or through a representative, to the meeting, before the resolution is put to a 
vote. 
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(c) If the director was appointed by a person named in a company’s memorandum of 
incorporation in terms of s 66(4)(a)(i), the resolution to remove the director does not 
take effect until that person appoints another director to replacement the director who 
is being removed. 
 
Deleting the words that are struck out in (1) above from the current s 71(1) would eliminate 
the ambiguity in that provision as to whether directors appointed by in terms of s 66(4)(a)(i) 
can be removed ordinary resolution of the shareholders. The proposed new s 71(2)(c) would 
ensure that the interests of the party who has the right to directly appoint a director in terms 
of s 66(4)(a)(i) are protected in the event that the appointed director is removed by ordinary 
resolution of the shareholders. 
 
 It is hoped that the adoption of the above recommendations would enhance the 
protection of shareholders in light of the increased powers of directors. A key feature of the 
new Act was to provide flexibility in the management of companies, most of the proposed 
changes would provide greater flexibility for companies to establish governance 
arrangements that meet their needs in their MOIs or, by means of shareholders’ agreements, 
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